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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
ESSAYS ON MIGRATION: NEXUS WITH POLICY, TRADE, AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
by 
Michael Good 
Florida International University, 2014 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Cem Karayalcin, Major Professor 
 This dissertation analyzes the intersection of migration with public policy, 
international trade, and economic development. The first essay investigates the impact on 
internal migration for 52 different demographic groups of the recent influx of state omnibus 
immigration laws targeting undocumented immigrants in the United States. Through a 
difference-in-differences estimation, I find empirical evidence that while the demographic 
groups pinpointed as having higher percentages of undocumented immigrants certainly 
experience population and employment 'outflows' from states implementing these 
immigration laws, there is a lack of associated 'inflows' for those demographic groups 
identified by economic theory as being probable substitutes for undocumented immigrants. 
Several segments designated as probable substitutes actually experience an adverse effect 
on population and employment. 
 The second essay examines the effect that migrants have on international trade 
between states of current residence and states of origin. My analysis provides the first 
results as to the migration-trade nexus at the state level for both places of destination and 
origin, relying on a unique data set allowing the mapping of Mexican-born migrants' U.S. 
vii 
 
states of residence to Mexican states of origin. In addition to an augmented gravity model, 
I employ generalized propensity scores in examining the potential of nonlinearities in the 
migration-trade relationship, estimating statistically significant elasticities of exports to 
both in-state and neighboring-state migration. 
 The third essay analyzes the potentially enormous wage gains that may motivate 
international migration, an activity which is limited to some extent by governments across 
the entire world.  Freer human mobility and the effects of migration on the migrants 
themselves have not garnered nearly as much attention as numerous other topics related to 
the economics of migration. I present novel data collected through household interviews in 
communities both in Mexico and the United States, comparing the absolute and relative 
wage gains for interviewees with data from existing Mexican surveys. Migrants indeed 
stand to collect large net gains; average incomes increase more than fivefold immediately, 
moving from the lower deciles of origin wage distributions to the top deciles. These results 
surpass those of some of the most successful current programs of economic development. 
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CHAPTER I 
DO IMMIGRANT OUTFLOWS LEAD TO NATIVE INFLOWS? 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MIGRATORY RESPONSES TO U.S. 
STATE IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION 
 Introduction 
 The recent influx of state immigration legislation in the United States provides an 
ideal quasi-experimental setting appropriate for examining the connection between 
immigration and internal migration. Since 2006, eleven different states have enacted 
fourteen omnibus immigration laws, implementing broad restrictions in relation to issues 
affecting immigrants such as work authorization, public program benefits, education, 
human trafficking and the transport and harbor of unauthorized immigrants, identification 
and driver's license policies, and document-carrying policies. A simple analysis of the 
incentives created by these wide-reaching omnibus laws leads to an expectation of outflows 
of the undocumented immigrant population from those states implementing immigration 
laws, as well as possible inflows among other demographics not specifically targeted by 
the new laws. Anecdotal evidence certainly provides backing to this expectation of 
immigrant outflows, as there are numerous reports of large out-migrations, especially of 
the undocumented population, in states which have recently put omnibus immigration laws 
into practice.1 However, much of the same anecdotal evidence also points to a lack of 
inflows of other demographic groups into the immigrant-vacated jobs, leading to a shortage 
of workers in certain areas where the outflows have been particularly strong. The anecdotal 
                                                          
1 See Robertson (2011) for one of many articles documenting this migratory response. 
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evidence begs the empirical analysis of a simple yet important question, which is the focus 
of the present study: Do immigrant outflows lead to native inflows?  
 The approach to attack this question utilizes a straightforward, two-step process. 
First, I use microdata from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to analyze in great detail 
the pre- and post-implementation numbers relating to both population and employment of 
demographic groups targeted by the state immigration laws. By use of a difference-in-
differences estimation that exploits the natural experiment setting and employs a treatment 
and control group (the treatment being the implementation of the state immigration law), I 
am able to verify if there truly are immigrant outflows in response to the change in state 
policy. Second, using the same microdata along with the treatment and control process, I 
analyze the pre- and post-implementation numbers of the demographic groups not targeted 
by the state immigration laws, permitting the identification of any native (or documented 
immigrant) population or worker inflows (outflows) in those states experiencing targeted 
immigrant outflows.  
 The importance of the study's findings is twofold. First, the documentation of the 
actual migratory response to the surge of state immigration laws is important in its own 
right. While much anecdotal evidence has been accumulated, detailed empirical analyses 
are lacking, possibly partly due to the relative newness of this trend in immigration 
legislation and the difficulty inherent in identifying the undocumented population. Second, 
there is an established literature examining the relationship between immigration and 
internal migration responses. However, despite numerous studies, this debate laden with 
key policy implications still has no clear victor. The present study contributes to the 
ongoing debate by providing additional rigorous empirical evidence as to the relationship 
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between immigration and internal migration responses. My analysis indicates that while 
the demographic groups pinpointed as having higher percentages of undocumented 
individuals indeed experience population and employment outflows from states 
implementing these immigration laws, there is a lack of associated inflows for those 
demographic groups identified by economic theory as being probable substitutes for 
undocumented immigrants. Although minimal substitution is present, several segments of 
the population designated as probable substitutes actually experience an adverse effect on 
population and employment. 
 To my knowledge, this is the first research exploiting the implementation of state 
omnibus immigration laws to explicitly examine the question posited above: Do immigrant 
outflows lead to native inflows? Card and Dinardo (2000) asks the question 'Do immigrant 
inflows lead to native outflows?' in the very title of the article - the experiment provided 
by the implementation of the current state immigration legislation now allows for a natural 
examination of the opposite side of their question, arguably just as important. The chapter 
is most related to Raphael and Ronconi (2009), which finds a significant out-migration of 
Hispanic immigrants from states passing immigration legislation. However, while similar 
in approach, their article examines only immigration laws specifically targeting 
employment and the sample is limited to pre-2009 implementation of laws, excluding a 
majority of this paper's richer sample.  
 After providing a brief background of recent U.S. state immigration law and a 
review of the relevant economic theory, I give specifics as to the data and my empirical 
strategy. I discuss the results of the difference-in-differences estimations for the various 
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demographic groups, finally checking for sensitivity and robustness before a brief 
conclusion. 
 State Immigration Law 
 A brief overview 
 Evident from the statistics provided by the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, the recent growth in the number of state immigration laws enacted in the 
United States is astounding. Table 1.1 outlines the number of immigration laws by category 
passed by state legislatures during the period of 2005 to 2011, the number vetoed by 
governors, and the number ultimately adopted by states.2 A majority of the laws target a 
specific issue in relation to undocumented immigrants, such as work authorization, public 
program benefits, or identification and licenses. While these focused laws certainly lower 
the incentive for an undocumented immigrant to reside in the respective state (some much 
more than others), a handful of states have implemented omnibus laws that address 
multiple issues at the same time. These broad-reaching laws theoretically have the largest 
effect on any outflows of immigrants, due to their nature of affecting not only employment 
opportunities, but also possibly limiting access to food, health, and education benefits, and 
in general creating an environment in which there is a constant threat of document 
verification and subsequent deportation. While the number of states enacting these multi-
issue laws has been limited, 2011 brought a particular surge - five states enacted omnibus 
legislation, while some eight states had similar legislation pending by year's end. The 
                                                          
2 All statistics in this section are obtained from the National Conference of State Legislatures website, 
www.ncsl.org. All categories listed at www.ncsl.org are included in Table 1.1 with the exception of 
'resolutions,' due to the fact that these laws tend to have no relation to a detrimental effect on immigrants. 
Budget laws are included in the 'Miscellaneous' category. 
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Appendix lists the fourteen states having already passed omnibus laws, accompanied by a 
summary of the issues addressed in each law.  
 Theoretical impact 
 Understanding the theoretical effect of the implementation of state omnibus 
immigration laws on the population and employment numbers of undocumented 
immigrants involves a simple cost and benefit analysis. Assuming that each individual has 
some benefit and some cost corresponding to living (working) in a particular geographic 
location, state immigration laws result in an increased cost burdening each undocumented 
individual.3 The cost could take various forms: an evasion cost, a discrimination cost, or a 
psychological cost, just to name a few. If all individuals only accept positive payoffs, a 
first indicator of an individual's (re)location decision is if the associated benefit is still 
higher than the now greater cost. However, even if the total payoff remains positive, the 
relevant indicator is the comparison of that total payoff to all other available payoffs, those 
potentially realized by migration to another US state or migration to another country. 
Clearly, if other possible payoffs do not differ greatly from the payoff of the immigrant's 
state of residence before the implementation of omnibus immigration law, the extra cost 
imposed by implementation could change an individual's payoff-maximizing location, 
ultimately causing out-migration. However, if a particular location gives a pre-
implementation payoff much higher than all other options, a payoff-maximizing 
                                                          
3 Although a substantial literature examines individuals' decisions to migrate, many times detailing the 
specific associated costs and benefits at great length, I choose to lump these into one generalized cost and 
benefit for each individual for reasons of simplifying the demonstration of the theoretical impact of 
immigration law. 
6 
 
undocumented individual could rationally choose to stay in a state even after 
implementation of immigration law.  
 An additional potential impact of immigration law is the effect implementation may 
have on employers, outlined in Raphael and Ronconi (2009). Most omnibus laws include 
some measure related to employment status verification, punishing employers caught 
hiring undocumented workers. If this is the case, employers now bear a higher cost related 
to hiring this segment of the population, translating into a lower payoff for undocumented 
individuals as the probability of obtaining the benefit associated with employment 
decreases. 
 Whether or not this hypothesized outflow of immigrants in turn incentivizes a 
response from the native or documented immigrant population is a more complicated 
question, due to the fact that the answer depends on the substitutability of these groups, a 
topic that numerous studies continue to examine. As much of the undocumented population 
is relatively low-skilled, these studies generally focus on the production substitutability of 
low-skilled natives (or low-skilled, foreign-born citizens) for immigrants. Ottoviano and 
Peri (2012) estimates that natives and immigrants of similar skill in the U.S. are imperfect 
substitutes, while Borjas et al. (2008) estimates an infinite substitution, pointing to the 
perfect substitutability of these demographic groups. After finding imperfect substitution 
among similarly-skilled natives and immigrants, Card (2009) points out that those most 
affected in terms of employment by the arrival of immigrants are those immigrants who 
had previously established residence in the area under examination.  
 As the issue of substitutability continues to be debated, various additional studies 
empirically analyze the related topic of whether immigrant inflows are associated with 
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native outflows (the partner research question to the present study), often focusing on how 
these flows may in turn affect workers' wages. Studies such as Filer (1992), Frey (1995), 
Borjas et al. (1997), and Borjas (2006) contend that immigration inflows do lead to native 
outflows; on the other hand, others including Wright et al. (1997), Card (2001), Kritz and 
Gurak (2001), and Peri and Sparber (2008) argue that native outflows, if present, do not 
stem from immigration inflows.  
 One of the central economic arguments stated by immigration law supporters, that 
of 'immigrants take natives' jobs,' follows directly from the findings of the former group of 
studies. In the current context of state immigration legislation, this reasoning implies that 
if immigrants in fact emigrate to another state (or country), natives will fill those jobs that 
were previously 'taken.' In the words of omnibus immigration law author Kris Kobach, this 
implication taken literally translates into 'if you want to create a job for a US citizen 
tomorrow, deport an illegal alien today.'4 Logically, the possible inflow of natives could 
manifest itself in one of two fashions: 1) population and worker inflows of natives moving 
from other states looking to replace the immigrant-vacated positions, or 2) worker inflows 
from the native population already present in the respective state (previously either 
unemployed or not in the labor force). The former possibility alters both population and 
employment numbers; the latter possibility does not appear as a change in the native 
population, but clearly surfaces as a change in the employment numbers. Following this 
line of thinking, this expected native inflow should be especially notable in times of high 
                                                          
4 I first encountered this commentary from the Kansas Secretary of State, who doubled as immigration 
advisor to U.S. presidential candidate Mitt Romney, as reported by Univision's Noticiero Edición Nocturna 
(Nightly News Edition). Video of Kobach's related comments, as part of the Conservative Political Action 
Conference (CPAC), is readily accessible on the Internet. 
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unemployment, such as those experienced during much of the period in focus.5 
Furthermore, since the geographical unit under examination is at the state level, the 
empirical setup is particularly conducive to observing this native inflow. Borjas (2006) 
points out that larger outflow (inflow) effects as a native response to immigration are found 
'the easier that natives find it to “vote with their feet”.' If inflows are indeed stemming 
mostly from within-state individuals previously not employed, this study obtains the largest 
possible inflow observable since there is absolutely zero cost to moving. In fact, a native 
inflow into employment does not even necessarily require 'voting with their feet.' 
Considering these conditions stacking the deck in favor of observing native inflows, if 
these inflows do not accompany immigrant outflows, the economic argument supporting 
stricter immigration policy quickly loses any traction it may have had. 
 Data and Empirical Strategy 
 In detailing the different possible migratory manifestations, I examine the data from 
the CPS both in terms of population and employment for all individuals ages 20 to 60. 
Monthly microdata cover six years, allowing for analysis of the period August 2005 to 
September 2011. I classify the population and employment data according to 52 
demographic groups, forming an essential part of my empirical strategy. Demographic 
indicators include citizenship/nativity, race/ethnicity, and education. Citizenship/nativity 
divides the population into four groups: U.S. citizen/born in U.S., U.S. naturalized 
citizen/foreign-born, noncitizen/foreign-born, and noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. 
                                                          
5 Unemployment rates calculated from the CPS reflect an average of nearly 7% unemployment in states at 
respective times of omnibus law implementation. While high compared temporally to adjacent periods 
within states, the average is below the national unemployment rate average of 7.7% for the same month-
year combinations of implementation. 
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after 1982. While the first three groups are clearly mutually exclusive, noncitizen/foreign-
born and noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982 are not, intentionally allowing 
for what I call 'demographic narrowing.' Demographic narrowing is my main strategy for 
pinpointing and comparing the demographic groups most likely (not) affected by the 
implementation of immigration law; it allows for narrowing the focus from a larger group, 
such as noncitizen/foreign-born, to a smaller portion of the larger group, such as those 
foreign-born noncitizens arriving to the U.S. after 1982. The necessity arises because the 
CPS and other available data sources do not specify legal or illegal status of the noncitizen 
population. However, by use of undocumented population estimates and a well-constructed 
demographic narrowing process, I can confidently identify those groups that are 
theoretically most affected.6 As an example, the specification of noncitizen/foreign-
born/arrived to U.S. after 1982 allows for pinpointing the narrowest group most likely 
targeted by the laws in terms of citizenship/nativity status. The group should have more 
members of illegal status than the noncitizen/foreign-born because of the Immigration Act 
of 1986, which legalized the residency of any immigrant present in the U.S. prior to 1982. 
While the obvious presence of many legal residents in the 'noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived 
to U.S. after 1982' category leaves this specification far from a perfect identification of the 
undocumented population, the narrowing achieves a second-best approximation of the 
targeted population.7 
                                                          
6 Passel and Cohn (2009) outlines these estimates, signaling for example, that of the 11.9 million 
undocumented immigrants in the U.S., 76% are Hispanic. 
 
7 Achieving the 'best approximation,' i.e. exact identification of the undocumented population, through 
surveys such as the CPS may actually not be ideal for this paper's purposes. If survey participants were 
explicitly asked about legal residency status, many undocumented residents would likely not willfully 
respond to the survey, creating an even stronger tendency toward non-response from this demographic than 
that which already exists. 
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 Race/ethnicity separates individuals into four groups as well: white/non-Hispanic, 
black/non-Hispanic, Asian/non-Hispanic, and Hispanic. The specific, perhaps unorthodox 
classification marks an intentional effort to avoid potential ambiguity, given the manner in 
which the CPS race and ethnicity questions are formulated. The survey classifies race by 
the options of 'white only,' 'black only,' 'American Indian only,' 'Asian only,' 'Hawaiian 
only,' or any combinations of the above; Hispanic or non-Hispanic status is determined in 
a separate question. The problem arises from the fact that these two classifications exhibit 
overlap; nearly all individuals who identify themselves as Hispanic also identify race as 
white or black, with a lower number identifying the other race categories. If this overlap 
were not accounted for and individuals were in turn classified simply as white, black, or 
Hispanic, a majority of Hispanics would be double-counted, causing an enormous problem 
of bias. Education simply classifies people as low-skilled or high-skilled, completion of 
high school marking the upper limit of the low-skilled category.8  
 For each of the 52 demographic groups, I specify an econometric model of the 
following form: 
ࢅ࢏࢚ ൌ ࢉ ൅ ࢻ࢏ ൅ ࢽ࢚ ൅ ࢼ૚ࢀ࢘ࢋࢇ࢚࢏࢚ ൅ ࢼ૛ࡼ࢕࢙࢚࢏࢚ ൅ ࢼ૜ࢀ࢘ࢋࢇ࢚࢏࢚ࡼ࢕࢙࢚࢏࢚ ൅ ࢿ࢏࢚ 
 The fixed effects/difference-in-differences specification employs dummy variables 
for all states and month-year combinations, represented by ߙ௜ and ߛ௧, respectively. The 
placeholder ௜ܻ௧ is for the variable of interest, either population or employment of state ݅ in 
month-year ݐ for each demographic group. ܶݎ݁ܽݐ௜௧ is a dummy variable taking a value of 
one for all ݐ if state ݅ receives treatment (omnibus immigration law implementation) at any 
                                                          
8 This education dividing line is selected based on results from Card (2009) finding that 'high school 
equivalent' and 'college equivalent' workers are imperfect substitutes. 
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point in the 2005 to 2011 period. ܲ݋ݏݐ௜௧ is a dummy variable taking a value of one if for 
state ݅, period ݐ is post-treatment. In turn, ܶݎ݁ܽݐ௜௧ܲ݋ݏݐ௜௧ takes a value of one only when 
state ݅ actually receives treatment in month-year ݐ. ߙ௜ controls for any observable or 
unobservable systematic differences across states, while ߛ௧ controls for any differences 
over time that may affect all states' outcomes, such as changes to federal immigration law.9 
ߚଷ is the coefficient of interest, the difference-in-differences estimate representing the 
change in the lefthand-side variable associated with omnibus immigration law 
implementation.10 I examine population and employment of the demographic groups in 
terms of both proportions and levels. First, by expressing population (employment) as 
logarithms, I use the specified equation to estimate the percentage change in the variable 
of interest associated with state immigration law implementation. Second, I use the 
logarithm of the demographic group to state total ratio for each variable of interest to 
estimate percentage changes in the composition of population (employment) associated 
with the implementation of state immigration law.11 
                                                          
9 A potential concern may be that part of the period under examination is spanned by an economic crisis in 
the U.S.. However, any effects from the economic crisis are controlled for by the inclusion of the month-
year combination time fixed effects; furthermore, if individual states suffered more or less than other states 
due to the financial crisis, this is controlled for by the individual state fixed effects. 
 
10 While the difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) method is an attractive alternative to difference-
in-differences (DD), DDD does not improve on DD in this study's case. The inclusion in DDD of the 
within-state control group is problematic due to the fact that I expect some effect on the population and 
employment of those 'non-immigrant' demographic groups in states receiving treatment. If these groups 
were to form a within-state control group as part of the DDD estimator, the measured effect of the state 
immigration legislation would obtain an upward bias. By employing DD, I avoid this potential bias and 
therefore am able to separate out the effects on the various demographic groups and their respective 
responses to implementation of the immigration laws. 
 
11 For each ratio, the population (employment) of the specific demographic group being examined serves as 
the numerator, while the state total serves as the denominator. 
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 For each set of regressions, I define two different control groups: 1) neighboring 
states of each respective state receiving treatment and 2) all U.S. states. While use of the 
first control group permits a potential bias due to the possibility of outflows (inflows) 
affecting mainly neighboring states, this possibility seems not to have manifested itself. 
The data show only slight changes in neighboring states' population and employment after 
immigration legislation. Furthermore, this is to be expected - the immigrant outflows may 
be large especially in terms of percentages, however the associated levels result in only 
small changes for receiving states when spread out over many states of relocation. 
Nonetheless, the inclusion of the second control group, all U.S. states, allows for a simple 
comparison, theoretically minimizing any bias that may exist through use of neighboring 
states in the regional control group. I exclude states from control group consideration if 
treatment is received during or prior to the respective legislation implementation period 
under examination. For the baseline regressions, six months on either side of the 
legislation's implementation date form the legislation implementation period and enter as 
observations into the regressions, allowing for a certain amount of flexibility in capturing 
any population and employment changes that result from omnibus legislation but may not 
be captured by only examining the months immediately before and after implementation.  
 I confirm the presence of a common trend with the results of t-tests reported in 
Tables 1.2 and 1.3. For each of the six months in the period prior to implementation, a t-
test is performed comparing the portions of population from the treatment group with those 
of the control group made up by each of four demographic groups of central importance: 
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982/Hispanic/low-skilled, 
native/Hispanic/low-skilled, native/white/non-Hispanic/low-skilled, and native/black/ 
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non-Hispanic/low-skilled.12 While small differences in means are certainly present, these 
differences are minimal and not statistically significant at the 5% level, evidenced by all t-
statistics below an absolute value of 0.70 in Table 1.2 for the regional control group. Use 
of the alternative national control group results in no statistically significant differences at 
the 5% level, and all t-statistics are below an absolute value of 0.82. Given the evident 
presence of the common trend, I thereby verify the central identification assumption and 
validate the difference-in-differences estimates. 
 The nature of the state omnibus immigration legislation process presents an 
additional problem in relation to defining the point of separation for pre- and post-
treatment, due to the varying lapse of time between law enactment and implementation as 
well as various challenges to the legality of the omnibus laws (outlined in the Appendix). 
I choose the established implementation date (labelled as “effective” in the Appendix) as 
the separation between pre- and post-treatment. Legislation establishes this date at least by 
the time it is enacted, therefore giving a period on average of six months for the population 
to adjust their employment/residency plans according to their expectations. Therefore, even 
in states such as Oklahoma where legal challenges postponed complete implementation of 
the immigration legislation, these expectations and accordingly adjusted plans presumably 
still have an effect as far as population and employment movements resulting from the 
omnibus laws.  
                                                          
12 Assuming an implementation month of  ߬, ߬ െ 1 represents one month prior to implementation, ߬ െ 2 
represents two months prior to implementation, and so on. The results of t-tests for portions of employment 
are not reported, but are available upon request from the author; these results are highly similar to those of 
population. 
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 Two additional aspects of my empirical strategy address specific critiques as to the 
preciseness of difference-in-differences estimation expressed in the recent literature. First, 
by aggregating population and employment data at the state level rather than including 
individual-level observations from the CPS in the specified regressions, I avoid the 
problem of common group errors presented by multilevel data emphasized in Donald and 
Lang (2007). In addition, I follow the recommendations of Bertrand et al. (2004) in 
calculating Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by state for inference purposes, 
allowing for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states and thereby 
accounting for the serious concern of serial correlation in the data. 
 Results and Discussion 
 Of the 52 demographic groups identified by the three indicators in this study, Passel 
and Cohn's figures help point to the group of 'noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to US after 
1982/Hispanic/low-skilled' as containing the highest percentage of undocumented 
population, and in turn theoretically most likely to be negatively affected in terms of 
population and/or employment by state immigration law implementation. In documenting 
the migratory outflows associated with the state omnibus laws, I include estimates in 
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 for this narrowest demographic, as well as the following broader 
demographic divisions, in descending order of expected percentage of undocumented 
population: 'noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982/Hispanic,' 
'noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982,' 'noncitizen/foreign-born/ 
Hispanic/low-skilled,' 'noncitizen/foreign-born/Hispanic,' and 'noncitizen/foreign-born.'13 
                                                          
13 All estimates related to employment numbers are available in the Appendix. 
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 In attempting to gauge the impact of the laws and any subsequent immigrant 
movements on the behavior of other demographic groups, I focus on several segments of 
the population with no undocumented individuals that economic theory has presented as 
possible substitutes for the already-mentioned groups with the highest percentages of 
undocumented immigrants.14 Borjas et al. (2011) argues that similarly-skilled immigrants 
and natives are perfect substitutes according to U.S. labor evidence, while Card (2009) 
suggests that if immigrants and natives are imperfect substitutes, additional immigrants 
would be the group designated as nearest-to-perfect substitute for immigrants already 
present in the U.S.. I take both findings to the data in the context of my study, documenting 
the following demographic groups' population changes in Table 1.6 and employment 
changes in Table 1.7: 'native/Hispanic/low-skilled,' 'native/white, non-Hispanic/low-
skilled,' and 'native/black, non-Hispanic/low-skilled' in order to capture any native-
immigrant substitutability, and 'naturalized citizen/foreign-born/Hispanic/low-skilled' in 
order to capture any immigrant-immigrant substitutability. To further shed light on the 
population and employment movement responses to immigration law, I also include the 
total change of state population (employment) associated with implementation of the 
legislation. 
 Impacts on Population 
 Figure 1.1 gives an idea as to the migratory outflows of immigrants in terms of 
population during the implementation period of omnibus immigration legislation. 
However, although an average decline in the examined demographic's proportion is 
                                                          
14 By substitutes, I refer to the terminology used in labor economics, which identifies groups that tend to 
substitute or complement one another, classified according to characteristics such as citizenship status, 
race/ethnicity, and skill level. 
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observed in the six months after implementation, this decrease is evidence from raw data 
not yet taking advantage of the treatment and control difference-in-differences 
methodology necessary for obtaining the desired estimates of interest. Panel A of Table 4 
shows the impact on population associated with the immigration law implementation for 
those demographic groups having the highest percentages of undocumented immigrants. I 
estimate that the implementation of omnibus laws is associated with a 24.41% decrease in 
the low-skilled, Hispanic, noncitizen population arriving post-1982 to the US, when 
comparing states receiving treatment to those geographic neighbors not receiving 
treatment.15 While this group is the group weighted most heavily with undocumented 
immigrants, even the group of foreign-born noncitizens, which certainly has a much lower 
percentage of undocumented population, experiences a decline of 9.93% associated with 
the law implementation. When the alternative control group of all US states is used, 
minimizing the possible bias created by expected inflows to neighboring states, the 
magnitude of these effects are only slightly attenuated, 19.02% and 8.22%, respectively. 
Interestingly, since the total population also experiences an associated decrease, albeit 
small in magnitude, the proportion changes detailed in Panel B of Table 1.4 are smaller in 
percentage terms than their Panel A level counterparts. All estimates in Table 1.4 are 
statistically significant at the 5% level, indeed pointing to a strong outflow of 
(undocumented) immigrant population in response to the state omnibus immigration laws.  
 Estimates in Table 1.6 outline the impact on those groups identified by economic 
theory as possible substitutes for immigrant groups, therefore leading to an expectation of 
                                                          
15 The estimates reported approximate percentage changes, as population (employment) is expressed in 
logarithmic form and estimates are then multiplied by a factor of 100. 
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inflows associated with immigrant outflows. However, of the four groups examined, only 
the native, black/non-Hispanic, low-skilled group has an associated population increase, 
magnitude of 6.51%. Both native and naturalized citizen groups of low-skilled Hispanics 
actually reflect a clear population decline, losing 11.57% and 4.70% respectively. While 
these estimates are not as significant as those in Table 1.4, the evidence does point to a lack 
of 'replacement' population for the outflow of immigrants. This fact is confirmed by the 
slightly negative estimates for total state population, -0.61% when employing the regional 
control group and -0.45% when including all U.S. states. The negative impact on groups 
not targeted by omnibus legislation is a noteworthy finding, likely due to one or both of 
two possibilities. First, low-skilled, Hispanic legal immigrants (or natives) may be 
suffering a type of workplace discrimination. As some of the omnibus legislation affects 
employers directly, some employers may be more reluctant to hire any worker who fits 
whatever profile the employer may associate with undocumented workers. On the other 
hand, this result could reflect that individuals in this demographic anticipate discriminatory 
treatment as a result of the immigration laws and therefore relocate, or simply decide not 
to live and work in a place where laws could unfortunately lead to instances of racial 
profiling. An additional consideration mentioned in Raphael and Ronconi (2009) is the fact 
that some immigrant families are made up of both undocumented and documented 
immigrants, leading to the out-migration of all family members when the undocumented 
are targeted by immigration law. In either case, these figures point to a central complaint 
of opponents of the state omnibus immigration laws - that on top of the negative effect on 
undocumented immigrants, the legislation most likely has an unintended, adverse effect on 
certain segments of the legal, documented immigrant population. 
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 Impacts on Employment 
 Figure 1.2 outlines the migratory outflows of immigrants in terms of employment 
during the implementation period of omnibus immigration legislation. Panel A of Table 
1.5 displays estimates for the immigrant demographic groups' that reflect a decline in 
employment associated with implementation of the immigration laws. Estimates range 
from -20.73% to -10.62%, evidencing a notable fall in employment, however generally 
slightly smaller in magnitude than that of these same groups' population change using the 
regional control group. In line with the population estimates, use of all U.S. states as the 
control group results in employment estimates of a lower magnitude for the examined 
immigrant demographic groups, with the largest effect being -16.32% for the noncitizen, 
Hispanic, low-skilled, arrived to U.S. post-1982 group. Once again, estimates for these 
groups are statistically significant, with only that of noncitizen/Hispanic not being 
significant at least the 10% level, the majority significant at the 5% level.  
 In examining the possible substitute groups listed in Table 1.7, the estimates for 
employment highlight two important trends. First, the immigration legislation again 
appears to adversely affect segments of the population other than those groups with high 
percentages of undocumented immigrants, even groups that are hypothesized to be 
substitutes for the immigrant groups. Panel A of Table 1.7 shows a 10.89% and a 14.60% 
decrease in employment level, respectively, for native, low-skilled Hispanics and 
naturalized citizen, low-skilled Hispanics when using regional control groups. While these 
estimates do vary when changing to all U.S. states as the control group of choice, they 
remain clearly negative. The same two possibilities hypothesized above in the discussion 
of the population estimates provide the clearest explanation as to why this result obtains. 
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Second, for the group of native, low-skilled blacks (non-Hispanics), there does appear to 
be some substitute or replacement effect in terms of employment. Estimates of 7.79% and 
10.68% for the regional and overall controls, respectively, signal a positive impact on 
employment for this demographic. However, this rise in employment is not shared by 
native, low-skilled whites (non-Hispanics), and the estimates throughout Table 1.7 are 
plagued by lower significance compared with those of Table 1.5. In fact, the overall gauge 
of the impact on employment, the estimate for the state total, is slightly negative using both 
control groups, just as in the case of population. 
 Checks on Initial Estimates 
 While the above estimates paint a relatively clear picture of the migratory responses 
to state immigration law implementation, the skeptical reader may raise concerns as to 
several issues worth addressing, including the robustness, sensitivity, and reliability of the 
estimates.  
 Robustness and Sensitivity 
 To this point, results obtain through the examination of a one-year implementation 
period, including all implementing states according to their effective date even if the actual 
implementation faces delays due to legal challenges. In order to first check the robustness 
of these results, I explore what changes may occur if Oklahoma's effective date of 
November 2007 is excluded from the treatment group. As detailed in the Appendix, the 
courts initially prevented a major section of Oklahoma's omnibus law from taking effect. 
As previously explained, I include Oklahoma in the initial treatment group based on those 
expectations that accompany the effective date, even if not all sections of the omnibus 
legislation ultimately take effect on this date. However, examining a second set of 
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regressions excluding Oklahoma allows for a simple check of whether the initial results are 
unduly influenced by Oklahoma's inclusion. 
 Tables 1.8 and 1.9 clearly show that the baseline results are robust to the exclusion 
of Oklahoma's effective date from the treatment group. The coefficients displayed in Table 
1.8 show all negative estimates larger in magnitude than those of Tables 1.4 and 1.5. This 
makes logical sense, since some immigrants waiting until the last moment (the expected 
effective date) to out-migrate may have opted to remain in Oklahoma when the 
employment section of this particular legislation did not take immediate effect, resulting in 
a smaller outflow than that which would have otherwise occurred. As in Table 1.4, all 
population estimates are significant at the 5% level, however unlike Table 1.5, all 
employment estimates are now significant at the 5% level, as well. Comparing Table 1.9 
with the corresponding Tables 1.6 and 1.7, population estimates in Table 1.9 are larger in 
magnitude (both positive and negative), with no changes in sign from the previous tables. 
For example, using the regional control results in a 14.53% decrease for native, low-skilled 
Hispanics and an 11.44% increase for native, low-skilled blacks (non-Hispanics). On the 
other hand, Table 1.9 lists somewhat attenuated employment estimates for the regional 
control, all coefficients consistent in sign with the exception of native, low-skilled whites 
(non-Hispanics). Estimates for the change in total population (employment) are consistent 
with the baseline regressions, ranging from -0.36% to -0.57%, although just as before the 
estimates for 'natives' are not as significant as those for 'immigrants.' 
 Turning to the issue of timing, I examine how sensitive the results are to changing 
the length of the implementation period. Tables 1.10 and 1.11 display the estimates of 
interest given a total implementation period of 6 months in Panel A, while estimates from 
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total implementation periods of 2 years are in Panel B.16 Six-month population and 
employment coefficients from Table 1.10 are extremely similar in magnitude and 
significance to those of Tables 1.4 and 1.5, however two-year coefficients are less 
significant and attenuated in magnitude, employment estimates for foreign-born non-
citizens turning slightly positive. While the magnitude and significance vary for six-month 
estimates in Table 1.11, all signs remain consistent with those from Tables 1.6 and 1.7 
except for population estimates related to naturalized, low-skilled Hispanics. Two-year 
coefficients paint the same picture as the corresponding six-month estimates, however 
there is additional sign disagreement in the estimates for native, low-skilled blacks (non-
Hispanics). In summary, while the baseline results do show some sensitivity to altering the 
length of the examined implementation period, both the six-month and two-year samples 
confirm general trends and resulting conclusions, the six-month results even matching 
those of the baseline regressions in magnitude and significance.  
 Endogeneity Bias? 
 An important concern as to the reliability of the difference-in-differences estimates 
is the issue of endogeneity. The implementation of state omnibus immigration legislation 
must be exogenous in order for the estimates to capture the true effect on population and 
employment, free from any endogeneity bias. Raphael and Ronconi (2009) addresses this 
concern in detail, pointing to evidence from the Pew Hispanic Center's National Survey of 
Latinos (NSL) as discounting the possibility that the laws' implementation are actually 
driven by other changes, leading to a problem of endogeneity. They examine both the 
                                                          
16 These are equivalent to a pre- and post-implementation period of 3 months each and 1 year each, 
respectively, compared with the baseline regressions using a pre- and post-implementation period of 6 
months each. 
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possibility of higher levels of discriminatory attitudes as well as that of changes in levels 
of discriminatory attitudes leading to immigration law implementation; however, through 
the data provided by the NSL both of these possible arguments of endogeneity are 
discarded.  
 An additional cause of endogeneity could arise from the simple case of the 
(undocumented) immigrant population increasing in size to a certain percentage of a state's 
total population, arriving to a tipping point which in turn triggers the beginnings of the 
process of immigration law enactment and implementation.17 It is common knowledge that 
a network effect indeed exists in the migration decision, resulting in regions with high 
percentages of immigrants tending to draw more immigrants.18 However, while the 
network effect could point to a tipping point eventually obtaining, its existence is clearly 
not sufficient for the tipping point to obtain. In fact, evidence from Passel and Cohn (2009) 
refutes the tipping point theory, citing the fact that the 'undocumented immigrant 
population grew rapidly from 1991 to 2006 but has since stabilized.' Since this stabilization 
occurred prior to the influx of state omnibus immigration legislation, any hesitation as to 
endogeneity is somewhat pacified. However, to further examine this possibility, especially 
given the fact that a lag between stabilization and immigration legislation implementation 
could occur, I again examine the narrowest demographic - noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived 
to U.S. after 1982/Hispanic/ low-skilled - specifically, I examine the exact proportion of 
                                                          
17 One might imagine a different sort of tipping point, in which the (undocumented) immigrant population 
increases in size until it gains sufficient political power to in turn influence immigration policy away from 
omnibus legislation. However, I examine the tipping point in terms of triggering omnibus legislation due to 
the fact that many immigrants (clearly, undocumented immigrants) do not have voting rights in the US and 
therefore have minimal political clout. 
 
18 For a sample of the literature examining network effects and the migration decision, see McKenzie and 
Rapoport (2007). 
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each state's population made up by this group, measured one year before implementation 
of omnibus legislation. This date serves as an approximate marker for when the legislative 
process of proposing and discussing new legislation actually takes place. Figure 1.3 (Figure 
1.4) shows the corresponding proportions of population (employment) for each state 
implementing omnibus law, along with the proportions of the same demographic group for 
all other states not implementing immigration law during the same period. Table 1.12 lists 
the rank of each proportion compared to all other state counterparts for the same time 
period.  
 Confirming the evidence from Passel and Cohn (2009), there does not appear to be 
a tipping point that sets in motion the adoption of omnibus immigration legislation, as the 
proportions exhibit a wide variety in their rankings. Using regional states as a comparison 
group, Georgia, Utah, and Arizona each rank third in the population measure among their 
respective regions, however Missouri, Oklahoma, and South Carolina rank in the bottom 
half of their regions, South Carolina ranking only ninth out of eleven. Regional 
employment rankings reflect much the same, although Nebraska joins the group of low-
ranking states. Switching to all US states as a comparison group, Arizona and Utah both 
experience relatively high overall proportions of population (employment) of the targeted 
demographic group one year before implementation, however other implementing states 
can be classified as having relatively moderate or low proportions. Missouri, South 
Carolina, and Oklahoma certainly qualify as having relatively low proportions of both 
population and employment, with overall population rankings of 27, 26, and 27, 
respectively. Additionally, Nebraska's overall rank of 30 for employment is the lowest 
statistic among the legislation-implementing states.  
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 Table 1.13 outlines a further test providing evidence against the tipping point 
theory. Panel A displays the results of regressing the implementation of state immigration 
law on the one-year lag of the narrowest demographic proportion detailed above, while 
Panel B shows the results of regressing the implementation of state immigration law on the 
one-year lag of the change in the narrowest demographic proportion. Any positive 
relationship between this (change in) proportion and subsequent immigration law 
implementation should clearly appear as positive, significant coefficients in the regression 
results. However, coefficients are insignificant and imprecisely estimated, each respective 
95% confidence interval including the possibility of both a negative and a positive 
relationship between the two respective variables. Furthermore, if these estimates were 
significant and precisely estimated, the association between the variables would remain 
small in scale given the interpretation of the estimates. The highest coefficient in magnitude 
in Panel A signals that even a one-unit increase in the narrowest demographic proportion 
(not possible since the independent variable is a proportion measured between zero and 
one) is only associated with a 51% increase in the probability that a state implements 
omnibus immigration legislation. Correspondingly, the coefficient of highest magnitude in 
Panel B signals that a one-unit increase in the change of the narrowest demographic 
proportion is associated with a 24% decrease in the probability that a state implements 
omnibus legislation. 
 Together with the evidence provided by Raphael and Ronconi (2009) and Passel 
and Cohn (2009), these trends (or lack thereof) strongly signal that the tipping point theory 
is not in line with empirical fact. The identified empirical strategy and resulting estimates 
are indeed free from worries of endogeneity, thereby contributing a reliable estimation of 
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the effect of immigration legislation on population and employment of the examined 
demographic groups. 
 Conclusion 
 The estimated impact of the implementation of state omnibus immigration 
legislation on total state population and employment is consistently slightly negative, 
ranging from -0.45% to -0.61% for population and -0.52% to -0.77% for employment. 
While somewhat imprecisely measured, these estimates' 95% confidence intervals indicate 
that they are almost certainly negative in sign, leaving only a relatively small possibility of 
any positive relationship. With the exception of native, low-skilled blacks (non-Hispanics), 
there appears to be no substitution in terms of inflows from those demographic groups 
predicted by theory as being probable substitutes for the undocumented immigrant 
population. Some of these groups actually experience an adverse impact on population and 
employment associated with implementation of the immigration legislation. This adverse 
impact is in addition to the highly statistically significant immigrant outflows of up to 
nearly a quarter of the corresponding population, as large as 24.41% in terms of population 
and 20.71% in terms of employment for the examined 'immigrant' demographic groups.  
 These findings point to the fact that omnibus legislation not only has a negative 
effect on the undocumented population, but it also unintentionally harms a much broader 
segment of the population. With substitution inflows on a smaller scale than the 
corresponding outflows, the empirical evidence clearly does not support the pro-
immigration law partner statements of 'immigrants take natives' jobs' and 'if you want to 
create a job for a U.S. citizen tomorrow, deport an illegal alien today.' This combination of 
adverse effects on population and employment at three demographic levels - the 
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undocumented population, the affected 'substitute' groups that actually do not substitute, 
and the total state populations - deserves careful consideration from not only economists, 
but from the wider policymaking community as well. As increasing the welfare related to 
states' population, especially in terms of employment, is the very reason posited by 
policymakers as justification for immigration law implementation, this trifecta of adverse 
effects leaves little doubt that state omnibus immigration legislation is not completing its 
stated mission. 
 Appendix  
1. Georgia SB-529  
 • Enacted 17 April 2006; effective 1 July 2007 
 • Work authorization, penalty for human trafficking, local immigration law 
 enforcement, determination of legal status when arrested, eliminates public 
 benefits 
2. Oklahoma HB-1804 
 • Enacted 8 May 2007; effective 1 November 2007 
 • Work authorization, identification/driver's licenses, local immigration law 
 enforcement, felony to harbor/transport unauthorized immigrants, eliminates 
 public benefits 
 • Legal Challenge 
  – Employment section barred from taking effect, except for E-Verify  
  system 
3. Missouri HB-1549 
 • Enacted 7 July 2008; effective 28 August 2008 (1 January 2009) 
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 • Work authorization, identification/driver's licenses, local immigration law 
 enforcement, eliminates public benefits 
4. South Carolina HB-4400 
 • Enacted 4 June 2008; effective 4 June 2008 (except for work authorization - 
 effective 1 January 2009) 
 • Work authorization, identification/driver's licenses, local immigration law 
 enforcement, eliminates public benefits, education restrictions 
5. Utah SB-81 
 • Enacted 13 March 2008; effective 1 July 2009 
 • Work authorization, identification/driver's licenses, local immigration law 
 enforcement, eliminates public benefits 
6. Georgia HB-2 
 • Enacted 11 May 2009; effective 1 January 2010 
 • Work authorization, determination of legal status when arrested, eliminates 
 public benefits 
7. Missouri HB-390 
 • Enacted 7 July 2009; effective 7 July 2009 
 • Work authorization, public benefits, education restrictions 
8. Nebraska LB-403 
 • Enacted 8 April 2009; effective 1 October 2009 
 • Work authorization, eliminates public benefits 
9. Arizona SB-1070, HB-2162 
 • Enacted 23 April 2010; effective 29 July 10 
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 • Work authorization, local immigration law enforcement, warrantless arrest, 
 citizens can sue agencies for nocompliance, document-carrying policy 
 • Legal challenge by U.S. Department of Justice 
  – Three provisions preliminarily barred from taking effect 
  – Pending appeal by Arizona governor Jan Brewer 
10. Utah H116, H466, H469, H497 
 • Enacted 15 March 2011; effective  
 • Work authorization, immigrant integration, proposed temporary worker program 
 by 2013 
 • Legal challenge by Utah Coalition of La Raza 
 – H497 temporarily restrained 
11. Georgia HB-87 
 • Enacted 13 May 2011; effective 1 July 2011 (except public benefits - effective 1 
 July 2012) 
 • Work authorization, local immigration law enforcement, eliminates public 
 benefits 
 • Legal challenge by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights et al. 
  – Two provisions enjoined preliminarily 
12. Indiana SB-590 
 • Enacted 10 May 2011; effective 1 July 2011 
 • Work authorization, eliminates public benefits, requests reimbursement of 
 'immigrant cost' from federal government  
 • Legal challenge by Ingrid Buquer, et al. 
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  – Two provisions enjoined preliminarily 
13. Alabama HB-56 
 • Enacted 9 June 2011; effective 1 September 2011 
 • Work authorization, local immigration law enforcement, felony to harbor/rent to 
 unauthorized immigrants, document-carrying policy, questioning of legal status in 
 public schools 
 • Legal challenge by US Department of Justice 
  – Two provisions barred from taking effect 14 October 2011 
14. South Carolina S-20 
 • Enacted 27 June 2011; effective 1 January 2012 
 • Work authorization, identification/driver's licenses, eliminates public benefits, 
 felony to harbor/rent to unauthorized immigrants 
 • Legal challenge by US Department of Justice 
  – Pending challenge filed 31 October 2011 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1. Enacted state immigration laws: 2005 to 2011 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Issue     2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Education    3 3 22 12 27 17 20 
Employment    5 14 29 19 21 27 27 
Health     0 0 14 11 28 17 23 
Human Trafficking   9 13 18 5 16 8 5 
ID/Driver’s License   10 6 40 32 46 26 27 
Law Enforcement   5 8 16 12 16 37 39 
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Miscellaneous    7 11 17 38 46 69 31 
Omnibus    0 1 1 3 3 2 6 
Public Benefits   5 10 33 9 15 9 15 
Voting     1 6 0 1 4 6 4 
Total Passed by Legislature  45 72 190 142 222 218 197 
Vetoed by Governor   6 6 12 3 20 10 15 
Total Enacted    39 66 178 139 202 208 182 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2. Pre-implementation characteristics of states, regional control 
________________________________________________________________________ 
      Treatment group Control group (regional) 
Time prior to implementation   Mean   Std. error Mean Std. error  T-test 
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to US after 1982/Hispanic/low-skilled 
߬ െ 6      3.13   0.87  3.11 0.32   -0.02 
߬ െ 5      3.48   0.93  3.08 0.31   -0.40 
߬ െ 4      3.57   0.94  3.01 0.30   -0.56 
߬ െ 3      3.50   0.95  3.01 0.31   -0.49 
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߬ െ 2      3.52   1.02  3.07 0.31   -0.44 
߬ െ 1      3.30   0.81  3.11 0.31   -0.19 
Native/Hispanic/low-skilled 
߬ െ 6      2.69   1.52  2.55 0.47   -0.09 
߬ െ 5      2.34   1.24  2.49 0.45   0.10 
߬ െ 4      2.55   1.38  2.43 0.44   -0.08 
߬ െ 3      2.08   1.01  2.48 0.46   0.27 
߬ െ 2      2.11   0.96  2.52 0.48   0.27 
߬ െ 1      2.25    1.19  2.62 0.49   0.24 
Native/white, non-Hispanic/low-skilled 
߬ െ 6      24.80   2.35  26.93 1.06   0.62 
߬ െ 5      24.39   2.22  26.80 1.06   0.70 
߬ െ 4      24.91   2.51  26.75 1.04   0.54 
߬ െ 3      26.47   2.49  26.77 1.03   0.09 
߬ െ 2      25.97   2.42  26.92 1.05   0.28 
߬ െ 1      26.11   2.51  27.02 1.07   0.26 
Native/black, non-Hispanic/low-skilled 
߬ െ 6      5.31   2.13  5.47 0.71   0.07 
߬ െ 5      5.61   2.39  5.58 0.73   -0.01 
߬ െ 4      5.92   2.41  5.53 0.72   -0.16 
߬ െ 3      6.01   2.39  5.42 0.71   -0.25 
߬ െ 2      5.99   2.47  5.37 0.71   -0.26 
߬ െ 1      5.72   2.36  5.29 0.69   -0.19 
Notes: Means and standard errors express the percentage of each demographic group in the respective total 
state populations (population shares multiplied by 100). Time prior to implementation corresponds to an 
implementation month of ߬, ߬ െ 1 is one month prior, ߬ െ 2 is two months prior, etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.3. Pre-implementation characteristics of states, national control 
________________________________________________________________________ 
      Treatment group Control group (national) 
Time prior to implementation   Mean   Std. error Mean Std. error  T-test 
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to US after 1982/Hispanic/low-skilled 
߬ െ 6      3.13   0.87  3.05 0.27   -0.08 
߬ െ 5      3.48   0.93  3.04 0.15   -0.40 
߬ െ 4      3.57   0.94  2.94 0.15   -0.60  
߬ െ 3      3.50   0.95  2.94 0.15   -0.54 
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߬ െ 2      3.52   1.02  3.00 0.15   -0.46 
߬ െ 1      3.30   0.81  3.01 0.15   -0.30 
Native/Hispanic/low-skilled 
߬ െ 6      2.69   1.52  2.39 0.32   -0.24 
߬ െ 5      2.34   1.24  2.39 0.18   0.01 
߬ െ 4      2.55   1.38  2.38 0.18   -0.05 
߬ െ 3      2.08   1.01  2.38 0.19   0.16 
߬ െ 2      2.11   0.96  2.38 0.18   0.17 
߬ െ 1      2.25    1.19  2.45 0.19   0.36 
Native/white, non-Hispanic/low-skilled 
߬ െ 6      24.80   2.35  26.32 0.51   0.44 
߬ െ 5      24.39   2.22  26.31 0.51   0.59 
߬ െ 4      24.91   2.51  26.28 0.51   0.34 
߬ െ 3      26.47   2.49  26.15 0.51   -0.03 
߬ െ 2      25.97   2.42  26.18 0.52   0.06 
߬ െ 1      26.11   2.51  26.23 0.52   0.04 
Native/black, non-Hispanic/low-skilled 
߬ െ 6      5.31   2.13  4.51 0.27   -0.43 
߬ െ 5      5.61   2.39  4.59 0.28   -0.56 
߬ െ 4      5.92   2.41  4.55 0.28   -0.73 
߬ െ 3      6.01   2.39  4.49 0.27   -0.81 
߬ െ 2      5.99   2.47  4.58 0.28   -0.82 
߬ െ 1      5.72   2.36  4.46 0.27   -0.67 
Notes: Means and standard errors express the percentage of each demographic group in the respective total 
state populations (population shares multiplied by 100). Time prior to implementation corresponds to an 
implementation month of ߬, ߬ െ 1 is one month prior, ߬ െ 2 is two months prior, etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.4. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus 
immigration laws on population: immigrants 
A. 100 ൈ ݈݊(population level) B.  100 ൈ ݈݊(population proportion) 
              (1)                  (2)   (1)  (2) 
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982/Hispanic/low-skilled 
ߚଷ   -24.41  -19.02   -23.75  -18.51  ݏ. ݁.   (6.59)  (6.75)   (6.59)  (6.75) 
ܴଶ   0.96  0.96   0.90  0.90  
݊   901  3676   901  3676 
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982/Hispanic 
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ߚଷ   -22.92  -19.27   -22.26  -18.79 ݏ. ݁.   (6.59)  (6.78)   (6.60)  (6.79) 
ܴଶ   0.97  0.97   0.93  0.91  
݊   910  3763   910  3763 
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982 
ߚଷ   -14.03  -11.39   -13.42  -10.94  ݏ. ݁.   (4.37)  (4.02)   (4.38)  (4.08) 
ܴଶ   0.98  0.98   0.92  0.93  
݊   924  3874   924  3874 
Noncitizen/foreign-born/Hispanic/low-skilled 
ߚଷ   -19.57  -14.42   -18.92  -13.92 ݏ. ݁.   (5.96)  (5.89)   (5.96)  (5.89) 
ܴଶ   0.97  0.97   0.91  0.91  
݊   909  3707   909  3707 
Noncitizen/foreign-born/Hispanic 
ߚଷ   -18.36  -14.75   -17.71  -14.28 ݏ. ݁.   (5.92)  (5.93)   (5.92)  (5.93) 
ܴଶ   0.98  0.97   0.93  0.92  
݊   913  3771   913  3771 
Noncitizen/foreign-born 
ߚଷ   -9.93  -8.22   -9.33  -7.77 ݏ. ݁.   (3.92)  (3.54)   (3.92)  (3.58) 
ܴଶ   0.98  0.98   0.93  0.93  
݊   924  3874   924  3874 
Control  Region  All   Region  All 
Notes: Panel A (B): Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression with the (proportion of the) log of 
population of the corresponding demographic group for state-month-year combinations as the dependent 
variable. Population includes all CPS data (using given sampling weights) for individuals ages 20 to 60. All 
regressions include state and month-year effects, controlling for any existing systematic differences across 
states as well as any differences over time that may affect all states' outcomes. Column (1) reports estimates 
using the regional control groups, while column (2) employs all U.S. states as a control. Huber-White robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses, allowing for unrestricted error correlations across observations 
within states. States having previously adopted omnibus legislation are excluded from the control groups. 
The estimate reported is the interaction between the indicator for 1 to 6 months post-implementation and the 
treatment indicator.  
Table 1.5. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus 
immigration laws on employment: immigrants 
A. 100 ൈ ݈݊(employment level)       B. 100 ൈ ݈݊(employment proportion) 
              (1)                  (2)   (1)  (2) 
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982/Hispanic/low-skilled 
ߚଷ   -20.73  -16.32   -21.17  -17.03 ݏ. ݁.   (7.34)  (7.08)   (7.22)  (7.08) 
ܴଶ   0.95  0.96   0.89  0.88  
݊   899  3627   899  3627 
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982/Hispanic 
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ߚଷ   -19.52  -16.42   -19.96  -17.16 ݏ. ݁.   (7.55)  (7.25)   (7.44)  (7.20) 
ܴଶ   0.96  0.96   0.90  0.89  
݊   904  3715   904  3715 
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982 
ߚଷ   -12.89  -9.12   -13.41  -9.89  ݏ. ݁.   (4.98)  (4.50)   (4.83)  (4.45) 
ܴଶ   0.98  0.98   0.91  0.92  
݊   923  3870   923  3870 
Noncitizen/foreign-born/Hispanic/low-skilled 
ߚଷ   -16.59  -13.92   -17.03  -14.63 ݏ. ݁.   (6.61)  (6.18)   (6.46)  (6.17) 
ܴଶ   0.96  0.96   0.90  0.89  
݊   907  3670   907  3670 
Noncitizen/foreign-born/Hispanic 
ߚଷ   -15.23  -13.29   -15.67  -14.02 ݏ. ݁.   (6.78)  (6.37)   (6.65)  (6.31) 
ܴଶ   0.97  0.97   0.91  0.90  
݊   907  3731   907  3731 
Noncitizen/foreign-born 
ߚଷ   -10.62  -7.90   -11.14  -8.67 ݏ. ݁.   (4.48)  (4.07)   (4.33)  (4.00) 
ܴଶ   0.98  0.98   0.92  0.93  
݊   924  3871   924  3871 
Control  Region  All   Region  All 
Notes: Panel A (B): Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression with the (proportion of the) log of 
employment of the corresponding demographic group for state-month-year combinations as the dependent 
variable. Employment includes all CPS data (using given sampling weights) for individuals ages 20 to 60. 
All regressions include state and month-year effects, controlling for any existing systematic differences 
across states as well as any differences over time that may affect all states' outcomes. Column (1) reports 
estimates using the regional control groups, while column (2) employs all U.S. states as a control. Huber-
White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, allowing for unrestricted error correlations across 
observations within states. States having previously adopted omnibus legislation are excluded from the 
control groups. The estimate reported is the interaction between the indicator for 1 to 6 months post-
implementation and the treatment indicator. 
Table 1.6. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus 
immigration laws on population: natives 
A. 100 ൈ ݈݊(population level) B.  100 ൈ ݈݊(population proportion) 
              (1)                  (2)   (1)  (2) 
Native/Hispanic/low-skilled 
ߚଷ   -11.57  -7.16   -10.97  -6.71 ݏ. ݁.   (7.28)  (6.92)   (7.32)  (6.97) 
ܴଶ   0.95  0.96   0.92  0.91  
݊   886  3791   886  3791 
Native/white, non-Hispanic/low-skilled 
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ߚଷ   -0.93  -0.36   -0.32  0.09 ݏ. ݁.   (1.18)  (1.21)   (1.14)  (1.24) 
ܴଶ   0.99  0.99   0.98  0.98  
݊   924  3876   924  3876 
Native/black, non-Hispanic/low-skilled 
ߚଷ   6.51  5.80   7.11  6.23 ݏ. ݁.   (5.40)  (5.24)   (5.30)  (5.11) 
ܴଶ   0.98  0.98   0.96  0.95  
݊   894  3715   894  3715 
Naturalized citizen/foreign-born/Hispanic/low-skilled 
ߚଷ   -4.70  -7.68   -3.99  -7.22 ݏ. ݁.   (8.36)  (8.08)   (8.27)  (7.96) 
ܴଶ   0.93  0.93   0.83  0.81  
݊   816  3483   816  3483 
Total 
ߚଷ   -0.61  -0.45   ---  --- ݏ. ݁.   (0.38)  (0.46)   ---  --- 
ܴଶ   0.99  0.99   ---  ---  
݊   924  3876   ---  ---
________________________________________________________________________ 
Control  Region  All   Region  All 
Notes: Panel A (B): Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression with the (proportion of the) log of 
population of the corresponding demographic group for state-month-year combinations as the dependent 
variable. Population includes all CPS data (using given sampling weights) for individuals ages 20 to 60. All 
regressions include state and month-year effects, controlling for any existing systematic differences across 
states as well as any differences over time that may affect all states' outcomes. Column (1) reports estimates 
using the regional control groups, while column (2) employs all U.S. states as a control. Huber-White robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses, allowing for unrestricted error correlations across observations 
within states. States having previously adopted omnibus legislation are excluded from the control groups. 
The estimate reported is the interaction between the indicator for 1 to 6 months post-implementation and the 
treatment indicator. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.7. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus 
immigration laws on employment: natives 
A. 100 ൈ ݈݊(employment level)     B.  100 ൈ ݈݊(employment proportion) 
              (1)                  (2)   (1)  (2) 
Native/Hispanic/low-skilled 
ߚଷ   -10.89  -4.05   -11.46  -4.82 ݏ. ݁.   (10.28)  (10.45)   (10.30)  (10.54) 
ܴଶ   0.94  0.95   0.90  0.89  
݊   872  3735   872  3735 
Native/white, non-Hispanic/low-skilled 
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ߚଷ   0.73  2.10   0.21  1.33 ݏ. ݁.   (1.44)  (1.36)   (1.35)  (1.30) 
ܴଶ   0.99  0.99   0.97  0.97  
݊   924  3876   924  3876 
Native/black, non-Hispanic/low-skilled 
ߚଷ   7.79  10.68   7.24  9.93 ݏ. ݁.   (6.54)  (5.80)   (6.56)  (5.74) 
ܴଶ   0.97  0.97   0.95  0.93  
݊   872  3612   872  3612 
Naturalized citizen/foreign-born/Hispanic/low-skilled 
ߚଷ   -14.60  -16.48   -15.14  -17.47 ݏ. ݁.   (9.06)  (7.84)   (8.93)  (7.79) 
ܴଶ   0.92  0.92   0.83  0.79  
݊   826  3397   826  3397 
Total 
ߚଷ   -0.52  -0.77   ---  --- ݏ. ݁.   (0.58)  (0.58)   ---  --- 
ܴଶ   0.99  0.99   ---  ---  
݊   924  3876   ---  --- 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Control  Region  All   Region  All 
Notes: Panel A (B): Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression with the (proportion of the) log of 
employment of the corresponding demographic group for state-month-year combinations as the dependent 
variable. Employment includes all CPS data (using given sampling weights) for individuals ages 20 to 60. 
All regressions include state and month-year effects, controlling for any existing systematic differences 
across states as well as any differences over time that may affect all states' outcomes. Column (1) reports 
estimates using the regional control groups, while column (2) employs all U.S. states as a control. Huber-
White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, allowing for unrestricted error correlations across 
observations within states. States having previously adopted omnibus legislation are excluded from the 
control groups. The estimate reported is the interaction between the indicator for 1 to 6 months post-
implementation and the treatment indicator. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.8. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus 
immigration laws on population and employment (no Oklahoma): immigrants 
   A.  Population    B.  Employment 
              (1)                  (2)   (1)  (2) 
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982/Hispanic/low-skilled 
ߚଷ   -31.05  -26.25   -19.37  -18.01 ݏ. ݁.   (6.47)  (6.84)   (6.72)  (7.85) 
ܴଶ   0.97  0.96   0.96  0.96  
݊   781  3117   779  3073 
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982/Hispanic 
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ߚଷ   -28.88  -25.41   -18.55  -18.58 ݏ. ݁.   (6.71)  (7.12)   (7.06)  (8.06) 
ܴଶ   0.98  0.97   0.97  0.96  
݊   790  3189   784  3149 
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982 
ߚଷ   -16.49  -14.53   -12.60  -11.17 ݏ. ݁.   (4.59)  (4.13)   (4.79)  (4.66) 
ܴଶ   0.98  0.98   0.98  0.98  
݊   804  3286   803  3282 
Noncitizen/foreign-born/Hispanic/low-skilled 
ߚଷ   -27.38  -23.01   -15.54  -14.97 ݏ. ݁.   (5.80)  (5.85)   (6.17)  (6.85) 
ܴଶ   0.97  0.97   0.97  0.96  
݊   789  3147   787  3113 
Noncitizen/foreign-born/Hispanic 
ߚଷ   -25.27  -22.19   -14.45  -14.82 ݏ. ݁.   (5.95)  (6.14)   (6.41)  (7.08) 
ܴଶ   0.98  0.97   0.97  0.97 
݊   793  3196   787  3162 
Noncitizen/foreign-born 
ߚଷ   -13.24  -12.30   -10.42  -9.97 ݏ. ݁.   (4.09)  (3.58)   (4.33)  (4.19) 
ܴଶ   0.98  0.98   0.98  0.98  
݊   804  3286   804  3283 
Control  Region  All   Region  All 
Notes: Estimates correspond to those found in Tables 1.4 and 1.5, excluding Oklahoma's effective date of 
November 2007 from the treatment group. In addition, I report only population and employment levels, not 
proportions. Panel A displays estimates associated with population, while Panel B displays estimates 
associated with employment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.9. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus 
immigration laws on population and employment (no Oklahoma): natives 
   A.  Population    B.  Employment 
              (1)                  (2)   (1)  (2) 
Native/Hispanic/low-skilled 
ߚଷ   -14.53  -11.49   -11.27  -10.71 ݏ. ݁.   (7.88)  (7.47)   (10.17)  (9.89) 
ܴଶ   0.95  0.96   0.94  0.95  
݊   774  3223   761  3173 
Native/white, non-Hispanic/low-skilled 
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ߚଷ   -0.67  -0.24   0.85  1.28 ݏ. ݁.   (1.23)  (1.39)   (1.41)  (1.45) 
ܴଶ   0.99  0.99   0.99  0.99  
݊   804  3288   804  3288 
Native/black, non-Hispanic/low-skilled 
ߚଷ   11.44  8.58   8.18  12.66 ݏ. ݁.   (6.08)  (5.96)   (6.64)  (6.64) 
ܴଶ   0.98  0.98   0.97  0.97  
݊   774  3159   753  3069 
Naturalized citizen/foreign-born/Hispanic/low-skilled 
ߚଷ   -6.25  -10.27   -11.65  -17.00 ݏ. ݁.   (8.79)  (8.05)   (8.55)  (7.94) 
ܴଶ   0.93  0.93   0.92  0.92  
݊   707  2961   694  2882 
Total 
ߚଷ   -0.45  -0.36   -0.57  -0.47 ݏ. ݁.   (0.42)  (0.49)   (0.57)  (0.59) 
ܴଶ   0.99  0.99   0.99  0.99 
݊   804  3288   804  3288 
Control  Region  All   Region  All 
Notes: Estimates correspond to those found in Tables 1.6 and 1.7, excluding Oklahoma's effective date of 
November 2007 from the treatment group. In addition, I report only population and employment levels, not 
proportions. Panel A displays estimates associated with population, while Panel B displays estimates 
associated with employment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.10. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus 
immigration laws on population and employment: immigrants 
A. Six-month implementation period   B. Two-year implementation period 
  Population  Employment      Population  Employment 
(1)       (2)  (3)       (4)      (1)       (2)  (3)       (4)     
________________________________________________________________________                        
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982/Hispanic/low-skilled 
ߚଷ    -24.75  -19.29  -10.09  -14.60      -7.11    -6.38 -4.63    -2.38 ݏ. ݁.    (9.54)   (10.57) (8.81)   (10.38)     (5.08)   (5.23)        (5.95)   (6.19) 
ܴଶ    0.97      0.97              0.96      0.96          0.96     0.96           0.95      0.96 
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݊    454       1846             457       1817         1751    7216          1737     7117 
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982/Hispanic 
ߚଷ    -21.97  -16.54  -12.10  -16.89      -8.26    -8.96 -6.51    -5.75 ݏ. ݁.    (9.38)   (10.70) (8.93)   (10.12)     (5.11)   (5.08)        (6.05)   (6.13) 
ܴଶ    0.98      0.97              0.97      0.96          0.97     0.97           0.95      0.96 
݊    459       1883             459       1854         1765    7392          1747     7285 
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982 
ߚଷ    -10.90  -8.71   -9.55     -11.24      -5.07    -4.17 -2.50    -2.41 ݏ. ݁.    (6.25)   (5.86) (6.46)   (5.89)       (3.15)   (3.04)        (3.59)   (3.55) 
ܴଶ    0.98      0.98              0.98      0.98          0.98     0.98           0.98      0.98 
݊    462       1936             462       1934         1801    7629          1795     7617 
Noncitizen/foreign-born/Hispanic/low-skilled 
ߚଷ    -22.28  -17.71  -10.85  -14.74      -3.60    -2.84 -1.10    -0.86 ݏ. ݁.    (8.54)   (9.05)  (8.40)   (9.21)      (4.56)   (4.65)         (5.24)   (5.41) 
ܴଶ    0.97      0.97              0.97      0.96          0.96     0.97           0.95      0.96 
݊    455       1860             460       1839         1760    7263          1747     7178 
Noncitizen/foreign-born/Hispanic 
ߚଷ    -19.32  -14.56  -11.59  -15.53      -5.27    -5.77 -3.43    -2.62 ݏ. ݁.    (8.24)   (9.23) (8.20)   (9.15)       (4.52)   (4.47)        (5.35)   (5.40) 
ܴଶ    0.98      0.97              0.97      0.97          0.97     0.97           0.96      0.96 
݊    459       1886             460       1863         1768    7405          1751     7314 
Noncitizen/foreign-born 
ߚଷ    -8.60    -7.51   -8.10    -10.36      -1.98    -1.34 0.42      0.31 ݏ. ݁.    (5.57)   (5.19) (5.76)   (5.49)       (2.84)   (2.71)        (3.27)   (3.21) 
ܴଶ    0.98      0.98              0.98      0.98          0.98     0.98           0.98      0.98 
݊    462       1936             462       1934         1801    7629          1798     7623 
Control   Region  All    Region   All       Region  All Region  All 
Notes: Estimates correspond to those found in Tables 1.4 and 1.5, however resulting from either six-month 
or two-year total implementation periods. Panel A displays estimates associated the six-month window, while 
Panel B displays estimates associated with the two-year window. I report only population and employment 
levels, not proportions. 
 
 
 
Table 1.11. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus 
immigration laws on population and employment: natives 
A. Six-month implementation period   B. Two-year implementation period 
  Population  Employment      Population  Employment 
(1)       (2)  (3)       (4)      (1)       (2)  (3)       (4)     
________________________________________________________________________                        
Native/Hispanic/low-skilled 
ߚଷ    -24.60  -21.30  -2.45    -12.28      -4.75    -2.56 -7.98    -5.70 ݏ. ݁.    (10.57) (9.87) (13.58) (13.32)     (6.20)   (5.91)        (7.12)   (6.73) 
ܴଶ    0.96      0.96              0.96      0.96          0.95     0.96           0.94      0.95 
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݊    446       1900             449       1875         1729    7463          1701     7354 
Native/white, non-Hispanic/low-skilled 
ߚଷ    -3.23    -2.89    -2.72    -0.30      -0.59    -0.43 -1.55    -1.40 ݏ. ݁.    (1.37)   (1.61) (2.27)   (2.02)       (0.90)   (0.89)        (1.07)   (1.04) 
ܴଶ    0.99      0.99              0.99      0.99          0.99     0.99           0.99      0.99 
݊    462       1938             462       1938         1801    7632          1799     7632 
Native/black, non-Hispanic/low-skilled 
ߚଷ    5.10      4.16   13.17    15.59       0.47    -1.75 0.33      -0.05 ݏ. ݁.    (7.81)   (7.27) (10.62) (8.54)       (4.20)   (4.08)        (4.73)   (4.68) 
ܴଶ    0.98      0.98              0.97      0.97          0.98     0.98           0.97      0.97 
݊    448       1858             433       1818         1743    7329          1696     7104 
Naturalized citizen/foreign-born/Hispanic/low-skilled 
ߚଷ    6.51      6.64              -1.05    -3.15       8.55     4.03  -1.81     5.97 ݏ. ݁.    (11.49) (11.63)  (12.22) (12.40)     (6.20)   (5.83)        (3.05)   (6.38) 
ܴଶ    0.93      0.93              0.94      0.92          0.92     0.93           0.91      0.92 
݊    411       1735             417       1691         1589    6818          1565     6618 
Total 
ߚଷ    -0.65    -0.54    -0.45    -1.04       0.06     0.09 0.26      0.12 ݏ. ݁.    (0.43)   (0.58) (0.62)   (0.50)       (0.28)   (0.34)        (0.43)   (0.44) 
ܴଶ    0.99      0.99              0.99      0.99          0.99     0.99           0.99      0.99 
݊    462       1938             462       1938         1801    7632          1799     7632 
Control   Region  All    Region   All       Region  All Region  All 
Notes: Estimates correspond to those found in Tables 1.6 and 1.7, however resulting from either six-month 
or two-year total implementation periods. Panel A displays estimates associated with the six-month window, 
while Panel B displays estimates associated with the two-year window. I report only population and 
employment levels, not proportions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.12. Rankings one year before implementation 
________________________________________________________________________ 
State     Population   Employment 
Georgia    3/12 9/49   3/12 8/49 
Oklahoma    7/10 27/49   8/10 28/49 
Missouri    6/11 27/44   8/11 25/44 
South Carolina   9/11 26/44   8/11 25/44 
Utah     3/10 4/44   3/10 4/44 
Nebraska    4/11 21/44   7/11 30/44 
Arizona    3/10 4/44   3/10 5/44 
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Group of Comparison   Region  All   Region  All 
Notes: Population (employment) is measured as the proportion of low-skilled, Hispanic immigrants arriving 
to the US after 1982 among the total population (employed) in each state (ages 20 to 60), with a ranking of 
one designating the highest proportion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.13. Estimates of the impact of the narrowest demographic on state 
immigration legislation implementation 
 A. Percentage of                          B. Change in percentage of 
        narrowest demographic           narrowest demographic 
  Population  Employment      Population  Employment 
(1)       (2)  (3)       (4)      (1)       (2)  (3)       (4)     
________________________________________________________________________                        
Coefficient   0.51      0.15     0.34      0.09      -0.24    -0.05 -0.22    -0.04 
ݏ. ݁.    (0.40)   (0.10) (0.44)   (0.11)       (0.31)   (0.08)        (0.34)   (0.08) 
95% bounds:     
     Lower   -0.27    -0.04             -0.53    -0.12         -0.85   -0.19          -0.89     0.20 
     Upper   1.28      0.33              1.21      0.29          0.37    0.10            0.45      0.12 
Control   Region  All               Region  All           Region  All           Region  All 
Notes: Each estimate is from an OLS regression with the dummy variable for omnibus immigration 
legislation implementation as the dependent variable. Reported estimates have the following interpretation 
for Panel A: a one unit increase in the percentage of the narrowest demographic in total state population 
(employment) is associated with a 100%*coefficient increase in the probability of state immigration 
legislation implementation. Reported estimates have the following interpretation for Panel B: a one unit 
increase in the change in the percentage of the narrowest demographic in total state population (employment) 
is associated with a 100%*coefficient increase in the probability of state immigration legislation 
implementation. 
 
Figure 1.1. Population before and after implementation: narrowest demographic 
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Notes: Population is measured as the proportion of low-skilled, Hispanic immigrants arriving to the US after 
1982 in the total state population (ages 20 to 60). Proportions displayed are measured during the one-year 
implementation period, consisting of six months before and after the implementation date of state omnibus 
immigration legislation. Implementation month-year combinations are indicated in the middle of the x-axis 
of each panel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Employment before and after implementation: narrowest demographic 
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Notes: Employment is measured as the proportion of low-skilled, Hispanic immigrants arriving to the US 
after 1982 among the total employed in each state (ages 20 to 60). Proportions displayed are measured during 
the one-year implementation period, consisting of six months before and after the implementation date of 
state omnibus immigration legislation. Implementation month-year combinations are indicated in the middle 
of the x-axis of each panel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Population at implementation: narrowest demographic 
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Notes: Population is measured as the proportion of low-skilled, Hispanic immigrants arriving to the US after 
1982 in the total state population (ages 20 to 60). Proportions displayed are measured one year before 
implementation of omnibus immigration law for each state implementing legislation, as well as the 
corresponding non-implementing states for each given implementation period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4. Employment at implementation: narrowest demographic 
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Notes: Employment is measured as the proportion of low-skilled, Hispanic immigrants arriving to the US 
after 1982 among the total employed in each state (ages 20 to 60). Proportions displayed are measured one 
year before implementation of omnibus immigration law for each state implementing legislation, as well as 
the corresponding non-implementing states for each given implementation period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
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GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY AND THE PRO-TRADE EFFECT OF 
MIGRATION: STATE-LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM MEXICAN MIGRANTS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
 Introduction 
 Recent studies emphasize the link between migration and trade, both through 
theoretical models and empirical evidence. From the seminal works of Gould (1994) and 
Head and Ries (1998) to more recent articles such as Aleksynska and Peri (2011), Kugler 
and Rapoport (2011) and Hatzigeorgiou and Lodefalk (2011), all point to the same general 
conclusion: migrants do indeed promote international trade between the destination and 
origin countries. The robust positive relationship between human and goods mobility 
across studies is especially noteworthy given the variety of approaches employed and the 
number of countries studied. While most studies use a standard gravity model augmented 
with a migration variable as well as various controls for bilateral trade costs, specific 
methods vary, including pooled cross section or panel data OLS with fixed effects, 2SLS 
and generalized propensity scores. The US and Canada garner the majority of attention in 
terms of country-specific studies, focusing on migrants to the destination country and the 
subsequent trade from the destination country to all other countries; however, studies have 
also focused on the UK, Spain, Denmark and Bolivia, among others.19 Furthermore, the 
geographic unit under examination varies, many measuring links at the country-country 
level while others narrow the focus to state-country connections.20 
                                                          
19 For example, see Girma and Yu (2002), Peri and Requeña (2010), White (2007), and Erlich and Canavire 
Bacarreza (2006), respectively. 
20 In order to maintain consistency, I always refer to the geographic unit in terms of destination-origin. For 
example, I classify a study examining the connection between migrants living in the United States and their 
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 As to the channels through which migrants enhance trade, the consensus points to 
a preference channel normally associated with increased imports for the migrant-
destination country, and an information channel associated with increased imports and 
exports for the migrant-destination country. Migrants may bring preferences for specific 
products with them to the destination region, leading to increased imports from the 
corresponding origin regions; on the other hand, migrants familiar with language, tastes, 
customs, or the workings of business and law in both the place of origin and destination 
may pass this information on to firms, thereby lowering the cost associated with entering 
or increasing presence in a particular foreign market, potentially increasing both imports 
and exports. 
 Two natural questions arise from this consistent body of evidence on the pro-trade 
effect of migration: (1) How localized are the preferences and information that migrants 
embody and potentially transmit to firms? and (2) How does geographic proximity matter 
for migration's pro-trade effect? While several previous studies focus on the state level for 
the given destination country, to my knowledge no studies examine the migration-trade 
link at the relatively localized state-state level, neither for one migration variable nor 
considering classification by geographic proximity of migrants.  
 By employing the state-state level in the following analysis, this finer geographic 
disaggregation allows for (1) more precise measurement of migrant networks and other 
potential determinants of trade, including the distance and mass variables fundamental to 
any gravity model, and (2) differentiation between different states of residence and origin 
                                                          
connection with exports from the U.S. (entire country) to countries of migrants' origins as “country-
country.” 
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for migrants and the associated trade. The former more accurately depicts the variation in 
the covariates theorized to drive the migration-trade nexus, in turn permitting more precise 
estimates.21 The latter crucially allows for the possibility that networks of migrants of 
similar state origin matter for the pro-trade effect of migration, above and beyond the 
traditionally-examined networks of compatriots. In other words, not only does a Mexican 
migrant now provide different information to the potential U.S. export market than a 
Canadian migrant, a Veracruzano (from the Gulf coast state of Veracruz, Mexico) also 
provides different knowledge than a Jalicense (from the Pacific coast state of Jalisco, 
Mexico).  
 As far as geographic proximity, Herander and Saavedra (2005) and Artal-Tur et al. 
(2012) (hereafter HS and APR, respectively) both point to the importance of distance 
between the networks of migrants that ultimately supply the pro-trade effect of migration 
as a determinant of the extra associated trade. Further understanding the importance of 
geographic proximity clearly sheds light on the influence of migrants, specifically as to 
whether an increase in exports can be expected given an increase in migrants of a particular 
state in states adjacent to the state under examination. While both previous studies show 
that geographic proximity certainly matters (the pro-trade effect is stronger as distance 
between migrant networks decreases), they lack the finer geographic disaggregation on the 
side of migrant origin (export destination). 
 My approach examines empirically the migration-trade nexus at the state-state 
level, first intentionally ignoring geographic proximity and then classifying migrants into 
                                                          
21 For example, Yilmazkuday (2013) finds that the estimated coefficient for distance in the gravity-type 
models of determinants of international trade suffers from greater bias if not considering production 
location within countries (at the state or local level). 
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three categories based on distance between migrant networks. Using data linking migrants' 
states of origin with current states of residence, I determine how localized the information 
that migrants transmit to exporting firms actually is and how geographic proximity matters 
in this process of transmission. Specifically, this method maps Mexican migrants' Mexican 
state of origin to current state of residence in the United States, using data on matrícula 
consular (consulate registration) holders available from the Mexican government.22 Use of 
a standard gravity model augmented to include migration as an additional explanatory 
variable for exports from U.S. to Mexican states, as well as an extension relying on the 
generalized propensity scores (GPS) method, allow for estimation of the pro-trade effect 
that migrants have at the state-state level for the first time, both overall and classified by 
geographic proximity.  
 I find that just as in previous studies at the country-country and state-country levels, 
migrants indeed have a statistically significant pro-trade effect at the state-state level, 
promoting exports from U.S. states of residence to Mexican states of origin. The initial 
specification reveals an elasticity of exports to migration of 0.11, while the GPS extension 
signals a diminishing yet positive marginal contribution over nearly the entire range of 
actual measured migrant stocks. Classified by geographic proximity, the preferred 
specification reveals the expected partial pro-trade effects otherwise disguised by the single 
estimate of migration's pro-trade effect, corresponding to contributions of $1984 (in-state) 
and $538 (neighboring-state) to annual exports between respective U.S. and Mexican states 
                                                          
22 The matrícula consular is an identification card made available by the Mexican government to citizens 
residing abroad starting in 1871. The card must be renewed every five years, giving the holder access to 
opening a bank account, obtaining a driver's license, and other services, depending on the specific country 
and state of residence. I define state of origin as the last state of permanent residence before migration 
occurred from Mexico to the U.S.. 
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associated with each average additional migrant. Given these results, geographic proximity 
appears to matter just as in HS and APR, with the in-state effect surpassing the neighboring-
state effect in magnitude; however, in contrast with previous results, I find that the 
neighboring-state contribution of migrants is indeed of statistical significance. All results 
vary minimally in magnitude and significance across several checks for robustness, 
providing clear evidence as to the additional benefit of migration that manifests itself 
through its nexus with international trade, highlighted at the relatively localized state-state 
level for the first time and classified by geographic proximity of migrant networks. 
 The rest of this chapter continues with a discussion of several aspects unique to the 
U.S.-Mexico relationship with relevance to the migration-trade nexus. I highlight my initial 
empirical strategy and data sources, followed by a discussion of the main results. After 
various checks for robustness and the details on the GPS extension, I briefly conclude. 
 US-Mexico relationship 
 The U.S.-Mexico relationship provides an especially interesting and appropriate 
setting conducive to examining the pro-trade effect of migration for several reasons. First 
and foremost is the fact that data is actually available, permitting the analysis at the state-
state level for the first time. Detailed exports data from U.S. to Mexican states are available 
for all years since 1994, coinciding with the implementation of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement. Perhaps most noteworthy is the availability of the matrícula consular 
data, uniquely allowing for the connection of Mexican state of origin to U.S. state of 
residence for each migrant registered during the period examined.  
 Additionally, as both the U.S. and Mexico are relatively large, heterogeneous 
countries, separation by state origin and destination is theoretically worthwhile; there is 
51 
 
clearly wide differentiation within countries as to preferences and the knowledge and 
information that residents hold about markets, customs, and tastes, all important factors for 
the theorized channels through which the pro-trade effect operates. For example, an 
emigrant leaving the southeastern state of Chiapas to reside in a given U.S. state 
undoubtedly has much different information than an emigrant leaving the northern state of 
Sonora, arguably similar to the level of differentiation existing across migrants of varying 
nationalities signaled by the previous literature.  
 Although this differentiation, depending on Mexican state of origin and U.S. state 
of residence, points unequivocally to the theorized pro-trade effect of migration at the state-
state level, several aspects of the U.S.-Mexico relationship signal that this effect could 
potentially be minimized relative to the entire range of possible pro-trade effects across all 
countries (and the respective sub-national divisions). First, both trade and migration 
between the U.S. and Mexico are relatively well-established, neither phenomenon being 
particularly new in its existence. HS, among others, find that the existence of a previous 
large migrant stock reduces any pro-trade effect of new migrants. However, the “newness” 
of migration from and to particular Mexican and U.S. states, respectively, could potentially 
offset the fact that the Mexico-U.S. migration is not novel at the country-country level.23 
Second, Mexican migration levels to the U.S. are relatively high, especially relevant if 
beyond a certain level of migration, further migrants may not marginally stimulate trade 
between places of residence and origin. The mean state-state count of matrículas 
                                                          
23 Card and Lewis (2007) examines the choice of U.S. states of destination for Mexican migrants, analyzing 
changing trends during the 1990s. Hatzigeorgiou and Lodefalk (2011) also highlights the importance of 
new migrants in updating information. 
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consulares for my sample is 3038, with the maximum of 270,201 corresponding to those 
Michoacanos registered in California. Previous evidence is divided on the existence of an 
“exhaustion point” of the pro-trade effect of migration, one of the possibilities explored in 
the GPS extension of Section 6; Serrano and Requeña (2013, hereafter SR) finds that every 
migrant makes a positive marginal contribution to exports at the province-country level, 
while Egger et al. (2012, hereafter EVN) finds evidence of an exhaustion point for imports 
at the country-country level of approximately 4,000 migrants, above which additional 
migrants provide zero stimulus for imports. Finally, a majority of the Mexican migrant 
population in the U.S. is relatively low-skilled and may not participate in any form of 
business network. These general characteristics are of potential importance given recent 
findings that being high-skilled and having access to business networks makes migrants 
particularly effective in their promotion of trade.24  
 Given the outlined aspects of the U.S.-Mexico relationship, any pro-trade effect 
found at the state-state level between states of these neighbor countries can be hypothesized 
to fall at the lower end of the spectrum of potential worldwide effects across all countries. 
In turn, while any claims of external validity should clearly be met with due skepticism, 
the presence of a U.S.-Mexico link between migration and trade would appear to suggest 
an even stronger potential of the general existence of a pro-trade effect of migration at the 
state-state level.  
 Empirical Strategy and Data 
                                                          
24 See Felbermayr and Jung (2009) and Aleksynska and Peri (2011) for these respective emphases. 
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 In estimating the effect of migration on international trade between states in the 
United States and in Mexico, I first employ a standard gravity model, the most common 
empirical strategy for studies examining not only factors affecting trade, but also the 
potential pro-trade stimulus provided by migration. Putting aside geographic proximity for 
a moment, I start with the standard model augmented with migration between respective 
state pairs as an additional explanatory variable; the resulting specification serves as a 
useful benchmark for the analysis to follow. 
݈݊ ௝ܶ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ݑ௜ ൅ ௝݉ ൅ ߶݈݊ܯ݅݃௝௜ ൅ ߚଵ݈݊ ௜ܻ ௝ܻ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊ܦ݅ݏݐ௝௜ ൅ ߚଷܣ݀ ௝݆௜ ൅ ௝݁௜ 
 Incorporating the potential importance of geographic proximity, I then further 
augment the gravity model to include two additional measures of Mexican migration to the 
United States. 
݈݊ ௝ܶ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߭௜ ൅ ߤ௝ ൅ ߛଵ݈݊ܯ݅݃௝௜ ൅ ߛଶ݈݊ܯ݅݃௝௔ௗ௝ ൅ ߛଷ݈݊ܯ݅݃௝௥௘௦௧ ൅ ߜଵ݈݊ ௜ܻ ௝ܻ ൅ ߜଶ݈݊ܦ݅ݏݐ௝௜
൅ ߜଷܣ݀ ௝݆௜ ൅ ߝ௝௜ 
 The variable ௝ܶ௜ measures exports from U.S. state ݅ to Mexican state ݆ in terms of 
yearly total value, dependent on migration, size of market (income), distance, and 
adjacency. ܯ݅݃௝௜  captures the stock of matrícula consular holders in each U.S. state ݅ from 
each Mexican state of origin ݆, ܯ݅݃௝௔ௗ௝ measures the stock of matrícula consular holders 
in the states adjacent to each U.S. state ݅  from each Mexican state of origin ݆ , while ܯ݅݃௝௥௘௦௧ 
reflects the stock of matrícula consular holders in the rest of U.S. states (exclusive of state 
݅ and adjacent states) from each Mexican state of origin ݆; ௜ܻ and ௝ܻ are the gross state 
products of U.S. state ݅ and Mexican state ݆, respectively, ܦ݅ݏݐ௝௜ represents the distance by 
land from U.S. state ݅ capital to Mexican state ݆ capital, while ܣ݀ ௝݆௜ is a dummy variable 
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taking the value of 1 for adjacent states and that of 0 for states not sharing a border. Given 
the log transformations, the coefficients of interest, ߛଵ, ߛଶ, and ߛଷ thus pinpoint the 
percentage increase (decrease) in yearly exports flowing from a U.S. state to a Mexican 
state associated with a 1% increase in the stock of migrants originating from the 
corresponding Mexican state and registered in the corresponding U.S. state (i.e., in-state), 
in the neighbors of the corresponding U.S. state (i.e., neighboring-state), and in the 
remainder of all other U.S. states (i.e., other-state), respectively. Additionally, ݑ௜, ௝݉, ߭௜, 
and ߤ௝ are U.S. and Mexican state fixed effects, controlling for the multilateral resistance 
terms as recommended by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). Other variables commonly 
employed as controls for bilateral trade costs in previous migration-augmented gravity 
models, such as trade agreements, language, colonial ties, legal system, currency, and 
cultural distance, are not relevant in the current setting since these variables are generally 
not differentiated within a single country, this being true in the case of the United States 
and Mexico.25 If migration indeed is conducive to trade, an expectation of ߶ ൐ 0, ߛଵ ൐ 0, 
ߛଶ ൐ 0, and ߛଷ ൐ 0 holds, the latter two inequalities depending on how far-reaching 
migrant networks' influence is; if geographic proximity matters for the migration-trade 
nexus, the clear expectation is ߛଵ ൐ ߛଶ ൐ ߛଷ.  
 Before detailing the data, the use of migrant stocks as the measure of migration 
merits a brief discussion. While much of the literature relies on migrant flows and 
subsequent panel data, I follow Felbermayr and Toubal (2007) and Vézina (2012) in the 
                                                          
25 There is a limited amount of heterogeneity for these potential variables, for example with the presence of 
a number of languages in Mexico, however in the sample at hand this differentiation is so minimal that it 
does not justify inclusion in the regression equation as an additional control variable. 
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use of stocks and the resulting cross-sectional data; several reasons exist pointing to 
migrant stocks as the appropriate choice for measuring migration when examining the 
migration-trade nexus.26 First, the hypothesized information channel operates with an 
indeterminate amount of lag; it is apparent that some time is needed for migrants to transmit 
information to exporting firms, however the exact amount of time is unclear, leaving the 
pinpointing of the appropriate lag for a panel estimation next to impossible. Second, any 
potential yearly data noise is minimized by employing migration stocks rather than flows. 
Finally, one may argue that migrant flows capture the most relevant information for the 
migration-trade link, as each year's migrants hold the most updated information 
corresponding to the associated year's exports. However, given that my migrant stock is 
the accumulation of those migrants registering for the matrícula consular between 2006 
and 2010, any worries of the embodied information being outdated are easily dispelled, as 
it is difficult to imagine this type of information rendered useless in the passage of a 
maximum of only five years. In fact, stocks appropriately capture the notion that exporting 
firms likely build on existing information accumulated from migrants over the years (even 
if the information is updated gradually) and that trade relationships may persist even if 
there is yearly variation in migration flows (Vézina, 2012). 
 Values of state-state exports are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Transportation 
statistics; these statistics cover all exports from the U.S. to Mexico at the state-state level, 
except for those transported by air or water, providing 90% coverage of total exports 
                                                          
26 I discuss below how the use of cross-sectional data limits direct treatment of the questions of potential 
endogeneity and direction of causality in the migration-trade context. 
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between the two nations.27 Given this coverage, the non-contiguous U.S. states of Alaska 
and Hawaii are excluded from the analysis.28 For the preferred specification, trade is 
measured by the state-state values from the year 2010. As original export data are listed 
with current dollars as the unit, I use the U.S. CPI-U series to convert all values to 2011 
U.S. dollars. Statistics on the number of matrículas consulares issued are calculated given 
the information provided by the Insitituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior (IME). Since 
holders of the card must specify last state of Mexican residence as well as current state of 
U.S. residence during the application process, these statistics uniquely allow for the 
construction of the necessary state-state migration data. As the identification cards have a 
renewal period of five years, I sum the available data from 2006 to 2010 in constructing 
the stock of Mexican migrants for each state-state combination.29 I consult the U.S. Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Mexican Instituto Nacional de Estadística y 
Geografía (INEGI) statistics for the respective gross state products corresponding to 2010, 
while distance between capital cities is calculated using the shortest route by land expressed 
in number of miles.30 The original data for Mexican gross state products are listed with the 
unit of 2003 pesos, therefore I initially convert the values to 2003 U.S. dollars using the 
                                                          
27 While imports data would clearly provide for useful comparison, unfortunately state-state data is not 
presently available. 
 
28  Modifications to the trade value calculation used to check for sensitivity of the results to these changes 
are detailed below. 
 
29 As of final revisions, data from 2010 is the most recent available. 
 
30 This differs from the standard measure used by similar studies, that of great circle distance, due to the 
fact that the trade data (and a majority of Mexico-U.S. migration) is by land. However, if great circle 
distance is indeed employed as the measure of distance, results change only minimally, with a slight 
increase in the magnitude of the distance coefficient. 
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average of monthly historical peso-dollar exchange rates from 2003. Finally, just as with 
the U.S. gross state products originally reported with the unit of 2005 U.S. dollars, I again 
use the CPI-U series to convert all values to 2011 dollars in order to maintain uniformity 
with the export values.  
 As the matrícula consular data do not completely cover the population of Mexican 
origin in the U.S. and could possibly present problems of selection, I closely examine the 
distribution of Mexican migrants across the U.S. states of residence in attempting to 
determine whether these data sufficiently represent the actual distribution of residents of 
Mexican origin across the U.S. states. As there is no justifiable reason to expect that 
Mexican state of origin affects selection into obtaining a matrícula consular,31 if the 
distribution of the data is sufficiently close to the actual distribution of Mexican migrants 
(irrespective of Mexican state origin) across U.S. states, the use of the matrícula consular 
data can be said to provide a certain level of representativeness for the state-state 
distribution, thereby minimizing any bias arising from selection problems. I thus can use 
the 2010 U.S. Census as a benchmark for comparison; I contrast the matrícula consular 
data with that of the Census, in which the number of residents in each U.S. state claiming 
Mexican origin is detailed. 
 Figure 2.1 details the distribution of Mexican migrants in the U.S. for both the 
matrícula consular data and the Census data; the data are expressed as the number of 
Mexican migrants in each state divided by the total stock of migrants from each respective 
                                                          
31 A natural assumption may be that education level is associated with legal migration status, thereby 
making it more likely for individuals to obtain a matrícula consular if the state of origin corresponds to a 
low-education Mexican state on average. However, this assumption does not appear to be correct; see 
below for a related brief discussion. 
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source.32 In fact, the matrícula consular data performs well in representing the actual 
distribution of Mexican migrants across U.S. states, with most states' difference 
coordinates close to zero. Only two states, Texas and Illinois, suffer from differences 
greater than 3%, while 43 of 48 states' differences in percentages are less than 1%.  
 Additionally, one may expect that the number of highly-educated migrants is 
underrepresented in the matrícula consular data, because of the fact that there is no clear 
incentive for a documented U.S. resident to hold the identification card. The consideration 
is especially important given the previously mentioned studies emphasizing the extra 
relevance of highly-educated migrants in promoting trade above and beyond the average 
migrant contribution. Taking the average education level in Mexican states from INEGI 
statistics, dispersed over a range of 6.7 to 10.5 years of schooling with a mean of 8.6, a first 
check of the data indeed shows a negative correlation between Mexican state average 
education level and the percentage of origin state population registered with the matrícula 
consular.33 
 However, the correlation gives no information as to the key question of how 
education level actually relates to legal migration status, and in turn to the matrícula 
consular. It is not clear that the expectation of underrepresentation is reasonable, given that 
the correlation between legal migration status and education level is anything but definitive 
for Mexican migrants in the U.S. Passel and Cohn (2009) determines that 47% of 
unauthorized migrants ages 25 to 64 in the U.S. have completed high school or less, while 
                                                          
32 This fraction with an upper limit of 1 is then multiplied by 100, resulting in the numbers expressed on the 
y-axis of Figure 1. 
 
33 See Figure 2.2 for a scatter plot of this correlated data. 
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Caponi and Plesca (2012) argues that documented Mexican migrants in the U.S. are 
actually more likely to have a lower education level than undocumented migrants. 
Comparing the matrícula consular data with other representative data as to education level 
presents two problems. The IME only reports state-state statistics including education level 
for 2006 and 2007, thereby providing a smaller sample in representing the overall stock of 
migrants; in addition, the best data for comparison, that of the U.S. Current Population 
Survey, is known to undercount undocumented migrants. Because of these difficulties and 
lack of available data, I do not empirically address the issue of state-state distribution by 
education level. Additional data availability would clearly allow for future exploration of 
this further rich level of detail. 
 Table A.1 details the number of matrículas consulares registered from 2006 to 
2010, classified by both US state of residence and Mexican state of origin, while Table A.2 
focuses on the state-state makeup of Mexican migration to the three top U.S. destination 
states, California, Texas, and Illinois, and the corresponding exports to Mexico. Table A.2 
and Figure A.1 provide an initial idea of the simple correlation between state-state 
migration and exports. Without any controls for bilateral trade costs or state fixed effects, 
the best-fit line displayed in Figure A.1 exhibits a slope of 0.44, providing preliminary 
evidence of a potential positive relationship between migration and exports at the state-
state level. Table 2.1 shows the mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum for 
variables in both the base and alternative samples. 
  
Results and Discussion 
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 Column 1 of Table 2.2 displays the results of the OLS regression employing the 
benchmark gravity equation. Including Mexico City, the base sample consists of 1536 
observations, a result of all trading pairs of 48 U.S. and 32 Mexican states. The coefficient 
estimate of migrants' effect on state-state exports is indeed significantly positive; holding 
all other factors constant, an increase of 1% in the number of state-state migrants is 
associated with a 0.11% increase in state-state exports, with ݌ ൏ 0.01. Distance, as 
expected, is significantly negative, reflecting a 1.60% decrease in state-state exports 
associated with a 1% increase in distance between the respective capitals of U.S. and 
Mexican states. Holding other factors constant, states that are adjacent enjoy more than 
double the trade of nonadjacent states, while a 1% increase in combined economy size is 
associated with a 0.94% increase in state-state exports. All coefficient estimates have the 
expected positive (negative) relationship with state-state exports, and are highly 
significant. 
 While these initial results are the first to confirm the existence of the pro-trade effect 
of migration at the more localized state-state level, given the crucial findings of HS and 
APR and the main hypothesis of this paper, it is not surprising that Columns 2 to 5 unmask 
key complexities disguised by the estimates in Column 1. Focusing on the preferred 
specification in Column 5, the geographic proximity of migrants clearly appears to matter 
for the promotion of international trade. The coefficients of both in-state and neighboring-
state migration are statistically significant, remaining so even after adding all relevant 
control variables. As expected, the elasticity with respect to in-state migration at 0.07 is 
lower than that of Column 1, due to the addition of neighboring-state migration. An 
increase of 1% in neighboring-state migration is associated with a 0.08% increase in state-
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state exports, while increased migration in the rest of U.S. states is associated with a small, 
yet statistically insignificant negative effect on state-state exports. The remaining 
independent variables' coefficients and levels of significance are similar to those of Column 
1, with attenuation in magnitude only for the distance estimate. Interpreting the coefficients 
of interest, Column 1 appears to capture the overall pro-trade effect of migration, masking 
the actual importance of geographic proximity. Column 5 sheds light on this importance; 
in-state migration indeed promotes trade between U.S. states of residence and Mexican 
states of origin, however neighboring-state migration also has an essential role in this 
expansion of trade. 
 The OLS estimates in turn permit a simple calculation of the magnitude of the pro-
trade effect of migration, highlighting the quantitative importance of this effect, as well as 
allowing for a comparison of the relative sizes of the benefit from in-state, neighboring-
state, and other-state migration. This exercise carries extra importance given the fact that 
at first glance the estimates in Column 5 appear to point to a counterintuitive result, that 
in-state migration is associated with a smaller pro-trade effect than that of neighboring-
state migration. Starting with results from Column 1, given a 10% increase in average 
immigration from a particular Mexican state to a particular U.S. state, the average migrant 
stock increases from 3038 to 3342. Employing the estimated coefficient of approximately 
0.11, this 10% increase in migration results in an increase in average state-state exports, 
settling on the new value of exports equal to $82,923,424. This translates into $3061 extra 
state-state exports per year associated with the average extra migrant.34 
                                                          
34 This figure can be alternatively calculated by multiplying the elasticity of exports to migration by the 
ratio of average state-state exports to average migrant stock. 
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 When different geographic proximities are separated in Column 5, I can now break 
down the distinct components of the pro-trade effect of migration. Once again assuming a 
10% increase in average in-state migration, the average in-state migrant stock increases 
3038 to 3342. Using the estimated coefficient of approximately 0.07 results in an increase 
in average state-state exports of $602,653, translating into $1984 extra state-state exports 
per year associated with the average extra in-state migrant. At the same time, these extra 
304 migrants are neighboring-state migrants for an average of 4.39 states (the average 
number of adjacent states for all U.S. states). Given the average neighboring-state migrant 
stock of 12,409, this increase is equivalent to a 2.45% increase. In turn, relying on the 
percentage increase and the estimate from Column 5 of approximately 0.08, average state-
state exports increase by $538 per neighboring-state migrant. Finally, the extra 304 
migrants are equivalent to a 0.23% increase in migration in the rest of the average of 42.61 
states. Given the Column 5 estimate of approximately -0.02, this increase results in a 
decrease of $13 per average migrant.35 Finally, collecting all calculations of separate 
components in order to compile an overall effect results in $3792 of extra state-state 
exports associated with the average extra immigrant from Mexico residing in the U.S.; it 
is crucial to emphasize that this contribution to exports by the single average extra migrant 
is actually spread across U.S. states, the three terms of Footnote 18 corresponding to state 
݅, neighbors of state ݅, and the rest of U.S. states, respectively.36 The compiled result is 
similar in magnitude to that of Column 1, however the separation of distinct geographic 
                                                          
35 Trade diversion could be a simple explanation for this negative effect, however I intentionally do not 
explore this further given the small magnitude and lack of significance of the ܯ݅݃௝௥௘௦௧ estimate. 
 
36 The calculation is as follows: $1984+$538(4.39)-$13(42.61). 
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proximities allows for the differentiation between the relatively larger in-state contribution 
of the average extra immigrant, the smaller neighboring-state contribution, and the 
minuscule other-state reduction of state-state exports. 
 In comparing the estimates and magnitude of the pro-trade effect of migration to 
those of the literature, I rely on HS and APR, as well as previous state-country and country-
country studies, as this paper is the first to examine the state-state level. While doing so 
provides a framework within which viewing my results is feasible, given the novel state-
state level and the emphasis on distinct geographic proximities, any comparison must be 
accompanied by a disclaimer highlighting these differences in sampling and geographic 
disaggregation of data. Table 2.3 provides an update of Table 2.1 from Peri and Requeña 
(2010) in order to include estimates from more recent studies, and those of this paper, as 
well as a comparison of extra annual exports generated per extra migrant. The elasticity of 
exports to in-state migration estimated as 0.07 echoes the positive, significant estimates 
from both HS and APR, however my significantly positive estimate for neighboring-state 
migration contrasts with that of HS (positive, but insignificant) and APR (not significantly 
different from zero). 
 Additionally, the finding of $3792 extra yearly exports generated by each extra 
migrant is similar to those of $2608 and $2717, detailed in White (2007) and Felbermayr 
and Jung (2009), respectively. While these estimates differ most dramatically from that of 
$24,895 found by Aleksynska and Peri (2011), it is worthwhile to signal that these numbers 
are not necessarily incompatible. As Aleksynska and Peri (2011) points out, factors such 
as average number of migrants in the sample and the specific measure of migrant stock 
contribute to these differentiated estimates. My measure based on the matrícula consular 
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includes some migrants who may not be economically active, and does not classify 
migrants based on education level, which most likely further attenuates estimates as 
mentioned in Kugler and Rapoport (2011).  
 Robustness and Sensitivity Checks 
 Among concerns of econometrics, it would be ideal to establish the direction of 
causality given the potential issue of endogeneity. While migrants contribute to trade 
through the aforementioned channels, there is also the possibility that trade could 
encourage migration, especially if increased trade is associated with higher incomes that 
act to attract migrants. However, as pointed out in Felbermayr and Toubal (2012), income 
and therefore cross-country (state) wage differentials may be affected by aggregate trade, 
but it is not clear how bilateral trade affects these wage differentials. While I am unable to 
test for the direction of causality given the cross-sectional data that I employ, I rely on the 
established literature that has gone to great lengths in demonstrating that rather than trade 
encouraging migration, migration actually encourages trade. Furthermore, given that my 
data is at the state-state level, a central concern as to validity expressed in Hanson (2010) 
is dispelled. Specifically, the state-state data eliminates the concern of omitted variables 
related to bilateral economic policies driving both international trade and migration since 
these very economic policies are generally set at the national level, not exhibiting variation 
within countries. 
 As a first check for robustness of the obtained results, I outline a new set of 
estimates in Table 2.4, now excluding Mexico City from the sample given the fact that it 
is not clear whether Mexico City should be included as a 32nd Mexican “state;” the revised 
sample contains 1488 state-state observations. The magnitude and significance of the pro-
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trade effect of migration change minimally, the exclusion of Mexico City slightly 
decreasing the magnitude of the in-state coefficient to just under 0.07 and that of 
neighboring states to nearly 0.08. An additional concern arises from the comparison of the 
matrícula consular data and the U.S. Census data highlighted in Section 3. Although a high 
level of representativeness is present, Texas and Illinois clearly are outliers in this respect, 
reflecting a difference of 9.11% and 3.24% between the data sets, respectively. Especially 
given the fact that both Texas and Illinois are two of the main destination states in the U.S. 
for Mexican migrants, it is important to consider migration's pro-trade effect excluding the 
two outliers from the sample as an additional test of robustness. Table 2.4 also highlights 
the coefficient estimates generated excluding Texas and Illinois, using a sample of 1472 
observations resulting from the combination of 46 U.S. and 32 Mexican states. Compared 
to the results presented in Table 2.2, in-state migration's effect on state-state exports is 
slightly greater, while neighboring-state migration's estimate is slightly lower, both 
minimally less significant. 
 Selection of state-state exports from the year 2010 as the measure for the dependent 
variable could be driving the obtained results; if estimates of migration's pro-trade effect 
on trade differ greatly across the use of varied individual years of trade data as alternative 
dependent variables, this would clearly be cause for concern. However, the estimates in 
fact vary only minimally when using exports data from 2008 and 2009 in lieu of 2010, as 
reported in Table 2.5. Migration's pro-trade effect remains significant and similar in 
magnitude across all alternative regressions accounted for, with the in-state estimate 
bottoming out at 0.0731 and peaking at 0.0935. Using the same simple method of 
calculation as in the previous section, these figures correspond to an extra $1819 and $2053 
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of annual exports, respectively, associated with the average extra in-state migrant, not 
considering the neighboring- and other-state contributions. 
 An additional concern is that trade and migration could be determined jointly, 
leaving forwarding the measure of exports as a clear strategy to alleviate this potential 
problem.37 I regress exports for periods ݐ ൅ 1, ݐ ൅ 2, and ݐ ൅ 3, respectively, with the 
preferred sample and specification, using all possible corresponding measures of migrant 
stock (matrícula consular stock) to eliminate any possibility of joint determination. This 
strategy results in six further regressions; Table 2.6 reports estimation results along with 
the corresponding exports and migration measures employed in each additional regression. 
The estimation of migration's pro-trade effect is consistent across these varied measures, 
both in magnitude and significance, with the elasticity of state-state exports to in-state 
migration ranging from 0.0789 to 0.1013. 
 Finally, I check the consistency of the estimates reported in Column 1 of Table 2.2 
given an alternative measure of migration. Specifically, I now use the share of all Mexican 
migrants residing in U.S. state ݅ who originate from Mexican state ݆ as the proxy for 
migration rather than migrant stocks. As outlined in Rauch and Trindade (2002) and echoed 
in Parsons and Vézina (2013), in the context of U.S.-Mexico state-state trade, a higher level 
of Mexican migrants from state ݆ in U.S. state ݅ increases the number of potential 
connections between exporting firms from U.S. state ݅ and state ݆ Mexican consumers 
while a higher migrant share increases the probability of a U.S. state ݅ exporting firm 
sending products to the associated Mexican state ݆. Table 7 highlights the estimated 
                                                          
37 As Aleksynska and Peri (2011) mentions, since the migration measure is a stock accumulated over years, 
it is probable that it is determined before trade flows; however I forward exports to assure that joint 
determination is not a factor. 
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coefficients given the use of the alternative measure, clearly confirming the significant 
positive association of migration with trade across the varied samples. 
 Extension: An Application of Generalized Propensity Scores 
 The evidence from EVN and SR points to the existence of nonlinearities in the 
migration-trade relationship, EVN finding an exhaustion point beyond which further 
migration no longer makes a positive marginal contribution to international trade. In the 
extension of the initial OLS examination, I apply generalized propensity scores to a 
continuous treatment (migrant stock levels), flexibly permitting the existence of 
nonlinearities. The GPS estimation provides the advantage of describing the pro-trade 
effect in detail over the entire spectrum of observed migrant stocks as the resulting 
estimated dose-response function reflects the expected outcome (exports) associated with 
each and every observed treatment (migrant stocks) under examination, not just the general 
elasticity of exports to migration. The use of this methodology is particularly attractive 
given the importance of addressing three central questions of interest in the migration-trade 
link: (1) is there a minimum level of migration required to generate positive returns 
(measured in terms of marginal exports), (2) is there a level of migration corresponding to 
a saturation point, beyond which positive marginal exports are completely exhausted, and 
(3) is there a certain migrant stock size that maximizes the pro-trade effect of migration. 
 Method 
 As the GPS uses the comparison of those observations demonstrating a certain level 
of homogeneity across observable characteristics, the method permits correction of the 
potential bias caused by selection into varying levels of treatment intensity, also allowing 
for the estimation of the trade outcomes associated with each of these different levels of 
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treatment intensity. Propensity score methods have been applied to binary treatments 
(Heckman et al., 1997), multiple treatments (Imbens, 2000), and most recently, continuous 
treatments (Hirano and Imbens, 2004). As I consider differing levels of state-state migrant 
stocks as widely varying doses across the spectrum of a continuous treatment in a quasi-
experimental setting, I rely on the methodology outlined in the latter of the propensity score 
applications.  
 Observing treatment doses ௜ܶ, the vector of observable covariates ௜ܺ, and the 
outcome variable ௜ܻ ൌ ௜ܻሺ ௜ܶሻ associated with the received treatment for all state-state pairs 
݅ ൌ 1,… ,ܰ, the goal of GPS estimation is ultimately pinpointing the dose-response 
function, ߤሺ߬ሻ ൌ ܧሾ ௜ܻሺ߬ሻሿ, interpreted as the average outcome associated with the specific 
treatment intensity ߬. This clearly highlights one advantage of GPS estimation; it allows 
for the estimation of the average outcome associated with each and every observed 
treatment intensity of the independent variable of focus.  
 The central assumption from Hirano and Imbens (2004) is that of weak 
unconfoundedness for continuous treatments, defined as ܻሺ߬ሻ ٣ ܶ|ܺ for all ߬ ∈ ܶ, i.e., for 
all possible realizations of treatment intensity, the outcome variable must reflect 
conditional independence. Therefore, any difference in treatment intensities is independent 
of the corresponding outcomes, after controlling for the observable covariates ܺ . Assuming 
݃ሺ߬, ݔሻ to be the conditional density of the treatment given the set of covariates, i.e., 
݃ሺ߬, ݔሻ ൌ ்݂ |௑ሺ߬|ݔሻ, the GPS is in turn defined as ܩ ൌ ݃ሺܶ, ܺሻ. 
 Just as in other applications of the propensity score, the GPS is characterized by a 
balancing property in which the probability that ܶ ൌ ߬ within strata of the GPS is 
independent of the set of covariates ܺ. In turn, removing potential bias requires two steps: 
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first, the estimation of the conditional expectation of the outcome given the treatment and 
the GPS, ߚሺ߬, ݃ሻ ൌ ܧሾܻ|ܶ ൌ ߬, ܩ ൌ ݃ሿ; second, the estimation of the dose-response 
function as the average of the conditional expectation over the GPS at a particular treatment 
intensity,38 ߤሺ߬ሻ ൌ ܧൣߚ൫߬, ݃ሺ߬, ܺሻ൯൧. 
 Estimation of the effect of migration on exports 
 After logarithmic transformation, the treatment variable of state-state migrant 
stocks is approximately normal, with skewness of -0.14 and kurtosis of 2.52, so I assume 
a normal distribution in estimating the conditional distribution of migration given the 
vector of chosen covariates: ݈݊ ௜ܶ| ௜ܺ~ܰሺߚ଴ ൅ ௜ܺߚଵ, ߪଶሻ. ߚଵ	is a column vector, while ௜ܺ 	is 
a row vector consisting of a variety of observable push and pull determinants of treatment 
intensity. Population and gross state product (GSP) enter ܺ ௜ as logarithmic transformations, 
as squares of those logarithmic transformations, and as growth variables for both Mexican 
states of origin and U.S. states of destination, intentionally allowing for a flexible, non-
linear relationship between these measures of market size and migrant stocks.39 
Furthermore, I include the standard geographic variables of adjacency and distance as 
covariates; the former as a binary variable taking the value of 1 for adjacent state-state pairs 
and 0 for non-adjacent state-state pairs, and the latter as a logarithmic transformation of the 
distance in miles by land from the respective Mexican state capital to the respective U.S. 
                                                          
38 See Hirano and Imbens (2004) for the proof that these two steps actually remove bias. 
 
39 In other specifications, I also included cubic terms of both population and GSP for Mexican and U.S. 
states, however, while explanatory power ሺܴଶሻ increased slightly, none of the additional coefficients 
exhibited high statistical significance. Estimated coefficients did not change in any significant way 
compared to those reported. 
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state capital.40 In addition, I insert unemployment rates and Gini coefficients for both 
Mexican states of origin and U.S. states of destination into the ௜ܺ vector, controlling for 
scarcity of employment availability and income inequality, respectively.41 Both measures 
are frequently included as push and pull factors in the determinants of migration (Clark et 
al., 2007; Grogger and Hanson, 2011; Mayda, 2010). I estimate the equation using scaled 
ordinary least squares, highlighting the results in Table 2.8.42 
 In general, the selected covariates are highly statistically significant, all 
independent variables being significant at the 2% level or lower except for the first- and 
second-order “Mex. GSP” variables and “Adjacency;” furthermore, the majority of the 
variation in treatment intensity (size of migrant stocks) is indeed explained by the 
covariates making up the vector ௜ܺ, the ܴଶ signaling this portion as 76%.  
 With the OLS estimation in hand, I construct the GPS as: 
ܩప෡ ൌ ଵ√ଶగఙෝమ ݁ݔ݌ ቀ
ଵ
ଶఙෝమ ൫ ௜ܶ െ ߚ଴෢ െ ௜ܺߚଵ෢൯
ଶቁ. 
 After generating the propensity scores, the balancing property must be tested in 
order to verify that the GPS indeed improves the balance of covariates, thereby providing 
confirmation of the first step necessary for bias removal. I follow the group and block 
method suggested by Hirano and Imbens (2004) in carrying out the balance check.  
                                                          
40 This differs from the standard circle distance used by much of the gravity literature, however I choose 
this measure given that the trade data captures only trade by land and a majority of Mexico-U.S. migration 
is by land, as well. 
 
41 I take U.S. population data, U.S. unemployment rates, and U.S. Gini coefficients from the BEA, Census 
Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics, respectively; data for Mexican states come from the INEGI. 
 
42 Both exports and migration are expressed as logarithms of the respective variable plus one. Results are 
equivalent to those obtained by maximum likelihood estimation, the method suggested for this initial 
estimation in Bia and Mattie (2008). 
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 First, dividing the observations into four treatment intensity groups allows for the 
comparison of covariates across these quartiles of the migrant stock distribution before 
balancing on the GPS. The four groups of treatment intensity contain 373, 371, 372 and 
372 state-state observations, respectively.43 As no GPS adjustment has yet occurred, the 
left section of Table 2.10 clearly reflects the great disparities across groups in the covariates 
of vector ௜ܺ, showing an average t-statistic of 5.46 and 66% of observable covariate 
comparisons across treatment intensity groups being statistically different at the 5% level. 
If left alone, these disparities lead to obvious concerns of biased inference due to selection 
into treatment intensity groups determined by observable characteristics.  
 Second, dividing the observations into blocks or strata according to the GPS allows 
for comparison of covariates across the treatment intensity quartiles, but now balanced on 
the GPS. I evaluate the GPS for all observations ݅ ൌ 1,… , ܰ using the OLS estimates at 
the median level of treatment intensity ܶ ௠௝ for each of the four quartiles ݆ ∈ ሼ1,2,3,4ሽ, then 
dividing the propensity scores into ten blocks based on the resulting GPS estimate deciles 
for each of the four corresponding ௠ܶ௝. Just as before adjustment, I carry out two-tailed t-
tests in order to measure the balance of covariates present comparing across groups, 
weighting the t-statistics by the respective number of observations in each block. However, 
having blocked on the GPS estimates allows me to now compare observations that have 
similar observable characteristics and hence the same predicted treatment intensity (same 
GPS block), but also have differing levels of actual treatment intensity (different migrant 
                                                          
43 The Appendix details robustness checks using the GPS method with two alternative samples. 
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stock quartiles).44 The middle section of Table 2.11 highlights the vast improvement in 
balancing the covariates achieved by employing the GPS; 79% of all covariate comparisons 
across treatment intensity groups exhibit no statistical differences at the 5% level, with 
average t-statistics displayed of 1.22. 
 Some studies employing propensity score estimation additionally rely on the 
common support condition in order to improve comparability of observations. The use of 
the common support simply results in the exclusion of any observations in the given sample 
that do not demonstrate a certain level of similarity in the observable covariates. Given the 
group and block method, this translates into comparing the GPS calculations for 
ܩ෠௞൫ ௠ܶ௝, ܺ௞൯ with those of ܩ෠௟൫ ௠ܶ௝, ௟ܺ൯, where ݇ ∈ ݆ and ݈ ∈ ݆. In turn, the only observations 
used in the remainder of the estimation process are those ݈ observations where: 
݉݅݊൛ܩ෠௞൫ ௠ܶ௝, ܺ௞൯ൟ ൑ ܩ෠௟൫ ௠ܶ௝, ௟ܺ൯ ൑ ݉ܽݔ൛ܩ෠௞൫ ௠ܶ௝, ܺ௞൯ൟ for all ݆ ∈ ሼ1,2,3,4ሽ. 
 A potential dilemma arises as only 390 of the 1488 state-state observations in fact 
meet the common support condition stated above. Faced with this large loss of information, 
a decision must be made among three standard solutions: (1) estimate the outcome variable 
only within the common support, thereby maximizing the reduction in bias, but also 
reducing the range over which exports can be predicted given the observed migration 
levels; (2) estimate the outcome variable inside and outside the common support, thereby 
maximizing the reduction in bias, maximizing the range over which exports can be 
predicted given the observed migration levels, but also reducing the preciseness of the 
estimated outcomes; or (3) estimate the outcome variable with all available observations, 
                                                          
44 The group and block method is highlighted in Tables 2.9 and 2.10, for the entire sample and for the 
modified common support, respectively. 
73 
 
thereby accepting a non-maximized reduction in potential bias, maximizing the range over 
which exports can be predicted given the observed migration levels, and maximizing the 
preciseness of the estimated outcomes. As exhibited in Table 11, much of the potential bias 
is indeed reduced simply by balancing on the GPS, without any consideration for the 
common support; 79% of all covariate comparisons across treatment intensity groups 
exhibit no statistical differences at the 5% level. On the other hand, using only the common 
support observations would greatly reduce the range of observed migrant stocks from 0-
227,032 (all observations) to 2-5,878 (common support observations), corresponding to a 
dramatic reduction in means and medians of migrant stocks from 2406 to 347 and 210.5 to 
134, respectively. Further evidence as to why the common support condition may be too 
stringent for our purposes is provided by the simple comparison of covariate means 
between those state-state combinations inside and outside the common support region. 
Table 2.12 highlights these comparisons, and perhaps surprisingly, the two groups do not 
appear to differ dramatically in the means of the covariates. 
 This fact points to the observation that exclusion from the common support region 
is mostly attributed to a lack of similarity of generalized propensity scores corresponding 
to just one of the four median treatment GPS group calculations, not a general lack of 
comparability of observables for the excluded observations across all four median 
treatment GPS groups. As the common support equation above highlights, the condition 
for inclusion in the common support region indeed depends on overlap of the GPS in each 
and every group ݆, therefore if any state-state observation has even only one exception to 
this rule, it is automatically excluded by the common support condition. Given the 
combination of the evidence mentioned, there is no clear best option of the three standard 
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solutions, although accepting the trade-off of a non-maximized reduction in bias in 
exchange for a maximized amount of information, range over which exports can be 
predicted, and preciseness in estimation may be the most attractive. 
 However, following Lechner (2008) in exploring alternative solutions to the 
common support problem, I continue the estimation process by pursuing a fourth option, 
one that I argue permits researchers confronted with similar common support dilemmas a 
certain amount of flexibility that is extremely useful in modifying the common support 
condition according to the particular needs of the research undertaken. By slightly relaxing 
the stringent condition requiring presence of observations in the common support region 
for all four groups ݆, we can still assure a maximized reduction of bias, while not trading 
off as much coverage and preciseness in terms of estimated outcomes. If indeed the 
standard common support condition means the researcher must sacrifice a large portion of 
information as in this paper, this condition relaxation provides a second-best option that 
can be applied to the data. My modified common support rule simply relaxes equation the 
equation above, now proposing that the only observations used in the remainder of the 
estimation process are those ݈ observations where: 
݉݅݊൛ܩ෠௞൫ ௠ܶ௝, ܺ௞൯ൟ ൑ ܩ෠௟൫ ௠ܶ௝, ௟ܺ൯ ൑ ݉ܽݔ൛ܩ෠௞൫ ௠ܶ௝, ܺ௞൯ൟ for at least two ݆ ∈ ሼ1,2,3,4ሽ. 
 That is, state-state observations are included as long as the corresponding GPS 
median-treatment scores for at least two of the four treatment quartiles fall within the 
common support region of the particular quartile. Guaranteeing a high level of 
comparability, while relaxing the condition from the original common support equation 
results in a new sample that does not suffer from the great loss of information previously 
seen; only 59 state-state observations are excluded by the modified common support, 
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resulting in the preferred sample of 1429 observations, and the range of migrant stocks 
over which exports can be estimated is not reduced at all.45 Additionally, the balancing of 
covariates is greatly improved through the use of the modified common support condition. 
The right section of Table 2.11 highlights this dramatic improvement; 71 of 72 covariate 
comparison groups show no statistical differences at the 5% level, with an average t-
statistic of 0.71. In turn, the high level of comparability of observations vindicates the use 
of the modified common support for this data set, as the guarantee of comparability of 
observations and the resulting reduction in bias is the very reason for adhering to a common 
support condition in the first place. 
 Moving on with only those observations meeting the modified common support 
condition, as a first step in estimating the dose-response function, I estimate the conditional 
expectation of exports given treatment intensity and the corresponding GPS:  
ܧሾ ௜ܻ| ௜ܶ , ܩ௜ሿ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ௜ܶ ൅ ߙଶ ௜ܶଶ ൅ ߙଷ ௜ܶଷ ൅ ߙସܩ෠௜ ൅ ߙହܩ෠௜ ௜ܶ. 
௜ܶ values are the actual observed migrant stocks, while ܩ෠௜ values are those estimates 
calculated from above. The resulting OLS estimates in Table 2.13 have no direct economic 
interpretation (Hirano and Imbens, 2004), however the individual and joint statistical 
                                                          
45 The Appendix lists the 59 state-state observations excluded from the ݊ ൌ 1488 sample, as well as those 
observations excluded from the ݊ ൌ 1536 and ݊ ൌ 1426 samples. It is important to point out that the 
selection of at least two ݆s and four treatment quartiles is the result of trying several variations of the 
modified common support condition; however, rather than being a drawback of the approach, this actually 
provides the researcher with the advantage of flexibility while assuring comparability of observations. In 
other words, it is easy to consider modified conditions that differ along the two mentioned dimensions, the 
number of ݆s and the number of original treatment groups, for example conditions requiring three of four 
quartiles, four of five quintiles, etc. Much as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) provides a means for 
model selection through trade-off between goodness of fit and model complexity, selection of the 
appropriate modified common support condition is dictated by the desired trade-off of the amount of 
balancing and bias reduction sacrificed compared to the amount of estimation power gained under each 
modification. 
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significance of the GPS coefficients is noteworthy.46 This significance signals that 
selection is important, confirming that the inclusion of the GPS terms and the GPS 
estimation process in general are indeed worthwhile in achieving some level of selection 
bias removal. 
 Finally, I estimate the dose-response function, capturing the average potential 
outcome at each and every treatment intensity ߬:  
ܧሾ ఛܻሿ෣ ൌ ଵே∑ ൣߙ଴ෞ ൅ ߙଵෞ߬ ൅ ߙଶෞ߬ଶ ൅ ߙଷෞ߬ଷ ൅ ߙସෞܩ෠ሺ߬, ௜ܺሻ ൅ ߙହෞܩ෠ሺ߬, ௜ܺሻ߬൧ே௜ୀଵ . 
 I report both the dose-response function and its derivative, the treatment effect 
function, in Figure 2.3. 
 Marginal Contributions  
 By calculating the marginal exports associated with each treatment level, 
ܯܽݎܧݔ݌௣ ൌ ൫ܧ௣ାଵ െ ܧ௣൯ ൫ܯ௣ାଵ െܯ௣൯ൗ , where ܧ and ܯ represent estimated exports and 
actual migrant stocks (backed out from the respective logarithmic transformations) and ݌ 
denotes the ordinal value of treatment intensities employed in the estimation of the dose-
response function, the nonlinearities present in the exports-migration relationship are now 
clearly on visual display in Figures 2.4 and 2.5.  
 Considering the benchmark OLS state-state estimate of $3061 extra exports per 
extra migrant, this average contribution of migration to exports is clearly weighted by the 
first migrants from one respective Mexican state to the state of U.S. residence. The first 
migrant makes a marginal contribution of $76,297 to exports, the hundredth contributes 
$3613, and the thousandth contributes $175. Marginal contributions of $8371, $1879, and 
                                                          
46 I choose to include the GPS only linearly as higher-order GPS terms (squared and cubed) do not add 
extra information and are not statistically significant. 
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$166, respectively, correspond to the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles (ܯ ൌ 33, 216, and 
1026) of the actual state-state migrant stock distribution for the ݊ ൌ 1429 sample. 
Marginal exports of $3061 matches to a migrant stock of 123, representing the 42nd 
percentile of the actual state-state migrant stock distribution. Interestingly, at the level of 
2276 migrants, the marginal contribution is temporarily “exhausted,” and dips below zero 
until 3761 migrants; this negative marginal contribution to exports bottoms out at -$4.53. 
However, only 66 of the 1429 (less than 5%) state-state migrant stocks fall in this 
exhaustion zone range. Total exports quickly recovers from the short-lived negative effect 
of migration, reaching the pre-exhaustion zone level of exports as early as 4900 migrants, 
with subsequent migrants all making increasingly positive marginal contributions to state-
state exports.  
 The estimated dose-response and treatment-effect functions provide clear answers 
to the three central questions of interest posed at the beginning of this paper. First, there is 
no minimum level of migration (other than one) necessary to generate positive returns in 
terms of exports; in fact, an individual migrant has the largest pro-trade effect when there 
are few migrants of the corresponding state-state classification. Second, while there does 
exist a small range of migrant stocks over which the marginal contribution of migrants 
turns slightly negative, this negative contribution is extremely temporary, as further 
migration returns the marginal contribution increasingly positive over the remaining range 
of state-state migrant stocks. Finally, because the marginal contribution remains positive 
beyond the exhaustion zone, the pro-trade effect of migration can only be maximized by 
the maximum level of observed state-state migration. 
 Conclusion 
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 Migrants indeed create a significant force in promoting extra trade from U.S. states 
of residence to Mexican states of origin. This finding is empirically consistent not only in 
statistical significance, but also in magnitude across the varied methods, specifications, and 
samples employed in this paper. Without consideration of potential nonlinearities and 
differing geographic proximities in an augmented gravity model, the elasticity of state-state 
exports to migration is 0.11, translating into $3061 extra annual exports per average extra 
migrant for a particular US-Mexico state-state combination, holding other factors constant. 
On the other hand, the application of generalized propensity scores permits the potential of 
nonlinearities in the migration-trade relationship, results pointing to a diminishing yet 
positive marginal contribution of migration to exports as migrant stock size increases over 
most of the range of measured migrant stocks. These results contribute the first evidence 
of the pro-trade effect of migration at the state-state level, a relatively localized level 
capable of measuring more accurately the potential determinants of trade and 
differentiating between migrant networks of varied state origin.  
 Additionally, this paper unmasks the importance of distinct geographic proximities 
that the use of one migration variable disguises. Through the examination of not only in-
state migration, but also neighboring-state and other-state migration, geographic proximity 
is revealed to indeed be a relevant factor in determining the pro-trade effect of migration, 
with networks suffering lower amounts of spatial separation making larger contributions 
to trade. Both in-state and neighboring-state migration make significantly positive 
contributions to state-state exports, with estimated elasticities of 0.07 and 0.08, 
respectively, resulting in partial contributions to average state-state exports of $1984 and 
$538. Combining the three contributions from migration of separate geographic 
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proximities gives an overall addition to state-state exports of $3792 by the average extra 
migrant.  
 Empirical studies employing data sets from countries other than the U.S. and 
Mexico, or classifying data by characteristics such as migrants' education level and 
participation in business networks, offer clear avenues for further research at the state-state 
level, just as they already have at the country-country level. In addition, sorting trade and 
migration data by industry, as well as decomposing the pro-trade effect into the intensive 
and extensive contributions, provides promising extensions. Furthermore, the very 
existence of the exhaustion zone gives another direction for related research specifically 
focusing on the GPS method: first, in verifying that a similar shape of the dose-response 
and treatment-effect functions obtains using other data, and second, in hypothesizing why 
it is that the exhaustion zone may exist yet does not extend to the larger migrant stocks 
providing positive contributions to state-state exports. Finally, the results not only shed 
light on how localized migration's nexus with trade may be and how geographic proximity 
matters, they inevitably connect to the ongoing debate in a host of countries as to the 
economic costs and benefits of migration. Without a doubt, the pro-trade effect of both in-
state and neighboring-state migration cannot be ignored in any careful analysis of the costs 
and benefits of migration. 
  
 Appendix: GPS robustness checks 
 As a first check on the robustness of the results, I carry out the GPS estimation 
adding the 48 observations corresponding to Mexico City into the sample, resulting in a 
starting sample size of 1536 state-state relationships, later reduced to 1478 after exclusion 
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according to the modified common support condition. If results are indeed robust to the 
inclusion of the extra Mexico City observations, the potential worries created by this 
sampling decision are minimized. Tables A.3 to A.7 and Figure A.2 display the key results 
for the larger sample, exhibiting only minor changes from the tables and figures highlighted 
previously. The GPS estimation allows for an improvement in balance from only 36% 
before the GPS to 76% after the GPS adjustment of covariate comparisons reflecting a lack 
of statistically significant differences at the 5% level; all but 3 covariate comparisons show 
lack of statistical significance after both GPS adjustment and exclusion based on the 
modified common support condition. The dose-response function in Figure A.2 is shifted 
slightly downward from that displayed in Figure 2.3, due to a slight decrease across the 
board in marginal exports associated with the marginal migrant. The inclusion of the 
Mexico City observations results in a dose-response function that corresponds to marginal 
contributions of $8118, $1678, and $158, respectively, for the 25th, 50th, and 75th 
percentiles (ܯ ൌ 34, 228,	and 1094) of the actual state-state migrant stock distribution for 
the ݊ ൌ 1478 sample. Furthermore, the downward shift results in an increased range for 
the exhaustion zone, now made up of migrant stocks between 2033 and 4465, 
corresponding to 7.4% of state-state migrant stocks. 
 Additionally, as detailed above, concerns may exist as to how well the matrícula 
consular data represents the actual state-state migrant distribution. In turn, I conduct a 
second check for robustness further excluding all observations associated with Texas and 
Illinois, the two outlier states from the original sample, resulting in a revised sample of 
1426 state-state observations, then reduced to 1380 by exclusion following the modified 
common support condition. The corresponding dose-response and treatment effect 
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functions are highlighted in Figure A.3, once again reflecting slight changes in outcomes 
from the original generalized propensity scores estimation. The GPS adjustment and use 
of the modified common support condition again provide a balancing of covariates, 
improving the percentage lacking statistically significant differences at the 5% level from 
33% to 87% to 94% of all possible covariate comparisons. Without the observations 
corresponding to Texas and Illinois, the dose-response and treatment effect functions again 
shift slightly downward, resulting in an exhaustion zone bordered by migrant stocks of 964 
and 8845, corresponding to 21.0% of state-state migrant stocks. Marginal contributions of 
$9238, $1641, and $18, respectively, correspond to the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles 
(ܯ ൌ 31, 201,	and 914) of the actual state-state migrant stock distribution for the ݊ ൌ
1380 sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics – base and alternative samples 
       Base sample Base sample minus     Base sample minus Texas 
Variable      ݊ ൌ 1536  Mexico City ݊ ൌ 1488   and Illinois ݊ ൌ 1472 
Exports (in USD) 81,993,616  73,115,405      50,679,743 
       (674,482,678) (658,528,331)      (385,569,081) 
       0/17,900,000,000 0/17,900,000,00     0/11,800,000,000 
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Migration 	௝௜       3038  2938       2377 
       (13,771)  (13,634)      (12,786) 
       0/270,201  0/270,201      0/270,201 
Migration 	௝					௔ௗ௝       12,409  12,070       12,770 
       (27,591)  (27,410)      (28,108) 
       1/308,918  1/308,918      1/308,918 
Migration 	௝						௥௘௦௧       130,355  126,016      130,655 
       (124,937)  (124,375)      (125,141) 
       858/525,394 858/525,394      858/525,394 
Distance (miles)   2078  2077       2106 
       (597)  (600)       (585) 
       239/3681  239/3681      239/3681 
Adjacency      0.006  0.006       0.004 
       (0.076)  (0.077)       (0.059) 
       0/1   0/1       0/1 
US GSP       34,392.30  34,392.30      31,232.81 
(bn. USD)      (39,909.53) (39,909.53)      (37,118.12) 
       2,950/218,967 2,950/218,967      2,950/218,967 
Mex. GSP      2,969.87  2,514.13      2,969.87 
(bn. USD)      (3,197.62)  (1,975.85)      (3,197.62) 
       529/17,097  529/9,235      529/17,097 
Notes: For each variable, means are listed first, standard deviations are reported in parentheses, while 
minimum/maximum pairs are reported in italics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2. Coefficient estimates using gravity equation (OLS, state fixed effects) 
Dependent variable: US-Mexico state-state exports 
Independent variable (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)        (5) 
Migration 	௝௜   0.1134*** 0.2403*** 0.1635***      0.1372***  0.0735* 
   (0.0382) (0.0348) (0.0420)         (0.0426)    (0.0432) 
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Migration 	௝					௔ௗ௝       0.1354***      0.0742       0.0814* 
       (0.0418)         (0.0457)    (0.0457) 
Migration 	௝							௥௘௦௧                   -0.5031*** -0.0215 
                   (0.1539)    (0.1685) 
Distance  -1.5952***           -1.4335*** 
   (0.2913)            (0.3177) 
Adjacency  1.2308***            1.3146*** 
   (0.4449)            (0.4531) 
Economy size  0.9365***            1.1589*** 
   (0.1391)            (0.1607) 
ܴଶ   0.8192  0.8116  0.8130             0.8143        0.8197 
݊   1536  1536  1536  1536           1536 
Notes: Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression with the logarithm of U.S.-Mexico state-state exports 
in U.S. dollars plus one as the dependent variable, employing the base sample of the 48 contiguous U.S. 
states and 32 Mexican states. All regressions include state fixed effects, controlling for any existing 
systematic differences across states that may affect all states' outcomes. Column (1) displays estimates for 
coefficients corresponding to the initial OLS equation. Column (2) reports estimates using only Migration 	௝௜  
as an explanatory variable, column (3) adds Migration 	௝					௔ௗ௝  as an explanatory variable, column (4) adds 
Migration 	௝							௥௘௦௧  and column (5) displays the preferred specification, adding the remainder of the relevant 
controls. Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and ** 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 2.3. Comparison of estimates for the elasticity of exports to migration 
        Elasticity of exports Extra annual exports   
Authors       to migration  generated per extra migrant Sample  Specification-Method 
My estimates       0.07 (in-state)  $1984 (in-state)  48 US states, 32  Pooled cross section, OLS with 
        0.08 (neighboring-state) $3792 (across all states) Mexican states, state-state trading partner fixed 
          2006-10  effects 
Aleksynska        0.25   $24,895   CEPII “square”  Pooled cross section, OLS with 
& Peri (2011)         gravity data set,  country-country fixed effects 
          5230 observations 
APR (2012)        0.02, 0.08, 0.07   ---    Italy, Portugal, and Panel, OLS with country-time 
         (in-state)       Spain, “about 100 and trading partner pairs 
         0.00, 0.02, -0.04  ---    countries,” 2002-10 fixed effects 
         (neighboring-state) 
Felbermayr &        0.11   $2717    21 “North” countries Pooled cross section, OLS, 
Jung (2009)         and 114 “South” differenced with country-country 
          countries, 1988-2000 fixed effects 
HS (2005)        0.16 (in-state)  ---    50 US states, 36  Pooled cross section, Tobit and 
         0.07 (other-state)      countries, 1993-96 LAD 
Peri & Requeña     0.05-0.11   ---    50 Spanish  Panel, OLS, 2SLS with country- 
(2010)                 provinces, 77  time and trading partner pairs 
          countries, 1993- fixed effects 
          2008 
White (2007)        0.11   $2608    US, 73 countries, Pooled cross section, OLS with 
          1980-2001  country-country fixed effects 
Notes: Estimates for elasticity are reported according to the preferred model specified by the authors in the corresponding articles, or if not specified, the most 
appropriate estimates for comparison to those of this paper. My estimates are those corresponding to the preferred base sample. Other articles' estimates are 
the following: the OLS fixed effects result for Aleksynska and Peri (2011), the benchmark OLS result for APR, the differenced result for Felbermayr and Jung 
(2009), the Tobit result for HS (2005), and the full sample result for White (2007). Figures for column 3 are generated according to the reported elasticities, 
multiplying the respective elasticity by the ratio of average state-state exports to average state-state stock of migrants; --- denotes that I found neither the 
corresponding summary statistics nor the estimate of the annual value of extra exports generated per migrant. 
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Table 2.4. Coefficient estimates using gravity equation, alternate samples (OLS, state fixed effects) 
Dependent variable: US-Mexico state-state exports, ݊ ൌ 1488 and ݊ ൌ 1472 
Independent variable   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)         
Migration 	௝௜           0.2394***  0.2349***  0.1616***  0.1554***  0.1351***  0.1355***  0.0671        0.0764* 
          (0.0354)      (0.0360)    (0.0428)     (0.0436)      (0.0434)     (0.0440)     (0.0440)     (0.0444) 
Migration 	௝					௔ௗ௝                0.1382***  0.1371***  0.0748        0.0725        0.0782*      0.0767 
               (0.0431)     (0.0429)      (0.0472)     (0.0475)     (0.0471)     (0.0476)  
Migration 	௝							௥௘௦௧          -0.5101*** -0.5032*** -0.0058      -0.0653 
          (0.1565)     (0.1608)     (0.1713)     (0.1730) 
Distance             -1.5813*** -1.3860*** 
               (0.3289)     (0.3351) 
Adjacency              1.2479***  1.7183*** 
               (0.4603)     (0.6060) 
Economy size              0.9927***  1.1865*** 
               (0.1510)     (0.1656) 
ܴଶ           0.7989  0.7965         0.8004      0.7980         0.8019        0.7994       0.8081         0.8052 
݊           1488         1472            1488            1472            1488           1472          1488            1472 
Notes: Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression with the logarithm of US-Mexico state-state exports in US dollars plus one as the dependent variable, 
employing the two alternative samples. All regressions include state fixed effects, controlling for any existing systematic differences across states that may 
affect all states' outcomes. Column (1) reports estimates using only Migration 	௝௜  as an explanatory variable, column (2) adds Migration 	௝					௔ௗ௝  as an explanatory 
variable, column (3) adds Migration 	௝							௥௘௦௧  and column (4) displays the preferred specification, adding the remainder of the relevant controls. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
Table 2.5. ࢽ૚and ࢽ૛with alternative (in)dependent variables (OLS, state fixed effects) 
    Base sample   Base sample minus Mexico  Base sample minus Texas 
(In)dependent variable ݊ ൌ 1536   City ݊ ൌ 1488   and Illinois ݊ ൌ 1472 
U.S.-Mexico state-state exports 2008 
Migration 	௝௜  2006-08  0.0929**  (0.0445)  0.0849*   (0.0454)   0.0935**  (0.0455) 
Migration 	௝					௔ௗ௝ 2006-08  0.0859*    (0.0484)  0.0850*   (0.0498)   0.0875*    (0.0489) 
ܴଶ    0.8028    0.7908     0.7991 
U.S.-Mexico state-state exports 2009 
Migration 	௝௜  2006-09  0.0803*    (0.0461)  0.0731     (0.0470)   0.0824*    (0.0470) 
Migration 	௝					௔ௗ௝ 2006-09  0.0547      (0.0492)  0.0505     (0.0508)   0.0548      (0.0499) 
ܴଶ    0.7940    0.7806     0.7898 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, while ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.6. Coefficient estimates using forwarded exports (OLS, state fixed effects) 
  J  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
Exports measure  2008  2009  2010  2009  2010  2010         
Migration measure  2006-07 2006-07 2006-07 2006-08 2006-08 2006-09 
Migration 	௝௜            0.1006** 0.1013** 0.0980** 0.0922** 0.0926** 0.0789* 
    (0.0444) (0.0446) (0.0446) (0.0447) (0.0447) (0.0461) 
Migration 	௝					௔ௗ௝    0.0824* 0.0473  0.0533  0.0514  0.0558  0.0599 
    (0.0484) (0.0486) (0.0486) (0.0486) (0.0486) (0.0492) 
Migration 	௝							௥௘௦௧    -0.0938 -0.1593 -0.0024 -0.1614 -0.0035 -0.0083 
    (0.1809) (0.1818) (0.1816) (0.1818) (0.1816) (0.1817)  
Distance   -1.4556*** -1.3079*** -1.6222*** -1.3146*** -1.6242*** -1.6367***  
    (0.3390) (0.3405) (0.3402) (0.3410) (0.3407) (0.3417)   
Adjacency   1.3076*** 1.2909*** 0.9733*** 1.2990*** 0.9791*** 0.9907*** 
    (0.4866) (0.4889) (0.4884) (0.4889) (0.4884) (0.4886)    
Economy size   1.3044*** 1.2673*** 1.1223*** 1.2717*** 1.1242*** 1.1360*** 
    (0.1723) (0.1731) (0.1729) (0.1733) (0.1731) (0.1731)   
ܴଶ           0.8029  0.7943  0.8076  0.7941  0.8075  0.8073 
݊     1536  1536  1536  1536  1536  1536 
Notes: Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression with the logarithm of U.S.-Mexico state-state exports in U.S. dollars plus one as the dependent variable, 
employing the base sample of the 48 contiguous U.S. states and 32 Mexican states. All regressions include state fixed effects, controlling for any existing 
systematic differences across states that may affect all states' outcomes. Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, 
** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.7. Coefficient estimates using gravity equation, migrant share  
(OLS, state fixed effects) 
      Base sample minus Base sample minus 
   Base sample  Mexico City   Texas and Illinois 
Independent variable ݊ ൌ 1536  ݊ ൌ 1488  ݊ ൌ 1472 
Migrant share 	௝௜  0.1251**  0.1172*  0.1397**      
   (0.0620)  (0.0631)  (0.0636)        
Distance  -1.7645***  -1.8887***  -1.7565*** 
   (0.2815)  (0.2893)  (0.2958) 
Adjacency  1.2013***  1.1264**  1.5184**  
   (0.4461)  (0.4529)  (0.5984) 
Economy size  1.2147***  0.6784***  1.1359***  
   (0.0907)  (0.1718)  (0.1204)  
ܴଶ   0.8186   0.8072   0.8041              
݊   1536   1488   1472   
Notes: Each column of estimates is from a separate OLS regression with the logarithm of U.S.-Mexico state-
state exports in U.S. dollars plus one as the dependent variable, employing the two alternative samples. All 
regressions include state fixed effects, controlling for any existing systematic differences across states that 
may affect all states' outcomes. Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.8. OLS estimation, dependent variable: ࢒࢔(migrants) 
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Covariates and statistics Estimated coefficient  Standard error 
U.S. population   20.31***   4.18 
U.S. population	ଶ  -0.75***   0.14 
Mex. Population  -5.82**   2.28 
Mex. population	ଶ  0.26***   0.08 
U.S. GSP   -7.46**   3.14 
U.S. GSP	ଶ   0.48***   0.14 
Mex. GSP   -0.03    1.75 
Mex. GSP	ଶ   -0.05    0.09 
U.S. pop. growth  6.58***   0.44 
Mex. pop. growth   -7.12***   0.75 
U.S. GSP growth  2.11***   0.68 
Mex. GSP growth  2.05***   0.46 
Adjacency   -0.17    0.46 
Distance   -3.00***   0.14 
U.S. unemployment  0.32***   0.04 
Mex. unemployment  0.10**    0.04 
U.S. Gini   -33.60***   2.38 
Mex. Gini   19.86***   13.32 
Constant   -47.89***   16.70 
Obervations     1488 
ܴଶ      0.76  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
Table 2.9. Groups and blocks, full sample ࢔ ൌ ૚૝ૡૡ 
Block  Group 1 Control 1 Group 2 Control 2 Group 3 Control 3 Group 4 Control 4 
1  37  958  37  651  37  565  37  738 
2  37  64  37  108  37  122  37  123 
3  38  30  37  65  37  76  37  100 
4  37  17  37  81  38  72  37  47 
5  38  18  37  54  37  71  37  25 
6  37  14  38  22  37  73  38  29 
7  37  5  37  30  38  44  37  15 
8  38  2  37  52  37  29  37  13 
9  37  4  37  31  37  41  37  13 
10  37  3  37  23  37  23  37  14 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.10. Groups and blocks, modified common support sample ࢔ ൌ ૚૝૛ૢ 
Block  Group 1 Control 1 Group 2 Control 2 Group 3 Control 3 Group 4 Control 4 
1  33  944  37  592  37  506  35  742 
2  34  62  37  108  37  122  35  132 
3  33  29  37  65  37  76  35  78 
4  34  26  37  81  38  72  35  28 
5  34  12  37  54  37  71  35  27 
6  33  10  38  22  37  73  35  19 
7  34  3  37  30  38  44  35  14 
8  33  1  37  52  37  29  35  13 
9  34  5  37  31  37  41  35  12 
10  33  2  37  23  37  23  35  14 
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Table 2.11. Three-stage balancing comparison of covariates 
   Before balancing on GPS  After balancing on GPS  Common support after balancing 
T-stats   ݊ ൌ 1488    (weighted t-stats) ݊ ൌ 1488  GPS (weighted t-stats) ݊ ൌ 1429 
Covariate  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
U.S. population 21.72 0.12 -4.04 -16.19  2.52 -0.41 0.41 -3.49  0.83 -0.30 0.42 -1.28 
U.S. population	ଶ 21.19 0.29 -3.69 -16.37  2.39 -0.40 0.46 -3.62  0.79 -0.30 0.47 -1.26 
Mex. Population 9.45 4.74 -2.67 -11.69  2.25 1.41 -0.25 -2.65  1.21 1.58 -0.18 -1.82  
Mex. population	ଶ 9.30 4.80 -2.55 -11.74  2.17 1.42 -0.23 -2.69  1.17 1.57 -0.16 -1.86 
U.S. GSP  21.39 0.18 -3.63 -16.50  2.30 -0.42 0.41 -3.65  0.61 -0.30 0.44 -1.35 
U.S. GSP	ଶ  20.56 0.41 -3.15 -16.66  2.11 -0.41 0.50 -3.79  0.56 -0.31 0.51 -1.33  
Mex. GSP  5.40 0.08 -0.39 -5.07  1.35 0.32 0.39 -1.10  0.96 0.36 0.41 -0.36 
Mex. GSP	ଶ  5.26 0.08 -0.31 -5.02  1.31 0.30 0.40 -1.13  0.94 0.34 0.42 -0.38  
U.S. pop. growth 6.52 2.16 -2.22 -6.46  1.51 0.81 -0.23 -2.11  1.27 0.72 -0.28 -1.43 
Mex. pop. growth  -2.87 2.67 0.27 -0.07  0.36 0.57 0.21 -0.28  0.51 0.55 0.19 -0.50  
U.S. GSP growth -6.76 -0.12 3.64 3.18  0.10 0.77 0.92 -0.08  0.04 0.66 0.85 0.24  
Mex. GSP growth -0.88 1.08 1.61 -1.78  -0.29 0.44 0.81 0.31  -0.32 0.45 0.82 0.15  
Adjacency                   1.74 1.73 0.96 -4.48  -0.59 0.73 0.41 -6.25  0.26 0.34 -0.32   0.13 
Distance  -14.03 -0.47 7.18 6.72  -4.75 -0.47 1.62 4.14  -4.18 -0.45 1.95 0.20  
U.S. unemployment 10.04 -0.10 -2.43 -7.26  1.03 0.32 0.55 -0.17  0.42 0.42 0.60 -0.34 
Mex. unemployment 1.31 -1.67 -3.10 3.41  1.62 0.01 -0.70 0.55  1.51 0.00 -0.66 0.91 
U.S. Gini  9.40 -1.23 -1.75 -6.19  1.37 -0.31 0.47 -1.91  0.32 -0.26 0.46 -0.59 
Mex. Gini  6.18 4.31 -3.50 -7.00  1.46 0.40 -0.87 -0.68  1.16 0.53 -0.83 -0.52 
Avg. absolute t-stat  5.46, 24/72 < |1.96|   1.22, 57/72 < |1.96|   0.71, 71/72 < |1.96| 
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Table 2.12. Covariate means: included vs. excluded observations 
   Mean of common    Mean of excluded 
Covariates  support observations   observations 
U.S. population 15.14     15.18 
Mex. population 14.50     14.70 
U.S. GSP  12.04     12.09 
Mex. GSP  9.77     9.86 
U.S. pop. growth 0.03     0.03 
Mex. pop. growth 0.09     0.09 
U.S. GSP growth 0.07     0.07 
Mex. GSP growth 0.08     0.08 
Adjacency  0.00     0.01 
Distance  7.58     7.60 
U.S. unemployment 5.66     5.67  
Mex. unemployment 3.82     3.77 
U.S. Gini  0.45     0.45 
Mex. Gini  0.47     0.48 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.13. OLS estimation, dependent variable: ࢒࢔(exports) 
Covariates and statistics Estimated coefficient  Standard error 
Migrant stock   1.06***   0.30 
Migrant stock	ଶ  -0.18***   0.07 
Migrant stock	ଷ  0.01***   0.00 
GPS    -5.65***   2.54 
Migrant stock ൈ GPS  1.54***   0.44 
Constant   11.75***   0.60 
Observations     1429 
ܴଶ      0.11 
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Table A.1.  Matrículas consulares registered 2006 to 2010, U.S. states of residence 
and Mexican states of origin: total of 4,659,656 
   U.S.      Mexico 
Alabama 27,442  Oklahoma 19,867  Aguascalientes 42,799  
Arizona 187,032  Oregon 74,103  Baja California 45,183 
Arkansas 19,711  Pennsylvania 23,555  Baja California Sur 3,178 
California 1,682,667  Rhode Island 931  Campeche 7,017 
Colorado 105,125  South Carolina 38,551 Chiapas 62,697 
Connecticut 10,645  South Dakota 723  Chihuahua 120,933 
Delaware 6,637  Tennessee 38,736  Coahuila 56,687 
Florida 107,392  Texas 779,636   Colima 32,326 
Georgia 150,704  Utah 55,330   Durango 126,923 
Idaho 16,340   Vermont 345   Guanajuato 377,674 
Illinois 387,377  Virginia 24,492  Guerrero 371,279 
Indiana 69,247  Washington 64,436  Hidalgo 131,280 
Iowa 15,953   West Virginia 663  Jalisco 425,607 
Kansas 21,981   Wisconsin 43,532  Mexico 238,343 
Kentucky 14,428  Wyoming 3,563  Mexico City 293,920 
Louisiana 8,074      Michoacan 525,514 
Maine 232       Morelos 105,732 
Maryland 20,729      Nayarit 72,227 
Massachusetts 2,629      Nuevo Leon 77,824 
Michigan 22,417      Oaxaca 283,295 
Minnesota 38,019      Puebla 307,606 
Missouri 17,103      Queretaro 58,608 
Mississippi 5,600      Quintana Roo 3,470 
Montana 164       San Luis Potosi 155,069 
Nebraska 22,291      Sinaloa 91,019 
New Hampshire 854      Sonora 49,074 
New Jersey 73,881      Tabasco 72,502 
New Mexico 53,212      Tamaulipas 98,290 
New York 133,625      Tlaxcala 35,293 
Nevada 108,310      Veracruz 205,799 
North Carolina 142,813     Yucatan 17,837 
North Dakota 54      Zacatecas 170,686 
Ohio 18,505        
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Table A.2.  Migration and trade in top U.S. states of Mexican migrant residence 
        California                        Texas    
Rank Migration  Exports            Migration           Exports  
1 Michoacan  Baja California Guanajuato           Chihuahua 
2 Jalisco   Mexico  San Luis Potosi         Tamaulipas 
3 Guerrero  Chihuahua  Tamaulipas           Mexico City 
4 Oaxaca  Mexico City  Nuevo Leon           Mexico 
5 Mexico City  Jalisco   Michoacan           Coahuila 
6 Guanajuato  Sonora   Guerrero           Nuevo Leon 
7 Puebla   Nuevo Leon  Zacatecas           Guanajuato 
8 Mexico  Sinaloa  Mexico            Jalisco 
9 Zacatecas  Tamaulipas  Coahuila           Queretaro 
10 Sinaloa  Puebla   Mexico City           Aguascalientes 
11 Nayarit  Baja California Sur Veracruz           San Luis Potosi 
12 Veracruz  Queretaro  Jalisco            Veracruz 
13 Morelos  Guanajuato  Durango            Hidalgo  
14 Hidalgo  Coahuila  Chihuahua           Sonora 
15 Baja California Aguascalientes Hidalgo           Durango 
16 Durango  Durango  Puebla            Tabasco 
17 Tabasco  San Luis Potosi Queretaro                 Baja California 
18 Colima  Quintana Roo  Oaxaca           Puebla 
19 Queretaro  Tlaxcala  Morelos           Michoacan 
20 Chiapas  Veracruz  Aguascalientes          Sinaloa 
21 Sonora   Hidalgo  Tabasco           Morelos 
22 Yucatan  Michoacan  Chiapas           Quintana Roo 
23 Aguascalientes Morelos  Tlaxcala           Campeche 
24 Tlaxcala  Yucatan  Sinaloa                      Colima 
25 Chihuahua  Campeche  Colima                     Zacatecas 
26 San Luis Potosi Nayarit  Nayarit                      Tlaxcala 
27 Coahuila  Tabasco  Campeche           Yucatan 
28 Tamaulipas  Zacatecas  Baja California         Oaxaca 
29 Nuevo Leon  Chiapas  Yucatan           Chiapas 
30 Campeche  Colima  Sonora                      Baja California  
31 Quintana Roo  Oaxaca  Quintana Roo           Guerrero 
32 Baja California Sur Guerrero  Baja California Sur   Nayarit  
Notes: States of origin are listed in order of number of matrículas consulares in the period of 2006 to 2010 
and value of state-state exports in 2010. 
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Table A.3. OLS estimation, dependent variable: ࢒࢔(migrants) 
Covariates and statistics Estimated coefficient  Standard error 
U.S. population  19.33***   4.09 
U.S. population	ଶ  -0.72***   0.14 
Mex. Population  -2.73    1.89 
Mex. population	ଶ  0.15**    0.06 
U.S. GSP   -6.61**   3.08 
U.S. GSP	ଶ   0.44***   0.13 
Mex. GSP   -3.39***   1.05 
Mex. GSP	ଶ   0.12**    0.05 
U.S. pop. growth  6.62***   0.43 
Mex. pop. growth   -6.84***   0.74 
U.S. GSP growth  2.20***   0.66 
Mex. GSP growth  1.94***   0.45 
Adjacency   -0.08    0.45 
Distance   -2.92***   0.14 
U.S. unemployment  0.32***   0.04 
Mex. unemployment  0.10**    0.04 
U.S. Gini   -33.02***   2.33 
Mex. Gini   20.95***   1.41 
Constant   -53.49***   16.32 
Obervations     1536 
ܴଶ      0.77  
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Table A.4. Groups and blocks, full sample ࢔ ൌ ૚૞૜૟ 
Block  Group 1 Control 1 Group 2 Control 2 Group 3 Control 3 Group 4 Control 4 
1  38  994  38  643  38  592  38  777 
2  39  57  38  130  38  126  38  114 
3  39  38  39  68  39  65  39  107  
4  38  17  38  88  38  83  39  44 
5  39  16  38  46  38  66  38  29 
6  39  15  39  43  39  62  38  26 
7  38  5  38  26  38  45  39  19 
8  39  2  39  52  39  50  39  11 
9  39  3  38  29  38  38  38  9 
10  38  3  38  28  38  26  38  16 
 
 
 
 
Table A.5. Groups and blocks, modified common support sample ࢔ ൌ ૚૝ૠૡ 
Block  Group 1 Control 1 Group 2 Control 2 Group 3 Control 3 Group 4 Control 4 
1  34  977  38  593  38  534  36  772 
2  35  58  38  124  38  126  37  144 
3  35  35  38  67  39  65  36  57 
4  36  26  39  89  38  83  37  40 
5  35  10  38  45  38  66  36  27 
6  35  10  38  43  39  62  36  27 
7  34  6  39  26  38  45  37  12 
8  36  1  38  52  39  50  37  13 
9  34  3  38  29  38  38  36  6 
10  35  3  38  28  38  26  36  16 
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Table A.6. Three-stage balancing comparison of covariates 
   Before balancing on GPS  After balancing on GPS  Common support after balancing 
T-stats   ݊ ൌ 1536    (weighted t-stats) ݊ ൌ 1536  GPS (weighted t-stats) ݊ ൌ 1478 
Covariate  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
U.S. population 22.15 0.02 -3.60 -17.21  2.66 -0.27 0.59 -4.05  1.07 -0.35 0.61 -1.93  
U.S. population	ଶ 21.63 0.19 -3.26 -17.41  2.52 -0.25 0.64 -4.19  1.03 -0.34 0.65 -1.93 
Mex. Population 9.84 5.53 -3.38 -12.23  2.22 1.48 -0.57 -2.45  1.24 1.62 -0.48 -1.61  
Mex. population	ଶ 9.70 5.61 -3.27 -12.29  2.15 1.50 -0.57 -2.48  1.20 1.64 -0.48 -1.63 
U.S. GSP  21.90 0.05 -3.18 -17.56  2.39 -0.26 0.60 -4.19  0.80 -0.35 0.63 -2.01 
U.S. GSP	ଶ  21.05 0.29 -2.70 -17.75  2.20 -0.23 0.68 -4.35  0.74 -0.33 0.70 -2.01  
Mex. GSP  5.73 1.71 -1.03 -6.44  1.08 0.70 0.09 -1.13  0.69 0.75 0.13 -0.37 
Mex. GSP	ଶ  5.59 1.80 -0.97 -6.46  0.97 0.70 0.09 -1.15  0.66 0.76 0.12 -0.40  
U.S. pop. growth 6.26 2.13 -2.08 -6.32  1.40 0.83 0.03 -2.02  1.19 0.75 -0.05 -0.88 
Mex. pop. growth  -3.03 1.47 0.75 0.81  0.35 -0.20 0.40 -0.27  0.53 -0.21 0.37 -0.31  
U.S. GSP growth -6.91 0.47 2.87 3.50  0.05 -0.93 0.86 -0.04  0.09 0.78 0.78 0.37  
Mex. GSP growth -0.93 0.62 1.71 -1.39  -0.41 0.55 0.85 0.24  -0.45 0.81 0.85 0.12  
Adjacency                   1.74 1.73 0.96 -4.47  0.59 0.72 0.37 -6.34  0.32 0.42 -0.04 0.00 
Distance  -14.13 0.04 7.17 6.31  -4.54 0.09 1.37 4.16  -3.92 0.25 1.64 0.02  
U.S. unemployment 10.37 -0.25 -2.23 -7.71  1.13 0.31 0.36 -0.50  0.58 0.36 0.43 -0.47 
Mex. unemployment 1.81 -0.63 -2.72 1.54  1.28 0.10 -0.55 0.21  1.15 0.12 -0.51 0.52 
U.S. Gini  9.74 -1.24 -1.56 -6.77  1.34 0.08 0.84 -2.51  0.45 -0.13 0.82 -0.99 
Mex. Gini  6.48 4.38 -4.11 -6.76  1.83 0.48 -1.00 -0.42  1.50 0.68 -0.93 -0.65 
Avg. absolute t-stat  5.66, 26/72 < |1.96|   1.28, 55/72 < |1.96|   0.76, 69/72 < |1.96| 
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Table A.7. OLS estimation, dependent variable: ࢒࢔(exports) 
Covariates and statistics Estimated coefficient  Standard error 
Migrant stock   1.11***   0.30 
Migrant stock	ଶ  -0.21***   0.07 
Migrant stock	ଷ  0.01***   0.00 
GPS    -7.58***   2.50 
Migrant stock ൈ GPS  1.91***   0.43 
Constant   12.03***   0.59 
Observations     1478 
ܴଶ      0.13 
 
 
 
 
Table A.8. OLS estimation, dependent variable: ࢒࢔(migrants) 
Covariates and statistics Estimated coefficient  Standard error 
U.S. population  20.11***   4.16 
U.S. population	ଶ  -0.75***   0.14 
Mex. Population  -6.46***   2.31 
Mex. population	ଶ  0.28***   0.08 
U.S. GSP   -8.01***   3.15 
U.S. GSP	ଶ   0.50***   0.14 
Mex. GSP   0.11    1.77 
Mex. GSP	ଶ   -0.06    0.09 
U.S. pop. growth  6.71***   0.44 
Mex. pop. growth   -7.11***   0.76 
U.S. GSP growth  2.14***   0.67 
Mex. GSP growth  2.04***   0.46 
Adjacency   -0.13    0.60 
Distance   -3.15***   0.15 
U.S. unemployment  0.320**   0.04 
Mex. unemployment  0.08**    0.04 
U.S. Gini   -33.48***   2.36 
Mex. Gini   20.35***   1.51 
Constant   -38.22***   16.78 
Obervations     1426 
ܴଶ      0.75  
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Table A.9. Groups and blocks, full sample ࢔ ൌ ૚૝૛૟ 
Block  Group 1 Control 1 Group 2 Control 2 Group 3 Control 3 Group 4 Control 4 
1  36  910  35  614  35  521  35  752 
2  36  51  35  90  36  125  36  97 
3  37  33  35  65  36  72  36  90 
4  36  17  35  63  36  55  35  42 
5  37  22  35  64  35  82  36  29 
6  36  15  35  34  36  61  36  25 
7  36  6  35  39  36  41  35  22 
8  37  2  35  35  36  47  36  6 
9  36  5  35  41  36  24  36  7 
10  36  2  35  31  35  41  35  0 
 
 
 
 
Table A.10. Groups and blocks, modified common support sample ࢔ ൌ ૚૜ૡ૙ 
Block  Group 1 Control 1 Group 2 Control 2 Group 3 Control 3 Group 4 Control 4 
1  32  904  34  576  35  475  34  709 
2  33  59  35  88  36  125  35  102 
3  33  28  36  61  36  72  35  88 
4  33  22  34  65  36  55  35  42 
5  33  16  36  61  35  82  35  31 
6  32  12  35  34  36  61  34  26 
7  33  4  35  40  36  41  35  18 
8  33  1  34  34  36  47  35  8 
9  33  5  36  41  36  24  35  8 
10  32  2  34  31  35  41  34  1  
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Table A.11. Three-stage balancing comparison of covariates 
   Before balancing on GPS  After balancing on GPS  Common support after balancing 
T-stats   ݊ ൌ 1426    (weighted t-stats) ݊ ൌ 1426  GPS (weighted t-stats) ݊ ൌ 1380 
Covariate  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
U.S. population 21.14 -1.16 -3.86 -14.54  2.61 -0.87 0.29 -1.03  1.13 -0.85 0.40 -0.79 
U.S. population	ଶ 20.62 -1.06 -3.53 -14.63  2.47 -0.89 0.35 -1.18  1.08 -0.88 0.45 -0.75 
Mex. Population 9.27 5.13 -2.88 -11.78  2.32 1.27 -0.40 -2.64  1.28 1.45 -0.30 -2.57  
Mex. population	ଶ 9.12 5.20 -2.74 -11.85  2.24 1.29 -0.37 -2.71  1.23 1.46 -0.27 -2.63  
U.S. GSP  20.79 -1.21 -3.43 -14.71  2.39 -0.90 0.30 -1.08  0.90 -0.88 0.42 -0.85 
U.S. GSP	ଶ  19.97 -1.06 -2.97 -14.76  2.21 -0.92 0.38 -1.02  0.84 -0.91 0.49 -0.79 
Mex. GSP  5.36 0.88 -1.11 -5.14  1.48 0.42 0.22 -1.36  1.16 0.51 0.25 -1.38 
Mex. GSP	ଶ  5.21 0.89 -1.03 -5.10  1.44 0.43 0.24 -1.40  1.14 0.51 0.26 -1.42  
U.S. pop. growth 6.00 2.59 -2.42 -6.20  1.16 1.09 -0.11 -1.44  1.12 1.04 -0.12 -1.32 
Mex. pop. growth  -2.92 2.34 0.80 -0.19  0.45 0.73 0.38 -0.50  0.65 0.79 0.36 -0.53  
U.S. GSP growth -6.90 0.02 3.11 3.73  -0.49 1.06 1.03 0.21  -0.25 0.97 0.98 0.21  
Mex. GSP growth -1.10 1.21 1.72 -1.82  -0.36 0.58 0.93 0.60  -0.37 0.81 0.91 0.52  
Adjacency                  1.31 1.28 0.26 -2.85  0.45 0.48 0.26 0.13  0.27 0.31 -0.28 0.12  
Distance  -13.11 -0.71 9.23 4.23  -4.46 -0.75 1.98 0.69  -3.92 -0.79 2.08 0.34  
U.S. unemployment 10.08 -0.28 -1.65 -8.05  1.47 0.04 0.67 -0.38  0.88 0.05 0.69 -0.28 
Mex. unemployment 1.19 -1.28 -3.53 3.62  1.68 0.02 -0.53 0.11  1.67 0.07 -0.52 0.13 
U.S. Gini  8.55 -1.58 -2.07 -4.79  1.31 -0.41 0.45 -0.52  0.59 -0.40 0.53 -0.36 
Mex. Gini  6.08 3.95 -3.18 -6.89  1.31 -0.06 -1.24 0.34  0.76 0.14 -1.14 0.27 
Avg. absolute t-stat  5.35, 24/72 < |1.96|   0.97, 63/72 < |1.96|   0.80, 68/72 < |1.96| 
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Table A.12. OLS estimation, dependent variable: ࢒࢔(exports) 
Covariates and statistics Estimated coefficient  Standard error 
Migrant stock   1.17***   0.31 
Migrant stock	ଶ  -0.20***   0.07 
Migrant stock	ଷ  0.01***   0.00 
GPS    -6.26***   2.61 
Migrant stock ൈ GPS  1.60***   0.46 
Constant   11.70***   0.62 
Observations     1380 
ܴଶ      0.10 
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Table A.13. State-state observations excluded by modified common support condition, starting sample of ࢔ ൌ ૚૝ૡૡ 
Arizona  Baja California South Dakota Baja California Sur  Texas  Zacatecas 
Arizona  Sonora   South Dakota Colima   Vermont Aguascalientes 
California  Baja California South Dakota Campeche   Vermont Baja California 
California  Veracruz  South Dakota Quintana Roo   Vermont Baja California Sur 
Maine    Baja California Sur Texas  Chihuahua   Vermont Colima 
Maine   Colima  Texas  Chiapas   Vermont Campeche 
Maine   Quintana Roo  Texas  Coahuila   Vermont Coahuila 
Montana   Colima  Texas  Durango   Vermont Morelos 
Montana  Campeche  Texas  Guerrero   Vermont Nayarit 
Montana  Quintana Roo  Texas  Guanajuato   Vermont Nuevo Leon 
North Dakota  Baja California Sur Texas   Hidalgo   Vermont Quintana Roo 
North Dakota  Colima  Texas   Jalisco    Vermont Queretaro 
North Dakota  Campeche  Texas  Michoacan   Vermont Sinaloa 
North Dakota  Morelos  Texas  Mexico   Vermont Sonora 
North Dakota  Quintana Roo  Texas  Nuevo Leon   Vermont Tlaxcala 
North Dakota  Yucatan  Texas  Oaxaca   Vermont Tamaulipas 
New Hampshire Baja California Sur Texas  Puebla    Vermont Yucatan 
Rhode Island  Baja California Sur Texas  San Luis Potosi  West Virginia Baja California Sur 
Rhode Island  Colima  Texas  Tamaulipas   West Virginia Quintana Roo 
Rhode Island  Quintana Roo  Texas  Veracruz   
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Table A.14. State-state observations excluded by modified common support condition, starting sample of ࢔ ൌ ૚૞૜૟ 
Arizona  Baja California South Dakota Baja California Sur  Texas  Zacatecas 
California  Baja California South Dakota Colima   Vermont Aguascalientes 
Maine    Baja California Sur South Dakota Campeche   Vermont Baja California 
Maine   Colima  South Dakota Quintana Roo   Vermont Baja California Sur 
Maine   Quintana Roo  Texas  Chihuahua   Vermont Colima 
Montana   Colima  Texas  Chiapas   Vermont Campeche 
Montana  Campeche  Texas  Durango   Vermont Coahuila 
Montana  Quintana Roo  Texas  Guerrero   Vermont Morelos 
North Dakota  Baja California Sur Texas  Guanajuato   Vermont Quintana Roo 
North Dakota  Colima  Texas   Hidalgo   Vermont Queretaro 
North Dakota  Campeche  Texas   Jalisco    Vermont Sinaloa 
North Dakota  Morelos  Texas  Michoacan   Vermont Sonora 
North Dakota  Quintana Roo  Texas  Mexico   Vermont Tabasco 
North Dakota  Yucatan  Texas   Mexico City   Vermont Tlaxcala 
New Hampshire Baja California Sur Texas  Nuevo Leon   Vermont Tamaulipas 
New Hampshire Baja California Sur Texas  Oaxaca   Vermont Yucatan 
New Hampshire Quintana Roo  Texas  San Luis Potosi  Vermont Tamaulipas 
Rhode Island  Baja California Sur Texas  Tamaulipas   West Virginia Baja California Sur 
Rhode Island  Colima  Texas   Veracruz   West Virginia Quintana Roo 
Rhode Island  Quintana Roo     
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Table A.15. State-state observations excluded by modified common support condition, starting sample of ࢔ ൌ ૚૝૛૟ 
Arizona Baja California North Dakota  Colima   Vermont  Colima 
Arizona Chihuahua  North Dakota  Campeche   Vermont Campeche 
Arizona Sonora   North Dakota  Quintana Roo   Vermont Coahuila 
California Baja California New Hampshire Baja California Sur  Vermont Morelos 
California Chihuahua  New Hampshire  Quintana Roo   Vermont Nuevo Leon 
California Mexico  Rhode Island  Baja California Sur  Vermont Quintana Roo 
California Oaxaca  Rhode Island  Colima   Vermont Queretaro 
California Puebla   Rhode Island  Quintana Roo   Vermont Sinaloa 
California Veracruz  South Dakota  Baja California Sur  Vermont Sonora 
Maine  Baja California Sur South Dakota  Campeche   Vermont Tabasco 
Maine  Colima  South Dakota  Colima   Vermont Tlaxcala 
Maine  Quintana Roo  South Dakota  Quintana Roo   Vermont Tamaulipas 
Montana Colima  Vermont  Aguascalientes  Vermont Yucatan 
Montana  Campeche  Vermont  Baja California  West Virginia Baja California Sur 
Montana Quintana Roo  Vermont  Baja California Sur  West Virginia Quintana Roo 
North Dakota Baja California Sur     
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Figure 2.1. Percentage distribution of matrículas consulares vs. U.S. Census 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Mexican states average education and migration 
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Figure 2.3. Dose response function and treatment effect function, ࢔ ൌ ૚૝૛ૢ 
 
 
 
Notes: 90 percent confidence intervals, represented by dashed lines, are constructed by bootstrapping. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Marginal contributions for migrants ൐ ૞૙૙ 
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Figure 2.5. Marginal contributions for migrants ൏ ૞૙૙ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1.  Migration and trade, simple correlation 
 
 
 
Notes: Migration is measured as the logarithm plus one of matrículas consulares from 2006-2010, while 
trade is measured as the logarithm plus one of trade in 2010; only values greater than zero are included. 
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Figure A.2.  Dose response function and treatment effect function, ࢔ ൌ ૚૝ૠૡ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.3.  Dose response function and treatment effect function, ࢔ ൌ ૚૜ૡ૙ 
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CHAPTER III 
WAGE GAPS, MIGRATION, AND DEVELOPMENT: 
A VIEW FROM BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER 
 Introduction 
 If a Mexican-born U.S. resident filed a visa application for a sibling living in 
Mexico 16 years, 11 months ago, that resident and sibling would just now be receiving a 
verdict. If the U.S. resident happened to be born in the Philippines, having filed an 
application for a sibling still living in the Philippines, they would be waiting even longer - 
currently up to 23 years and 7 months.47 While these astonishingly long lines at the United 
States border are clearly partly driven by U.S. immigration policy restrictions, specifically 
yearly quotas limiting the supply of immigrant visas depending on visa class and country 
of origin, the lines also exhibit the demand for entry into the United States. In the above 
cases, demand is most likely enhanced by the existence of family connections, however the 
difference in wages and standards of living across countries is arguably the most important 
factor attracting immigrants from all over the world. This demand is reflected by the fact 
that 272 potential migrants applied for each visa awarded by the 2010 U.S. Diversity Visa 
Lottery for entry at-large, the lottery open to those meeting minimum qualifications and 
not applying through family connections to U.S. residents. This number rose to 393 per 
available visa in 2012.48 
                                                          
47 These scenarios are based on online priority date information from the U.S. Bureau of Consular Affairs. 
As of September 1, 2013, the website lists a priority date for processing of October 8, 1996 for Mexican 
siblings, while that of February 15, 1990 for Filipino siblings. 
 
48 The U.S. Bureau of Consular Affairs' website lists detailed statistics for the Diversity Visa Lottery from 
2007-2012. 
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 International migration demands attention from economists on a number of issues, 
many of which have already been examined extensively by the literature. Among a wide 
variety of topics, researchers focus on effects of immigration on the destination country 
(Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica, 2007); effects of emigration on the origin country 
(Taylor and Dyer, 2009); remittances (Stark, 2009); migrant selection (McKenzie et al., 
2010); and most recently, factors underlying individual attitudes toward immigration (Card 
et al., 2012). The recognition of the extreme amount of demand for entry in excess of 
permitted supply raises the issue of efficiency gains from the relaxation of existing 
restrictions on immigration, in addition to the separate need for increased attention to the 
effects of migration on the migrants themselves. Only a handful of researchers have started 
to tackle these themes, especially crucial to potential migrants outside the OECD countries, 
given that studies generally find huge economic gains accruing to those who actually cross 
the border into the wealthier countries. For example, Clemens et al. (2008), hereafter CMP, 
calculates wage ratios for 42 developing countries of observably equivalent workers 
residing in the US compared to residing in the respective country of origin, adjusting for 
selection, estimating a median of over 4 for all countries examined. Furthermore, of the 
three areas of globalization (goods, capital, and labor), efficiency arguments clearly point 
to restrictions on labor mobility as the single largest remaining cause of market distortions 
and efficiency losses in the world economy, with goods and capital already enjoying much 
higher levels of relatively unrestrained mobility. Pritchett (2006) succinctly signals the 
huge disparity in possible worldwide efficiency gains from the three areas of globalization, 
comparing a gain of $65 billion from complete capital liberalization (Caselli and Feyrer, 
2007), a gain of $107 billion from complete trade liberalization (World Bank, 2005), and 
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the massive gain of $65 trillion from complete labor mobility (Hamilton and Whalley, 
1984; Klein and Ventura, 2004). Even a slight relaxation of labor mobility restrictions 
would result in huge efficiency gains, estimated at $170 billion given a 3% increase in 
migrants in the labor forces of OECD countries (Walmsley and Winters, 2005). 
 Accepting the potential gains as a given, the issue turns to one of ethics, as limiting 
labor mobility is the only remaining widely accepted discrimination based on a 
characteristic determined by birth, that of national origin. By sustaining strong restrictions 
on labor mobility, wealthy countries are implicitly valuing potentially minuscule losses to 
small groups of existing residents more than the huge potential gains to new residents 
simply based on country of birth, difficult to justify on any ethical grounds.49 Both 
economic efficiency and ethical arguments lead to unequivocal support in favor of more 
labor mobility, arguments that become even stronger if viewing human mobility in the light 
of its current and potential contributions to economic development. As stated by Clemens 
and Pritchett (2008), “...crossing international borders is not an alternative to economic 
development, it is economic development.” Indeed, 23 of every 100 Mexicans earning 
more than $10/day live abroad; 87 of every 100 Haitians earning more than $10/day live 
abroad. Simply put, while migration is much more a complement to rather than a substitute 
for more traditionally accepted development strategies, migration indeed makes a large 
contribution to the economic development of migrants themselves. 
 My analysis examines the connection between existing wage gaps, migration, and 
migration's power for development, coinciding with CMP in its attempt to bring these 
                                                          
49 The total welfare gain or loss related to immigration remains relatively controversial, with recent 
research from di Giovanni et al. (2013) finding that natives in migrant-receiving countries actually 
experience long-run gains from increased migration.  
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issues to the forefront of the international migration and economic development research 
agendas. My empirical analysis relies heavily on two datasets - first, a novel dataset 
compiled from personal interviews with migrants in the U.S. as well as households in high-
migration communities in Mexico, and second, La Encuesta sobre Migración en la 
Frontera Norte de México (EMIF) dataset captures human flows between the United States 
and Mexico. By way of the detailed survey information from both EMIF and my original 
data, as well as Mexican census data, I allow for a comparison across the differing samples 
in attempting to answer the following questions: (1) What are the wage gains for migrants 
arriving to and working in the United States? (2) Where in the origin wage distribution do 
migrants come from? (3) Where in the origin wage distribution do migrants end up?  
 In examining the first question, I contribute to the limited number of existing 
estimates detailing international wage gaps. Mexican household survey information, along 
with the data mentioned above, allows for the calculation of exact wage gains for the 
subsample of migrants reporting before- and after-migration wages in both EMIF and the 
new data. In answering the second, I focus on the issue of selection, clearly relevant in 
thinking about possible future gains from further migration. I again combine the existing 
household survey data with the EMIF and new data in pinpointing migrants' starting 
positions within the origin wage distributions. Finally, in examining the third, I contribute 
evidence to migration's power of development. Specifically, I take the gains to migrants 
from question one and place these post-migration wages in the origin wage distribution, 
allowing for a dynamic comparison of migrants' before- and after-migration wages relative 
to the relevant origin community. Opting to adopt the approach of Clemens and Pritchett 
(2008) and focus on people rather than places in terms of development, addressing these 
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three questions systematically allows me to obtain succinct measures of migrants' 
economic development, in addition to the development relative to those remaining in origin 
communities. In particular, the figures for migrants' wage gains from the subsamples make 
a much needed contribution; estimates for gains based on comparing outcomes for 
observably similar workers are somewhat more common, however gains calculated based 
on comparing outcomes for observably and unobservably identical workers - the same 
individuals - are few and far between. 
 I find that the migrant groups under examination enjoy immediate average wage 
gains from migration of over $5 (at Purchasing Power Parity) per hour worked, resulting 
in average income increases of over fivefold. These absolute wage gains translate into 
average relative movements within origin wage distributions of upwards of 50 and 60 
percentiles, respectively, for the main two groups studied. Additionally, all but two of the 
approximately 40% of migrants in poverty before migration are able to rise above the 
poverty line by moving across borders. In continuation, I highlight issues related to the 
data, discuss the results, and briefly conclude.  
 Data and Background 
 My analysis draws on three datasets: the 2010 Mexican Census, EMIF covering the 
years 1999-2009, and the original data collected through household interviews in 
communities both in Mexico (HIMEX) and the United States (HIUS). The EMIF data 
provides a first look into the actual wage gains accruing to Mexican migrants choosing to 
cross the border, as the population working in the U.S. and reentering Mexico in order to 
visit can be correctly identified through the survey results. The population that provides an 
answer as to wages in the U.S. and the wages earned in Mexico immediately before 
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migration form my EMIF sample under examination. It is important to point out that this 
sample does not address the wage gains question as exactly as we would like, as migrants 
report current wages in the U.S. as opposed to the wages received immediately after 
migration to the U.S. during the interview upon reentry into Mexico. Assuming that with 
time comes added experience, skills, and possible adaptation to a new labor market that 
contributes to higher productivity and results in higher wages, this clearly has the potential 
of biasing the apparent wage gains upward, entirely dependent on how much time has 
passed between time of migration and the time of the EMIF interview.50  
 The novel HIMEX and HIUS data address this shortcoming directly, detailing 
migrants' wages both immediately before and after migration. Although in some cases the 
physical process of migration can be a long one, possibly even several months, it is difficult 
to argue that during that time any new experience, skills, or any other factor that would 
potentially affect the wage-earning ability of an individual are acquired; this time is spent 
just migrating. Therefore, the only change affecting wages is physical geographic location; 
a migrant simply leaves one labor market in order to enter another, allowing for complete 
identification of the wage gains stemming from migration.  
 HIMEX and HIUS data are the result of household interviews, conducted both in 
Mexico and the U.S. during 2012, following a format similar to that of the Mexican 
Migration Project (MMP). HIMEX comprises 264 interviews in the state of Veracruz, 
Mexico, a state for which U.S.-destined migration has increased in recent years, while 
                                                          
50 Length of time between migration and the EMIF interview varies across the waves of the EMIF, clearly 
increasing in recent years, with the averages as follows: 33 months in 2009, 25 months in 2008, 24 months 
in 2007, 19 months in 2006, 18 months in 2005, 17 months in 2004, 16 months in 2003, 13 months in 2002, 
13 months in 2001, 11 months in 2000, and 11 months in 1999. 
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HIUS is formed by 187 interviews in South Florida. While the HIMEX and HIUS samples 
do not necessarily provide data representative of the entire Mexico-U.S. migrant 
population, they do contribute two snapshots that are representative at the respective 
community level, as households are randomly selected within communities for 
participation. Random selection is based on a process of dividing communities into 
equally-sized blocks based on satellite map imagery, and the subsequent verification of 
mapping of all community blocks in person upon arrival at each specific location.51 The 
random selection on both sides of the border provides a key difference between my data 
and that of the MMP. The MMP uses the “snowball method” relying on personal references 
in U.S. migrant communities; since random selection is used in both Veracruz and South 
Florida in my survey, both samples indeed are representative of the communities surveyed.  
 In addition to absolute wage gains, relative income gains are often argued to be a 
potential benefit of importance to migrants. If an individual's income is not only increasing 
in absolute terms, but is also growing relative to that of the appropriate reference 
population, migration may be even more attractive.52 The Census data allows for the 
construction of the origin wage distributions from which the migrant sample migrates.53 In 
turn, inserting the HIMEX and HIUS pre- and post-migration wages into the respective 
                                                          
51 HIMEX and HIUS refusal to participate rates reach 12% and 25%, respectively. The number of 
observations containing both pre- and post-migration wages included in the calculation of the results 
presented in the remainder of the paper are 128 and 69, respectively, due to incomplete answering of the 
survey. 
 
52 See Stark and Taylor (1991) for an exposition on the potential importance of these relative differences, 
coined relative deprivation. 
53 The 2010 Census includes data on wages and various units of time of the wages reported, allowing for a 
simple calculation of the hourly wage. 
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origin wage distributions permits a clear comparison of the relative position of migrants in 
the associated income distributions pre- and post-migration.  
 For purposes of comparison, all wages are converted to 2011 US dollars at 
Purchasing Power Parity (P$) by using World Bank (2012) GDP conversion factors, as 
well as the US CPI-U series. Observations containing apparent reporting errors as to wages 
are dropped from the EMIF and Census data.54 I use eleven waves of EMIF data, the 
average sample size being 6,480. Those migrants reporting wages earned in the U.S. and 
wages earned in Mexico immediately before migration average 480 per wave. I extract the 
Census data for the nine states and fifteen different Mexican municipios (municipalities) 
represented in the HIMEX and HIUS populations, then examining the relative gains at the 
municipality level. Approximately one-third of Census observations contain wage 
information, examined municipalities ranging from 1,323 to 17,721 in the number of 
reported wages.55  
 Table 3.1 outlines summary statistics from the gathered data on migrants, including 
mean, median, standard deviation, and range for each of the two main samples. In 
comparing the two samples, on average HIMEX migrants have higher pre- and post-
migration wages; furthermore, they are slightly younger at the time of the interview, more 
likely to be male, more educated, and less settled in destination communities (by number 
of years since migration), relative to HIUS migrants. Additionally, 66% and 80% of 
HIMEX and HIUS migrants are married, respectively. HIMEX migrants are more likely to 
                                                          
54 This includes hourly wages less than $0.20 (2011 P$) and clear reporting errors, such as an hourly wage 
for manual labor of $450 or $1050. 
 
55 Due to lack of available data, Mexico City, which encompasses various municipalities, is not examined 
at the municipality level. 
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send remittances than HIUS migrants (21% and 25%, respectively, report sending no 
remittances); those HIMEX migrants who do send remittances send more on average than 
HIUS migrants, the respective averages representing 18% and 12% of post-migration 
wages.56  
 Results and Discussion 
 Absolute wage gains 
 In discussing the results, I use the following straightforward definitions for wage 
differences ሺܦௐ௜ሻ and wage ratios ሺܴௐ௜ሻ: ሺܦௐ௜ሻ ൌ ൫ ௜ܹ,௣௢௦௧ െ ௜ܹ,௣௥௘൯, where ௜ܹ,௣௢௦௧  and 
௜ܹ,௣௥௘ are hourly wages for individual ݅ adjusted to 2011 P$ immediately post- and pre-
migration, respectively, and ܴௐ௜ ൌ ௐ೔,೛೚ೞ೟ௐ೔,೛ೝ೐ . 
 HIMEX 
 Figure 3.1 summarizes the pre- and post-migration wages for HIMEX emigrants. 
On average, a HIMEX emigrant gains P$7.06 in hourly wages by leaving Mexico and 
entering the U.S. This gain in wages is immediate, representing the wage gains due purely 
to geographic relocation. Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2 signal that this average disguises 
considerable variation in gains across the population, with ܦௐ௜ ∈ ሾ3.44, 20.53ሿ, however 
all emigrants certainly enjoy positive wage gains from crossing the border. Considering an 
alternative measure of wage gains, that of wage ratio ܴௐ௜, the average ratio of HIMEX 
emigrants is 5.24, meaning that emigrants face earning more than five times in post-
migration wages than those earned immediately before migration. Figure 3.3 highlights the 
                                                          
56 This percentage calculation assumes a 40-hour workweek and four weeks of monthly work, as 
remittances are reported by migrants on a monthly basis. 
118 
 
variation across individuals in ܴௐ௜, this measure ranging from 1.91 to 13.65. Without a 
benchmark for comparison, it is difficult to judge whether these gains are “small” or 
“large,” although at first glance the gains to migrants seem quite substantial. However, 
simple observation using measures of poverty helps to start put in perspective the 
magnitude of gains accruing to migrants willing and wanting to cross the border in the 
HIMEX sample. A considerable amount of the HIMEX population is moving out of 
poverty, whether using the Mexican or U.S. definition of the poverty line. Immediately 
before undertaking migration, 30% of HIMEX migrants are below the Mexican poverty 
line of $1904 (unadjusted, per individual) pesos per month established by the Consejo 
Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL).57 Immediately 
after migration, with an average wage of P$8.92 per hour, zero HIMEX migrants are in 
poverty measured by the 2012 U.S. standard of $11,170 (unadjusted, per individual) 
annually; the entire portion of impoverished individuals not only springboards out of 
poverty by the Mexican measure, poverty is no longer found in this population even when 
measured by the more stringent U.S. poverty line. 
 HIUS 
 Figure 3.4 shows hourly wages for the HIUS migrants pre- and post-migration. By 
visual inspection, the distributions are quite similar to those of the HIMEX sample; Table 
3.2 highlights that HIUS migrants have a slightly lower pre- and post-migration hourly 
wage than their HIMEX counterparts, averaging P$1.75 and P$6.96, respectively. Average 
absolute wage gains of P$5.22 accrue to HIUS migrants, coming up short of those of 
                                                          
57 For ease of exposition, I use the most recent poverty line pobreza patrimonial from 2008, although the 
CONEVAL has also adopted a multidimensional strategy for measuring poverty in Mexico based on 
factors other than just income. 
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HIMEX migrants. However, the distribution of those gains exhibits more homogeneity for 
HIUS migrants than for HIMEX migrants, with ܦௐ௜ ∈ ሾ1.77, 8.80ሿ as evidenced in Figure 
3.5.  
 As displayed in Figure 3.6, HIUS migrants enjoy an average wage ratio of 5.56, 
nearly mirroring the HIMEX average wage ratio; even the migrant gaining the least in 
magnitude still enjoys considerable wage gains, enjoying a wage ratio of 1.41. Again 
framing the evidence in terms of the Mexican and U.S. poverty lines, 63% of HIUS 
migrants live in poverty pre-migration, earning less than $1904 pesos per month. 
Astoundingly, the act of migrating moves all but two migrants above the U.S. poverty line 
of $11,170 annual dollars in post-migration wages, while zero are left in poverty by the 
Mexican measure. 
 EMIF 
 Although the variation in time elapsed between each individual's migration and the 
corresponding EMIF survey is problematic for identifying the wage gains due solely to 
geographic mobility, the data provides a benchmark for comparing the gains found in the 
HIMEX and HIUS samples, especially useful since the EMIF provides a representative 
sample of Mexican border crossers.58 Figure 3.7 depicts the absolute wage gains accruing 
to EMIF-surveyed migrants, showing the distribution of pre-migration versus post-
migration hourly wages. For both wage distributions and the resulting wage ratios 
displayed in Figure 3.8, results are extremely consistent across the eleven EMIF waves 
examined, with only the slight amount of variation noted by comparing averages (medians) 
                                                          
58 See Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social (2012) for details on methodology of the EMIF. 
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from Table 3.2. The full EMIF samples exhibit a wage difference range (in averages) from 
a minimum of P$6.20 (2003) to a maximum of P$7.68 (2009); wage ratio averages lie 
between 4.65 (2003) and 5.29 (1999 and 2009). While HIUS average wage differences fall 
short of those of the EMIF samples due to overall lower wages (both before and after 
migration), both HIMEX and HIUS wage ratios reside near the upper limit of the EMIF 
samples, HIUS average wage ratios eclipsing all EMIF averages at 5.56.  
 In the interest of further detailing the true amount of wage gains attributable solely 
to migration, I trim the EMIF samples by analyzing wage changes for only those migrants 
who report fewer than twelve months elapsed between migration and the EMIF interview. 
With this limited window of time, it is reasonable to assume that the U.S. wages reported 
in the EMIF interview are equal to the wages received immediately after migration. Given 
the expectation that both wage ratios and wage differences are biased upward as longer 
time periods elapse between migration and the EMIF survey, the revised samples should 
return both attenuated wage differences and wage ratios compared to those of the full EMIF 
samples. Table 3.2 confirms the hypothesized effect, as both wage differences and wage 
ratios drop across all EMIF waves for the subsample reporting less than twelve months 
elapsed. However, perhaps somewhat surprisingly the decreases are not large in magnitude, 
leaving two possible explanations. First, migrant workers may not be enjoying as much 
wage growth as expected after arrival in the U.S., most wage gains actually accruing 
immediately upon arrival due exclusively to migration. Second, differences in time elapsed 
between the trimmed sample of less than twelve months and the rest of the sample may not 
be large enough to permit wage growth over time to take on any magnitude of significance 
in the present analysis. Average wage differences ranging from P$5.87 (2003) to P$7.14 
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(2009) approach those of HIMEX and HIUS migrants, while HIMEX and HIUS average 
wage ratios lie just above the trimmed samples' range of 3.92 (2008) to 5.22 (1999). 
 In further examining these results, I again rely on CMP and Pritchett (2006) in 
making comparisons with various wage ratios discussed in the literature. CMP provides a 
convenient benchmark estimate for comparison with ܴௐ௜, however it is important to note 
that this estimate is generated from much different data and observably equivalent workers, 
adjusted for selection, while my figures are calculated comparing observably and 
unobservably equivalent workers; the CMP measure of ܴ ௘ (comparable to ܴ ௐ௜) for Mexico 
is estimated as 2.46, after adjustment for selection. Pritchett (2006) highlights other types 
of wage discrimination dependent on aspects such as race or gender; for example, the 1995 
male-female wage ratio in the US is estimated as 1.3 and in the median country as 1.4, 
while the 1939 US white-black wage ratio has been estimated at 1.6. While these wage 
ratios pale in comparison to both the ܴ ௘ of CMP and even the lowest of my calculated wage 
ratios, ironically they receive much more attention than the wage ratios mentioned in this 
paper. With no formal restrictions on worker mobility, one might imagine a ܴௐ௜ 
approaching the geographic ratios also mentioned in Pritchett (2006) of the 1999 urban-
rural wage ratio of 1.4 averaged over 43 countries, or the 1999 US-Puerto Rico wage ratio 
of 1.5.59 
  
 Relative wage gains 
                                                          
59 Even with no restrictions on worker mobility, it is reasonable to expect the sustainability of wage ratios 
greater than 1, as the costs of moving, including potential differences in language, customs, culture, etc. 
make relocating less attractive relative to the origin. 
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 Examining relative wage gains provides a second perspective on the economic 
benefits migrants enjoy by moving across the border. The widely-studied idea of relative 
deprivation highlighted in Stark and Taylor (1991) forms the theoretical foundation for my 
strategy of placing the migrant pre- and post-migration wages into the wage distribution of 
the origin communities, specifically at the municipality level. This allows for a 
straightforward inspection of where in the distribution migrants come from, and where in 
the distribution migrants end up. The selection of the origin community as the relevant 
reference group is simple to justify as the majority of migrants in the HIMEX and HIUS 
samples maintain strong connections with family members in Mexico, migrants often 
crossing the border without their immediate families. Anecdotal evidence confirms this 
idea as well, as several interviewees in Mexico explained, “If you want to talk to the 
migrant families, just look for the nicer houses.” Some of these houses are the result of 
individual male migrants sending money to their respective wives who have stayed behind 
in Mexico, while some are the result of accumulated savings for a migrant who decided to 
make the move back to Mexico after some time in the U.S. - in either case, the evidence 
indeed points to the origin community as the appropriate group of reference. While 
reference groups may be subject to partial or complete revision if a migrant becomes more 
(less) connected to the destination (origin) community, I assume this possibility away, 
especially given that the measured wage gains accrue immediately upon migration, when 
migrants are arguably just as connected to origin communities as before undertaking 
migration.60 
                                                          
60 I relax this assumption in the following subsection, examining the possibility of revised groups of 
reference. 
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 HIMEX 
 Figure 9 clearly shows the movement in the origin wage distribution that HIMEX 
migrants make. Pre-migration wages are concentrated in the lower half of the Census wage 
distribution, with the dashed-line bars representing these wages before relocation. Post-
migration wages move to the right tail of the distribution, dotted bars representing these 
relatively high wages after relocation. Figure 3.10 paints an even clearer picture of the 
relative movement, as it displays the percentiles of the origin wage distribution from which 
migrants come and the percentiles in which they end up immediately after migrating. 
HIMEX migrants are fairly evenly spread out among the Census distribution before 
migration, although the majority clearly comes from below the median wage. However, 
the dotted bars represent the dramatic post-migration change; all migrants move to the 
upper two deciles of the origin wage distribution simply by migrating. Migrant pre-
migration wages are spread between the 3rd and 92nd percentiles of the Census wage 
distribution, the average coming from the 38th and the median from the 40th; post-
migration wages all fall in the upper section of Census wages between the 84th and 99th 
percentiles, the average falling in the 90th and the median in the 91st. As a result, the 
average HIMEX migrant leapfrogs over 52 percent of the reference population by 
undertaking migration. 
 
 
 HIUS 
 HIUS migrants come from an assortment of origin wage distributions, spread across 
14 municipalities in 8 different Mexican states. Figure 3.11 summarizes the relative gains 
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for all HIUS migrants across all represented municipalities, although migrants are placed 
in the respective origin wage distributions separately in order to arrive at the displayed 
percentiles. HIUS migrants come disproportionately from the lower deciles of the various 
Census wage distributions, starting from relatively disadvantaged income positions even 
more than HIMEX migrants. However, movements within the origin wage distributions 
are quite similar to those of the HIMEX counterparts; HIUS migrants move to the upper 
deciles of the Census wage distributions, with slightly greater variation in percentile 
outcomes than HIMEX migrants. HIUS migrant pre-migration wages are spread between 
the 1st and 84th percentiles of the respective Census wage distributions, the average 
coming from the 15th and the median from the 9th; post-migration wages fall between the 
52nd and 94th percentiles of Census wages, the average falling in the 79th and the median 
in the 80th. These dramatic changes result in the average HIUS migrant jumping over 64 
percent of the population within the origin wage distribution upon migrating. 
 Are migrants better off after migration? 
 Clearly migrants are benefiting from large wage gains; however, income gains do 
not necessarily translate into a higher level of overall well-being. Costs of migration, both 
financial and any costs related to a preference for places of origin, cut into the income gains 
that migrants enjoy, but migrants may also change the relevant group of reference upon 
migrating or over time as adaptation to the place of destination occurs, this possibility 
examined recently in Stillman et al. (2012). If the reference group changes, even a higher 
level of objective well-being (income gains net of any migration costs) could result in a 
lower level of subjective well-being if migrants now compare their respective situations to 
the incomes of the destination community that are generally higher than those of the 
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community of origin. While revealed preference suggests that migrants are better off after 
migration, Bartram (2011) argues that migration results in seemingly paradoxical lower 
levels of well-being. However, Stillman et al. (2012) challenges this conclusion, 
emphasizing clear higher levels of objective well-being yet complex and conflicting results 
regarding subjective well-being. 
 Unfortunately, given the nature of the potential costs of migration, measuring the 
wage gains to migration is an easier task than measuring the costs. It is nearly impossible 
to quantify any cost related to differences in language and culture or a preference for place 
of origin; however, my survey data provides a glimpse as to the large portion of the 
migration cost related to the actual trip. The actual cost of the migration trip itself averages 
P$2249 for HIMEX migrants and P$2570 for HIUS migrants.61 This cost includes and is 
often dominated by the frequent cost of the hired coyote, responsible for facilitating the 
border crossing of undocumented migrants.62 This up-front cost to migration is certainly 
large, often requiring borrowing to finance the expense, especially given the origin income 
levels of the migrants entering the samples. The substantial average costs are equivalent to 
between 9 and 11 months income for an individual hovering at the Mexican poverty line 
of $1904 pesos per month. However, Table 3.3 provides a contrasting perspective, arguably 
signaling that this cost is not as large as first appears. Given cost of migration ܿ௜ and wage 
difference ܦௐ௜, I calculate the number of hours of work required for each individual 
migrant to “break even,” ܧ௜ ൌ ௖೔஽ೈ೔. 
                                                          
61 In all reported statistics related to cost and the subsequent break-even hours, I do not include 
observations for migrants reporting a total cost of $0. 
 
62 While interviewees are not explicitly asked about legal status or the use of coyotes, many volunteer 
information, detailing both the cost of the coyote as well as the total cost of migration. 
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 Assuming a 40-hour workweek, the average HIMEX migrant breaks even near the 
beginning of the ninth week of work, while the average HIUS migrant must wait until the 
thirteenth week. In turn, objective well-being is clearly increased through migration, unless 
those uncaptured recurring costs of migration related to preference for place of origin 
surpass the remaining wage gains during the first year of migration and also year after year 
if the migrant prolongs residence in the destination community. While impossible to rule 
out given lack of data on the other costs of migration, the possibility of a net loss does not 
appear to be a likely occurrence, as this would require those other costs of migration to 
average a minimum of P$8737 and P$5576 for HIMEX and HIUS migrants per year, 
respectively, given the average break-even hours and wage gains for each group.63 
 With apparent gains in objective well-being in hand, the last question of my 
household survey allows for the examination of the subjective well-being of migrants, as 
well as insight on the relative importance of absolute versus relative gains. “Knowing what 
you do today, would you choose to migrate if you had the decision to make again?” was 
asked of every survey participant as a wrap-up question to the interview.64 In turn, 
examining the various possible outcomes related to this question, partially dependent on 
whether migrants update the reference group to the destination community or hold on to 
                                                          
63 This requirement is conservatively calculated with the first year of migration in mind, when costs are 
highest due to the cost of the actual trip, ܿ௜; I assume a 40-hour workweek and 40 weeks of work per year, 
allowing for periods of unemployment. Given the averages of break-even hours, this means that HIMEX 
and HIUS migrants have 1237.6 and 1068.32 hours, respectively, left over to cover any uncaptured costs of 
migration before experiencing zero net gains. 
64 While reporting responses beyond the yes/no answers is outside the scope of this paper, this question 
resulted in much of the most interesting information that the interviewees shared with me, as many 
migrants expressed strong mixed feelings on migration related to (dis)advantages of the communities of 
origin and destination. 
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the community of origin, allows for inference on the subjective well-being of migrants and 
further exploration of absolute versus relative gains from migration.65 
 Given that all migrants in the HIMEX and HIUS samples experience both absolute 
and relative gains (relative to the origin community), if “no” is the chosen answer, only 
two options exist: (1) the costs of migration are so great that they outweigh the absolute 
and relative wage gains, or (2) the migrant is indeed updating the reference group and 
suffering a worse relative standing within the relevant community overshadows the large 
absolute gains from migration. If the answer is “yes,” one of three explanations must hold 
for each migrant: (1) updating of the reference group occurs and relative position worsens, 
however the absolute gains are large enough to outweigh the relative losses, (2) updating 
of the reference group occurs and relative position improves, adding extra benefit to the 
absolute gains, or (3) no updating of the reference group occurs, leaving the absolute gains 
and improved position relative to the origin community. 
 Exploring the evidence further, even though every single migrant sampled 
experiences post-migration absolute wage gains and improved position relative to the 
origin community, migrants are generally worse off post-migration relative to the US 
destination community than in the Mexican origin community pre-migration. Using the 
corresponding Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMA) from 2011 American Community 
Survey data as the relevant US destination community, the average HIUS migrant falls 8 
percentiles in the wage distribution to the 7th percentile. This average disguises a 
considerable range of outcomes, spread from gains of 11 percentiles to losses of 72 
                                                          
65 It is clearly possible that migrants may have hybrid reference groups, some mixture of both destination 
and origin communities, however I assume away this possibility in the following discussion for ease of 
exposition. 
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percentiles, associated with relative positions ranging from the 1st percentile to the 39th in 
the US PUMA wage distribution. With 86% of HIUS answers and 91% of HIMEX answers 
“yes,” option (2) can be eliminated as a general explanation; either absolute gains outweigh 
the relative losses (if reference groups are updated) or migrants overwhelmingly are not 
updating reference groups. However, it should be pointed out that even though worse 
relative position in the destination community does not appear to be a deciding factor, a 
larger fall in relative position may contribute to “no” answers, as a t-test for differences in 
changes in relative positioning is statistically significant at the 5% level when comparing 
the “yes” and “no” responders. Although both groups lose in relative position on average, 
the “no” responders fall an average of nearly 17 percentiles more than “yes” responders.66 
 Further insight is provided by examining how the answers relate to the size of wage 
gains and length of time since the migration occurred. Intuitively, one clearly expects 
subjective well-being (the probability of a “yes” answer) to be increasing in the size of 
absolute and/or relative wage gains. As far as the length of time, it is not clear whether a 
longer time at destination would translate into a higher or lower probability of higher 
subjective well-being; as migrants spend more time in the destination community, it is 
more likely that they update the reference group to the destination, giving a higher group 
of incomes with which to compare relative position, however the very fact that more time 
has been spent since migration could reflect a type of selection in the sense that only the 
most satisfied migrants remain in the destination community for longer periods of time.  
                                                          
66 These ideas provide avenues for future research, however further data is clearly required in order to reach 
definitive conclusions. 
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 Looking to the data, Table 3.4 summarizes a comparison of the three main measures 
of wage gains (without costs) between the migrants answering “yes” and those answering 
“no” in each sample. I report the difference in means (the means of “no” responders 
subtracted from the means of “yes” responders) and the standard deviation of wage 
differences, wage ratios, and percentile changes within the origin wage distributions, as 
well as the t-statistics, checking to verify if the two groups exhibit statistically significant 
differences in wage gains. While HIUS migrants certainly provide evidence in favor of the 
hypothesized positive association between wage gains and subjective well-being, with 
statistically significant positive differences in means at the 5% level for both wage 
differences and percentile changes, HIMEX does not signal the same. Differences in 
means, while not statistically significant, are actually negative for all three measures, with 
the unexpected result that migrants answering “no” experience more wage gains on average 
than the rest of the sample. On the other hand, the very reason for separating the HIMEX 
and HIUS samples in reporting results, the difference in geographic location of the 
interviews, may suggest a reason for the HIMEX negative differences in means. The 
HIMEX sample includes return migrants, who may have achieved relative success through 
migration and already reached a target goal allowing them to return to the place of origin. 
If this is indeed the case, some may be unduly influenced by this fact in answering the 
question as to subjective well-being, given that the return decision was previously made, 
thereby leading to “no” responders being among the most successful as far as gains from 
migration. 
Switching to net gains, the last row of each section in Table 3.4 reports the same statistics 
as those above, however using break-even hours ௖೔஽ೈ೔ as the relevant measure of gains from 
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migration. Similar to the wage gains (without costs) story, the HIUS sample supports the 
hypothesized relationship, showing that “yes” responders have a highly statistically 
significant lower amount of break-even hours, however the HIMEX sample shows no 
statistically significant differences, the difference in means being positive (“no” responders 
have fewer break-even hours than “yes” responders). Table 3.5 displays a similar 
comparison between the two groups for the length of time in the destination community 
(length of time since migration). As expected, these results are even more inconclusive, 
with neither sample providing statistically significant differences between “yes” and “no” 
responders. 
 Comparing with an established program of successful development 
 If we indeed accept migration as not an alternative to economic development, but 
rather a crucial component of development, it is inevitable to ask how the net gains from 
migration compare with those of other programs of economic development. In the context 
of Mexico, a program that has been deemed as one of the most successful is that of 
PROGRESA/Oportunidades. With no fewer than 30 countries now adopting and including 
conditional cash transfer programs such as PROGRESA/Oportunidades as part of social 
policy, it is no surprise to find a return of over 50 papers from a simple title search on 
“Progresa” at the online economics database at ideas.repec.org. Behrman et al. (2011) 
provides a follow-up to previous work analyzing the success of the program in Mexico, 
estimating the “long-run” costs and benefits to the program based on the return in terms of 
increased schooling due to program participation, as well as various assumed rates of return 
to schooling and discount rates. Given the lowest assumed discount rate of 3%, along with 
the highest assumed return to schooling at 10%, a 9-10 year-old boy starting six years of 
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PROGRESA/Oportunidades participation can expect $3557 in extra lifetime earnings due 
to the improved human capital.  
 While this amount certainly reflects successful outcomes for participants in 
PROGRESA/Oportunidades, how does it compare to the gains from migration? Even by 
stacking the deck against migration and employing the highest average break-even hours, 
531.68 of the HIUS sample, an astounding result obtains. Converting to P$, $3557 becomes 
P$5487, meaning that a Mexican migrant would have to work just over 1000 hours in the 
United States to match a lifetime of extra earnings from six years of participation in 
PROGRESA/Oportunidades. Adding this to the work required to recuperate the explicit 
cost of migration, and assuming a 40-hour workweek, 39 weeks of work in the US 
surpasses the lifetime net benefits of one of the most successful development programs on 
record.67 While I do not want to suggest a lack of importance of 
PROGRESA/Oportunidades or any other development program already in place, this stark 
comparison clearly emphasizes just how powerful a development tool migration has been 
and could potentially be in the future. 
 Observable characteristics and (net) gains 
 As a final examination of the survey data, I characterize the relationship between 
relevant observable traits of the migrant samples and the associated (net) gains of 
migration. In doing this, I focus on education, gender, time since migration, age at 
migration, and legal migration status, respectively, and the connection with my various 
                                                          
67 I assume that PROGRESA/Oportunidades entails no cost to the individual participant, intentionally 
ignoring societal costs in making this comparison. While PROGRESA/Oportunidades clearly has a cost of 
implementation, it is not clear whether further labor mobility would result in increased or decreased costs to 
society, due to the many effects on both origin and destination countries of migration. A full analysis of this 
question is beyond the scope of this paper, however provides a clear avenue for further research. 
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measures of (net) gains, i.e. ܦௐ௜, ܴ ௐ௜, and ௖೔஽ೈ೔. Further understanding of these relationships 
is important in attempting to identify if certain types of migrants are relatively more or less 
likely to enjoy larger gains from migration. While the literature tends to signal potential 
gains increasing in education, hypothesizing a relationship between education and gains is 
not straightforward across the varied measures. While it may be reasonable to expect this 
positive relationship to hold when using ܦௐ௜ as the measure of gains, it is also easy to 
imagine the opposite result if using ܴௐ௜, given the fact that individuals with lower 
education levels tend to have a lower initial wage before migration. Concerning the other 
observable traits of focus, I refrain from hypothesizing the correlations given similar 
confounding issues, however emphasize time since migration given a potential concern. In 
reporting the results of both HIMEX and HIUS samples, I group together individual 
migrants who have migrated over a considerable span of years. Even though all gains are 
reported using only wage immediately pre- and post-migration, if gains to migration are 
consistently increasing (decreasing) over time, it may be more reasonable for purposes of 
comparison to separate the samples further into subdivisions according to year of 
migration. 
 Table 3.6 details the simple correlations between the selected observable 
characteristics and the three varied measures of (net) gains for the HIUS sample. Without 
controlling for other potential determinants of gains, gains from migration are negatively 
associated with years of education, positively associated with years since migration, and 
positively associated with cost of migration, the proxy for legal status given the assumption 
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that migration without legal documents results in an increased ܿ௜.68 The relationship with 
age at migration is unclear, older age negatively associated with the wage difference, while 
pointing to larger gains using the wage ratio and break-even hours. A t-test separating men 
and women results in no statistically significant differences across all three measures of 
gains, men generally enjoying marginally larger gains relative to women. In addition to ܿ௜, 
I employ voluntarily-reported results on the payment to a coyote as an alternative proxy 
for legal status. This is not an exact measure of legal status because no explicit question as 
to legal status was included in the household survey, however many interviewees 
voluntarily offered information on the use of a coyote in answering the question on cost of 
migration. Furthermore, it is also possible that some migrants who cross the border illegally 
do not employ a coyote. Dividing the sample into those reporting the use of a coyote 
(irrespective of reported cost) and those who do not, a maximum t-statistic of 0.94 for t-
test on the three measures of gains signals a lack of statistically significant differences 
between the two groups. 
 The OLS regression results detailed in Table 3.7 provide an alternative perspective 
as to the relationship between the selected observable characteristics of migrants and their 
gains from migration. General positive (negative) associations reflect the correlations 
detailed in Table 3.6, however the estimates are plagued by a lack of statistical significance, 
only years since migration and education being statistically significant at the 10% level for 
ܦௐ௜ and ܴௐ௜, respectively. In summary, while being less educated, being male, and having 
migrated a longer time ago appear to be associated with larger gains from migration, the 
                                                          
68 The positive association with cost of migration is expected, as this association does not include net gains. 
This can be translated as higher wage gains needed to compensate the migrant for a higher migration cost. 
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evidence on specific determinants of these gains is rather inconclusive for the HIUS 
sample; nearly all estimates reflect statistical insignificance. 
 Conclusion 
 In answering the three central questions stated in the opening section of this paper, 
the results tell an overwhelmingly straightforward story. With minimum average wage 
ratios of 3.92 across all examined samples, migrants are experiencing large wage gains by 
crossing the Mexico-U.S. border. HIMEX and HIUS migrants gain an average of P$7.06 
and P$5.22 per hour worked, and enjoy average wage ratios of 5.24 and 5.56, respectively. 
Even given the explicit cost of migration that cuts into these wage gains, HIMEX and HIUS 
migrants need only an average of 362 and 521 hours of work in the U.S., respectively, 
before experiencing outright positive gains. 100% of the approximately 30% of HIMEX 
migrants starting below the Mexican poverty line make the jump out of poverty by 
relocating, even when measured by the more stringent U.S. measure of the poverty line; 
only 2 of the 60% of HIUS migrants moving away from poverty in Mexico remain 
impoverished by U.S. standards. It is indeed difficult or nearly impossible to find evidence 
of (or even imagine) a specific program of economic development with a success rate 
similar to that of migration found in this paper; what program can claim such success 
stories as pulling all impoverished individuals out of poverty (HIMEX) or increasing 
participants' incomes more than fivefold on average (HIMEX and HIUS)?  
 In addition to the absolute wage gains, migration also translates into large 
movements in migrants' relative positions within the origin wage distributions. Before 
migrating, the average HIMEX migrant resides at the 38th percentile of the origin wage 
distribution, moving to the 84th percentile immediately after migration; the average HIUS 
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migrant moves from the 15th to the 79th percentile. Upon migration, HIMEX migrants on 
average pass 52% of the population in the respective origin wage distribution, while HIUS 
migrants advance past an astounding average of 64% of the relevant reference population. 
Furthermore, while 70% of HIMEX migrants and 91% of HIUS migrants have pre-
migration wages below the corresponding median income, 100% and 34% rise to the very 
top of the origin wage distributions, jumping to the highest two deciles immediately after 
migration.  
 With these impressively large documented gains available to migrants willing and 
wanting to move across the border, especially as governments either seek to further limit 
international migration or discuss options for alternative immigration schemes around the 
world, further examination of the effects of these policies and complete understanding of 
the motivation for and determinants of migration is essential. In focusing on the economic 
development consequences of migration, the effect of migration on migrants themselves - 
perhaps the most important effect of all - must not be forgotten and pushed behind other 
themes such as effects on sending or receiving countries in the international migration and 
economic development research. Letouzé et al. (2009) states “...that migration is not an 
important contributor nor hindrance to development...best seen in terms of the expanded 
opportunities it offers individuals to carry out their life plans.” However, viewed through 
the lens of the shifted focus of development on people rather than places, migration not 
only expands opportunities, those very expanded opportunities contribute greatly to what 
the definition of economic development should be all about. 
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Table 3.1. Summary statistics of migrant samples 
Indicator   Mean  Median Std. dev. Min./max. 
HIMEX (݊ ൌ 128)  
Pre-migration wage (P$/hr.) 1.87  1.79  0.69  0.84/5.77 
Post-migration wage (P$/hr.) 8.93  7.83  3.12  5.92/24.23 
Age at interview  38.02  37  10.23  21/75 
Gender (m ൌ 1, f ൌ 2) 1.28  1  0.45  1/2 
Years of schooling  8.80  8  2.75  3/16 
Years since migration  11.89  12  6.61  1/44 
Remittances (monthly P$) 181.25  200  171.95  0/1000 
HIUS (݊ ൌ 69)  
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Pre-migration wage (P$/hr.) 1.75  1.49  1.25  0.25/8.57 
Post-migration wage (P$/hr.) 6.96  6.73  1.37  4.14/14.04 
Age at interview  40.44  39  13.55  18/76 
Gender (m ൌ 1, f ൌ 2) 1.48  1  0.50  1/2 
Years of schooling  6.65  6  3.67  0/14 
Years since migration  16.77  14  9.31  1/45 
Remittances (monthly P$) 102.20  100  82.83  0/300 
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Table 3.2. Migrant wage gains 
   Pre-migration wage Post-migration wage       Wage difference          Wage ratio 
 Average     Median Average       Median Average  Median   Std. dev   Average   Median   Std. dev. 
HIMEX 1.87 1.79 8.93 7.83 7.06 5.87        1.21         5.24         4.50       4.01 
HIUS 1.75            1.49          6.96              6.95                 5.22         5.15        3.03          5.56          4.29        2.36 
EMIF 
2009 full 2.44 2.12        10.12            9.36    7.68        7.12        4.08          5.29          4.68        3.13 
 ൏ 12 months 2.55             2.11          9.69              8.67                7.14         6.73        4.16         4.69          4.10        2.68 
2008 full 2.99 2.32         10.62 9.36  7.62         6.92       5.40         4.73         3.99       3.12    
 ൏ 12 months  3.63 2.61         10.05           9.10                 6.42         6.58        3.94         3.92          3.59        2.12 
2007 full 2.91 2.20         10.34           9.00                7.43         6.56       5.26         4.87         4.13        3.47 
 ൏ 12 months   3.55             2.44          10.36            8.64                6.82          6.25        4.78         4.21       3.69        2.55  
2006 full 3.09             2.23         10.06           8.96                6.97          6.45        5.22         4.75          4.03        3.70 
 ൏ 12 months   3.30           2.27         10.06            8.96                 6.76         5.95        6.26         4.56          3.74        3.91 
2005 full 2.92             2.35         10.03            9.20                7.10         6.44        5.07         4.84         3.85        3.57 
 ൏ 12 months 3.06            2.39         10.08            8.63                 7.01          6.33        5.29         4.55          3.74        3.52 
2004 full 2.76            2.07         9.68             8.93                6.92         6.26        4.55         4.83         4.05        3.15 
 ൏ 12 months   2.78            2.07         9.39              8.33                 6.61          6.08        4.82          4.54          3.74        2.94 
2003 full 2.90            2.24         9.10              8.54                6.20         6.00       4.38         4.65         3.92        3.42 
 ൏ 12 months 3.04 2.32         8.91              8.24                 5.87          5.69        4.12         4.22          3.64        3.23 
2002 full 2.81            2.12         9.16              8.75                6.35         6.17       4.28         4.85         3.93        3.57 
 ൏ 12 months 2.98             2.12          8.86             8.52                 5.89          5.91        4.11         4.56         3.93        3.34 
2001 full 2.67 1.98          9.18              7.94                6.51          6.18       4.77        5.14         4.54        3.67 
 ൏ 12 months 2.66             2.01          9.01              7.83                 6.36          5.94        4.81         4.73          4.21        3.11 
2000 full 2.42            1.79          8.81              7.86                6.39         6.17        3.71        5.27         4.65        3.30                 
 ൏ 12 months 2.48             1.79          8.66              7.86                 6.19          6.12        3.50        5.00         4.50        3.05 
1999 full 2.56            1.80          9.13              8.10                6.57         6.07       5.06        5.29         4.50        3.52 
 ൏ 12 months 2.50             1.80          8.97              8.10                 6.47          6.00        4.83        5.22          4.43        3.53 
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Table 3.3. Break-even hours 
         Mean       Std. dev.  Median Min./max. 
HIMEX 
Break-even hours ቀ ௖೔஽ೈ೔ቁ    362.40  194.43  341.11  36.50/1104.62 
HIUS 
Break-even hours ቀ ௖೔஽ೈ೔ቁ 531.68  325.58  455.44  39.50/2017.49 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4. Wage gains and subjective well-being 
    Mean  Std. dev.  T-stat   
HIMEX 
Wage difference  -0.71  1.01   -0.71  
Wage ratio   -1.37  0.77   -1.77 
Percentile change (origin) -10.11  6.76   -1.49 
Break-even hours  81.89  64.99   1.26 
HIUS 
Wage difference  1.09  0.42   2.60  
Wage ratio   1.92  1.44   1.34 
Percentile change (origin) 17.82  6.32   2.82 
Break-even hours  -354.40 125.66   -2.82 
 
Notes: Mean reports the difference in means between the respective values of “yes” responders minus those 
of “no” responders, while std. dev. is the associated standard deviation. T-stat signals the statistical 
significance of the differences across the two groups, an absolute value greater than 1.96 being statistically 
significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
Table 3.5. Length of time since migration and subjective well-being 
     Mean  Std. dev.  T-stat   
HIMEX 
Length of time since migration -0.74  2.17   -0.34 
HIUS 
Length of time since migration 0.98  3.37   0.29 
 
Notes: Mean reports the difference in means between the respective values of “yes” responders minus those 
of “no” responders, while std. dev. is the associated standard deviation. T-stat signals the statistical 
significance of the differences across the two groups, an absolute value greater than 1.96 being statistically 
significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 3.6. Simple correlations: observable characteristics and gains from migration 
  Years of education Years since migration      Age at migration   ܿ௜ 
ܦௐ௜  -0.16   0.47        -0.02   0.18 ܴௐ௜  -0.39   0.07        0.22   0.12 
ቀ ௖೔஽ೈ೔ቁ  0.06   -0.24        -0.01   --- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.7. OLS regression results 
Dependent variable:        ܦௐ௜           ܴௐ௜           ܿ௜ 
Covariates  Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error 
Education  -0.03  0.05  -0.47** 0.20  -0.37  16.76 
Gender  -0.21  0.28  0.32  1.12  12.50  94.75 
Years since migration 0.05*** 0.02  -0.00  0.06  -8.88  5.31 
Age at migration -0.00  0.02  0.01  0.07  -0.96  5.97 
Cost   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  ---  --- 
Constant  4.78*** 0.90  6.93*  3.66  631.95** 296.35 
ܴଶ   0.27  ---  0.17  ---  0.06  --- 
 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 3.1. HIMEX wages before and after migration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. HIMEX wage gains from migration 
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Figure 3.3. HIMEX wage ratios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. HIUS wages before and after migration 
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Figure 3.5. HIUS wage gains from migration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6. HIUS wage ratios 
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Figure 3.7. EMIF wages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8. EMIF wage ratios 
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Figure 3.9. HIMEX wages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10. HIMEX in Census distribution 
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Figure 3.11. HIUS in Census distribution 
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